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Abstract
Labour mobility is a means by which to allocate human resources 
efficiently. The movement of labour into areas or states where it can 
increase individual worth, benefits the aggregate economy. This thesis 
is an empirical investigation of five aspects of labour mobility in 
Britain. A recurring theme of this study is the interaction between 
unemployment and mobility. We utilise information from the British 
Labour Force Surveys as the basis for our study. Specifically we 
examine:
1) The impact of unemployment on the inter-regional mobility of labour. 
We find that unemployment experience, and not regional differentials, 
increase the likelihood of migration. Further the regional allocation 
process functions less effectively at higher levels of aggregate 
unemployment.
2) The job search behaviour of employed workers. We show how worker 
satisfaction, as principally captured by length of job tenure, plays the 
largest role in the decision to seek work. The type of search strategy 
undertaken is partly dependent on the level of local labour demand.
3) The influence of unemployment benefit on job search effort. We 
demonstrate how benefit receipients search more extensively than others. 
Benefit claimants have a higher probability of locating a job offer.
4) Labour market transitions. Utilising a specially constructed dataset, 
we estimate annual probabilities of movement between employment, 
unemployment and inactivity. Worker heterogeneity is shown to explain 
the majority of these transitions.
5) Inter-firm mobility. Job-shopping by workers is an essential 
pre-requisite for eventual long-term, productive job matches. High 
levels of unemployment are shown to impede the job-shopping process.
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Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis are revised versions of articles 
co-written with my supervisor, Chris Pissarides. Chapter 2 is based upon 
'Unemployment and the Inter-regional Mobility of Labour' published in 
The Economic Journal, September 1989. Chapter 3 appeared as 'On-the-Job 
Search: Some Empirical Evidence', Centre for Labour Economics Discussion 
Paper no. 317. In addition an earlier version of chapter 4 was published 
as 'Unemployment Benefits and Search Effort in the U.K. Labour Market', 
Centre for Labour Economics Discussion Paper no. 333.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Overview
Labour mobility promotes the efficient allocation of human 
resources. If labour is able to increase its personal worth and 
productivity by a change of circumstance, then this will also enhance 
and facilitate growth in the aggregate economy. Mobility is undertaken 
as the result of individual optimising investment decisions. Over time, 
individuals continuously receive, update and process information which 
determines the relative costs and returns to movement. The aim of this 
thesis is two-fold. Firstly, we seek to investigate empirically aspects 
of labour mobility in Britain. Secondly, we seek to assess how 
differential levels of unemployment might affect observed mobility 
behaviour. We address this possible interaction against the background 
of the rise in aggregate unemployment that occured during the early 
eighties.
Throughout this study we shall be concerned with three possible 
channels by which unemployment could effect individual expected returns 
and subsequent mobility behaviour. Firstly, an individual’s experience 
of the unemployed state may be sufficient to engender a divergence in 
the costs and returns to movement when compared with other groups. 
Differential access to informational outlets and flows could directly 
influence the probability of change. Secondly, regional unemployment 
differentials, which widened during the early eighties in Britain, may 
produce relative differences in opportunity across the country and so 
influence individual behaviour directly. Thirdly, the rise in aggregate 
unemployment could itself exert independent pressure on movement.
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Workers may act differently during periods of low and high unemployment.
We proceed with our analysis within this general framework. 
Specifically we investigate: a) the extent of inter-regional mobility in 
Britain and the likely effects of unemployment thereon, b) the job 
search activities and strategies of employed workers and their 
dependence on local economic conditions, c) a comparison of the job 
search efforts of unemployed benefit receipients and non-receipients in 
an attempt to determine which group search more extensively, d) labour 
market transitions over the period 1983-84 and e) inter-firm mobility 
and the potential for unemployment influences. We discuss these issues 
more fully in section 1.3.
1.2 Data sources
We are primarily concerned with an analysis of individual mobility 
behaviour. We therefore utilise the largest and most comprehensive 
micro-data source available in Britain, namely the Labour Force Survey 
(LFS). The LFS is a random sample of around 0.5 per cent of private U.K. 
households. Begun as part of a European Community requirement in 1973, 
the LFS contains detailed labour market information on approximately 
60,000 households. To a certain extent the hypotheses addressed in the 
following chapters are determined by the extent of information contained 
in the LFS. Though conducted bi-annually until 1983 and annually 
thereafter, this study draws principally on the 1977, 1983 and 1984
surveys, largely because these were readily available when this 
investigation began. A comparison between the former and latter two 
surveys does however serve as a contrast of labour market behaviour in 
periods of low and high unemployment respectively.
The LFS suffers from a degree of definitional inconsistency across
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the years. Owing to the experimental nature of the survey during the 
seventies and early eighties, both content and definitions tend to vary 
somewhat. For example, the LFS classification of unemployment changed in 
every year until 1984. We have endeavoured to compensate for these 
inconsistencies wherever possible and have indicated in the text where 
survey differences may have influenced the outcome.
One major flaw in the LFS is the omission of any information 
concerning personal earnings or wealth. The designers of the LFS believe 
that the inclusion of questions seeking to ascertain earnings would be 
to the detriment of the other detailed labour market information. Yet 
since much of our foregoing analysis on mobility is often dependent on a 
monetary evaluation of the returns from particular labour market states, 
we have deemed it necessary to proxy earnings, or earnings potential, as 
best as possible. We therefore use regional, occupational and industrial 
LFS information to match individuals with wage data published in the 
annual U.K. New Earnings Survey. A similar technique is applied to match 
in additional external data which reflect economic conditions in the 
individual's local labour market. We obtain the relevant regional 
unemployment variable in this manner.
Finally, chapters 5 and 6 of this study utilise information from a 
longitudinal dataset specially constructed from the 1983 and 1984 LFS. 
Labour mobility is above all a dynamic phenomenon. Individuals react to 
changing circumstances over time. The standard LFS contains some dynamic 
information. Every year individuals are questioned as to the duration of 
their current state spell. In addition, a series of retrospective 
questions are proffered seeking to ascertain the respondents 
circumstances one year earlier. This information is sufficient for our 
purposes in chapters 2, 3 and 4. The retrospective data forms the
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dependent variable in the regressions of chapter 2 and information on 
current state spell duration enters the vector of explanatory variables 
in chapters 2, 3 and 4.
Chapters 5 and 6 however are concerned with the effect of past
actions in determining current status and mobility behaviour. The extent 
of retrospective LFS data is too limited to analyse these issues 
effectively. We have therefore found it necessary to construct a two 
period longitudinal dataset from the 1983 and 1984 surveys. By 
exploiting the 30 per cent sample overlap between successive surveys, as 
required under European Community directives, it has been possible to 
match the personal characteristics of over 7,000 individuals interviewed 
in both years. This has produced a dataset rich in detailed labour
market information. We proceed to analyse how an individual's situation 
as observed in 1983 will influence the labour market status observed in 
1984. Chapter 5 provides details of the construction of the dataset.
1.3 Unemployment and Mobility
Our adopted approach throughout much of this thesis utilises 
supply-side economic concepts. This stems from the nature of the LFS 
which concentrates exclusively upon the labour market activities of 
individuals. Consequently we have adopted economic theories which are 
primarily concerned with worker behaviour and movement, rather than the 
actions of firms. Search theoretic considerations therefore feature 
strongly in this study which owe much to the seminal works of Stigler 
(1962) and Sjaastad (1962). Individuals therefore undertake mobility 
decisions in an uncertain environment, on the basis of an evaluation of
the expected returns from their actions.
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1.3.1 Inter-regional Migration
In chapter 2 we attempt to assess the relation between unemployment 
and the inter-regional movement of labour. We therefore examine the 
ability of migration to act as an equilibriating force in Britain in 
response to unemployment differentials. We suggest three potential 
levels at which unemployment may influence mobility. Firstly, the 
unemployed are more likely to move than the employed. The cost of the 
former's mobility is lower and the potential rewards greater. Secondly, 
regional unemployment differentials may encourage mobility. Regions with 
above average unemployment offer below average probabilities of job 
placement and this can deter in-migration. Thirdly, at higher aggregate 
unemployment rates, the likelihood of migration should be lower. High 
levels of unemployment reduce the potential for gain everywhere.
We compare estimated migration probabilities using LFS data from two 
periods of differential aggregate levels of unemployment, 1976-77 and
1983-84. On the basis of our results we conclude that:
a) Unemployment experience does increase the likelihood of migration.
b) There is only a weak relationship between mobility and regional 
unemployment differentials, once we control for the propensity to 
experience the unemployed state.
c) High aggregate unemployment discourages mobility. Estimated 
migration probabilities are shown to decline during periods of 
rising unemployment.
These results indicate that the regional allocation process functions 
less effectively during periods of depressed demand.
1.3.2 On-the-Job Search
In order to undertake movement, workers must have previously engaged
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in some form of job search. Chapter 3 examines the search activities of 
those workers who choose to search whilst employed. On-the-job search is 
an important area to study, since empirical evidence suggests that 
around half of all vacancies are filled from the stock of employed 
workers. Job to job changes account for around two thirds of all 
voluntary employment separations. We seek to identify the type of worker 
most likely to search on the job rather than not search or quit into 
search unemployment. We then analyse the methods of job search used by 
that subset of workers who choose on-the-job search.
Economic theory indicates that the first question, the likelihood of 
on-the-job search, is the product of the probabilities of undertaking 
search and the decision not to quit given search takes place. This 
introduces a degree of ambiguity into the theoretical analysis, since 
there are often competing influences on the explanatory variables from 
the underlying probability structure. Job search should be dependent on 
worker satisfaction and the potential gains from investing in search. We 
capture the former in a vector of individual and firm-specific 
characteristics and the latter in a vector of variables representing 
local economic conditions.
Having taken a decision to search, the worker then chooses the 
appropriate search stategy. This should maximise the probability of 
receiving an acceptable wage offer and is dependent on personal 
characteristics and the prevailing economic climate. We identify three 
main strategies. Random search involves direct approaches to potential 
employers. Indirect search invokes the use of employment agencies as 
intermediaries in the search for jobs. Self directed search locates job 
offers through the media or with the help of personal contacts.
Using 1984 LFS data we find that local economic conditions and
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inter-industry wage differentials are positively correlated with 
on-the-job search. The strongest influence is however worker 
satisfaction and alternative worth as captured by job tenure. The
aquisition of firm-specific capital reduces the gain to search. Job
search strategies are shown to be dependent on search duration and
economic activity. The most commonly adopted approach whilst employed, 
is self-directed search. Employed job seekers concentrate search efforts 
in their attempt to locate acceptable job offers.
1.3.3 Unemployment Benefits and Job Search
Chapter 4 examines the role of unemployment benefits in facilitating 
mobility. Benefits should raise the efficiency of the labour market if 
recipients use the additional income to finance job search activities 
rather than leisure. The probability of gaining employment is the 
product of the likelihood of receiving an offer and the probability that 
it is acceptable. Empirical work of the effect of benefits on
unemployment outflow has concentrated upon the potential for these 
transfer payments to increase worker choosiness. Little attention has 
been devoted to the possible causality between benefits and job search 
effort. If the receipt of unemployment benefit induces workers to search 
harder, then this could nullify any reservation wage effect of benefits 
on unemployment duration. Chapter 4 attempts to address this problem.
Using 1984 LFS data we compare the search efforts of claimant and 
non-claimant as measured by the number of search methods used by 
unemployed workers to locate employment. Having first dealt with a 
potential selectivity problem regarding differential labour market 
attachment of the two goups, we find that benefit receipients search 
more extensively than non-receipients. We conclude that studies of
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unemployment duration should incorporate an explicit allowance of this 
effect when seeking to establish a link between benefit provision and 
unemployment outflows.
1.3.4 Labour Market Transitions
Dynamic worker behaviour determines the stocks of unemployed, 
employed and the inactive. Current job search decisions affect future 
mobility. Chapter 5 examines this decision process by following the 
movement of workers across labour force states. This is achieved by 
construction of a dataset which matches individuals observed in two 
consecutive years of the LFS. This enables us to adopt a Markovian 
framework with which to analyse labour market transitions. We model the 
probability that an individual is observed in either employment, 
unemployment or inactivity in 1984, as a function of the state occupied 
in 1983. We estimate both gross and individual flows. The individual 
flows are based upon a reduced form approach that allows us to proxy the 
origin state by a vector of individual and state-specific 
characteristics.
The gross flow data contrasts the labour market experiences of prime 
age males with the rest of the population. We show that unemployment 
amongst prime age men is caused principally by employment separations 
and problems regaining work once lost. Teenage and much female 
unemployment is caused by an inability to find work on labour force 
entry. Whilst our results are subject to several caveats, notably a 
potential selectivity problem and identification difficulties that arise 
when estimating annual rather than instantaneous transitions, we find 
that heterogeneity dominates the individual transition estimates.
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Differences in personal characteristics and environment explain the 
majority of unemployment and participatory flows. We find no strong 
evidence of any duration effects. In contrast, employment outflows are 
strongly dependent on the length of state spell. This is shown to be 
consistent with job-matching and firm-specific theories of turnover.
1.3.5 Inter-firm Mobility
Our final investigation concentrates on the movement of workers 
across firms. Over the course of a year, job-to-job movements comprise 
the majority of employment separations. We view these changes as an 
endeavour by workers (and firms) to move into long-term productive job 
matches. The longer a continuous spell of employment, the more valuable 
that match becomes and the less attractive alternative offers. Only by 
engaging in job shopping, can workers identify and move into "good 
jobs". Chapter 6 utilises LFS data to assess the extent of inter-firm 
mobility in Britain.
We present an outline of employee turnover over time, by industry 
and by occupation. The existence of long-term employment in Britain is 
calculated from 1983 data by calculating a series of eventual tenures. 
We estimate predicted tenure by extrapolating information on current 
incomplete employment durations. We estimate the likelihood of 
inter-firm mobility using the matched LFS dataset. This enables us to 
model a 1984 employment separation as a function of the firm-specific 
and environmental characteristics of the origin workplace.
We proceed to demonstrate the existence of a strong negative 
relationship between mobility and job tenure. This we argue is 
indicative of the strength of firm-specific capital cosiderations in
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determining mobility. Long term employment relationships are shown to be 
a common feature of the British labour market. This stability is however 
only achieved by extensive job shopping early in a worker's career. This 
allocation process is adversely affected by high levels of unemployment. 
The mobility of workers living in high unemployment districts is reduced 
at all tenure levels.
Chapter 6 ends with an observation that runs throughout this thesis. 
We are therefore led to conclude in chapter 7 that the potential for 
labour mobility to act as an efficiency enhancing mechanism is reduced 
at high levels of unemployment.
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Chapter 2: Unemployment and the Inter-Regional Mobility of Labour
2.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the relation between unemployment and the 
inter-regional mobilty of labour in Great Britain. In doing so we seek 
to assess the ability of migration to act as an equilibriating force in 
a dynamic economy, as envisaged nearly thirty years ago by Sjaastad 
(1962). We argue that unemployment might affect mobility at three 
levels. First, the status of a worker affects mobility: an unemployed 
worker is more likely to move than an employed one. Second, regional 
unemployment differentials encourage mobility: the probability that a
given worker migrates is higher if the worker lives in a high 
unemployment region, and the larger the region's unemployment 
differential the higher the migration probability. Third, at higher 
overall unemployment rates the probability of migration is less.
The recognition of a link between unemployment and the 
inter-regional movement of labour is not new. Over one hundred years 
ago, Ravenstein (1885) documented the movement of individuals from the 
countryside into the major towns of Britain, which were said to offer 
more widespread opportunities for employment. Hicks (1932) commented 
that the main causes of migration were net economic disadvantages. 
Indeed any analysis of net inter-regional migration in Britain will 
reveal a tendancy for labour to move away from areas of high 
unemployment (see Armstrong and Taylor (1985) for example). Yet 
empirical verification of this process remains scarce. In his review 
article, Greenwood (1975) was moved to commment that one of the most
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perplexing problems still confronting migration scholars was the lack of 
local unemployment rates in explaining migration.
One possible explanation is that previous applied work had relied 
upon highly aggregative data. This was often for want of an alternative. 
Hart (1970) using UK data, provides an early example of this type of 
approach and inconclusive outcome. Examination of net migration data 
obscures the observation that large numbers of workers simultaneously 
migrate to areas of depressed demand. For example, in the period 
1983-84, 48,000 individuals left the Northern region of England, a
traditional area of high unemployment. Yet there was a contemporaneous 
inflow into the region of 41,000. It is therefore conceivable that these 
contrasting movements of labour could render regional unemployment rates 
insignificant in any regression of net migration. A further explanation 
is given by Creedy (1974), who advances the idea of a differential 
response to local economic conditions by the employed and unemployed. He 
argues that the employed are more interested in regional income 
disparities, whilst the unemployed concentrate upon the relative chances 
of finding a job. Given that the former are in the majority this could 
be sufficient to return an insignificant unemployment coefficient in any 
net migration regression. This argument applies equally to studies of 
gross migration.
The advent of large, household survey datasets enabled empirical 
verification of these hypotheses to be undertaken. The first such
examination was carried out by DaVanzo (1978) for the US, using
cross-sectional evidence of gross migration behaviour from the Panel
Survey of Income Dynamics. This study also gave the first empirical 
support to the additional idea that experience of the state of
unemployment is a prime motivating force in the decision to migrate,
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irrespective of the origin unemployment rate — something that would be 
impossible to ascertain using aggregate data. Schlottmann and Herzog 
(1981) pursued a similar applied approach in showing that controlling 
for labour force status affected the estimated coeffficients of other 
migratory determinants, particularly age and education which proxy the 
stock of human capital and are therefore highly correlated with the 
likelihood of being unemployed.
The most relevant UK empirical studies which utilise gross data are 
the series of papers by Hughes and McCormick (1981,1985a,1987). Whilst 
primarily concerned with the housing market and migration and with 
recourse to a dataset that records only migration intentions, the 
authors present results which suggest that the unemployed are more 
likely to consider migration. The notable finding of these studies — 
that council tenants are less likely to migrate — also has direct 
implications for any analysis of the unemployment-migration 
relationship, because of the proven positive correlation between local 
authority housing and unemployment (see Nickell (1980) for example).
Interestingly Hughes and McCormick (1981) contained a migration 
equation with a negative coefficient for the origin unemployment rate. 
This, together with two contemporaneous UK time series studies, suggests 
a third potential channel by which unemployment could influence 
migration — at the aggregate level. Articles by Pissarides and McMaster 
(1984) and Gordon (1985a) advanced the notion of a pro-cyclical response 
of mobility to economic conditions. The former show that migration 
responds positively to relative rather than absoulte regional 
unemployment differentials. Gordon (1985b) has shown that when aggregate 
unemployment rises, so relative unemployment in low (high) unemployment 
regions rises (falls)l. The implications for Pissarides and McMaster's
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findings are that net in-migration to low unemployment regions will 
fall in bad times. Likewise net out-migration from high unemployment 
regions. Gordon (1985a) recognised that the level of economic activity 
would influence the probability of receiving and accepting job offers in 
different regions which in turn determine the migration probability. 
Evidence of a negative coefficient on the national unemployment rate is 
produced, which supports the idea that the ability of migration to act 
as an equilibriating mechanism is limited during a recession.
Thus in order to effectively assess the impact of unemployment, this 
chapter endeavours to draw together the disparate strands of the 
migration literature in order to produce a comprehensive empirical 
evaluation of the effect of unemployment on the inter-regional mobility 
of labour in Britain. We utilise gross migration data taken from the 
United Kingdom Labour Force Survey (LFS) in attempting to assess the 
impact of a) unemployment experience, b) regional differentials and c) 
aggregate unemployment. The first and second effects are derived from 
individual logistic regression probabilities estimated using data from a 
single LFS. We do this with reference to the 1984 survey. The third 
effect, however, cannot be estimated by using data from a single year, 
so we estimate the same regression for a second year with different 
aggregate unemployment, 1977, and compare the results.
In the next section we explain the role of unemployment in the 
context of a simple human capital model of mobility. Section 2.3 
describes the data used for our study. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 report the 
results of estimating migration probabilities in 1983-84 and 1976-77, 
including the effects of personal characteristics and other economic 
variables. In section 2.6 we use the estimates to calculate predicted 
migration probabilities for various household types. These
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probabilities, which give the best numerical summary of our results, are 
reported in Table 2.7. Our conclusions regarding the three effects of 
unemployment on mobility are summarised in section 2.7.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
In order to assess the response of migration to unemployment, we 
draw on aspects of human capital and expected income models of mobility 
embedded respectively in the works of Sjaastad (1962) and Harris and 
Todaro (1969). We model the probability of individual migration as a 
function of personal characteristics and market variables. Personal 
characteristics influence the migration decision mainly through the 
subjective cost of movement and the influence of market variables 
determines the net return to migration. However, because our data 
sources do not contain information on individual (or household) 
earnings, personal characteristics may also influence the migration 
decision through their effect on potential earnings. We have no means 
of distinguishing between the two effects in our regressions.
According to the human capital framework, labour will move if the 
net returns from so doing exceed the subjective cost of movement. The 
cost of movement depends on a number of observable characteristics 
(family circumstances, labour market status, etc) and on some 
unobservable ones. By assuming that the unobservable characteristics 
are randomly Weibull distributed across the population we can write the 
probability of migration as a logistic function of a vector of observed 
personal characteristics and market variables. We do not develop the 
model in detail, because it is familiar from several similar studies, 
notably Hughes and McCormick (1981,1985a) for Britain and DaVanzo (1978)
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for the U S . We list briefly instead the main arguments for the three 
effects of unemployment that we focus on. As far as we know, none of 
the earlier studies has explored the three effects together by making 
use of a micro data source.
Firstly, unemployed workers are more likely to move than employed 
workers because the cost of movement for them is less. Unemployed 
workers give up unemployment-related benefits in the region of 
residence. Most of these can be claimed in the region of destination, 
if the migrant is still unemployed. Employed migrants must be 
compensated for a job that they give up in the region of origin, which 
is necessarily more valuable than any unemployment-related benefits 
given up by unemployed migrants. The opportunity costs of unemployed 
migration are correspondingly lower.
Against this, we note two other effects pertaining to unemployment 
status that could work in the opposite direction. The first is that 
unemployed workers may have less access to the capital market than 
employed workers do and this may impede movement. If workers do not 
hold much liquid wealth other than their income, the marginal cost of 
moving is higher for the unemployed than for the employed. The 
interaction between the housing market and access to the capital market 
could also play a decisive role in the migration decision. The second 
effect is that employed workers may have better access to job 
information networks in other regions, especially if their own firm has 
establishments in several locations. Thus, within-firm mobility may 
offset to some extent the stronger relative effect of unemployment 
status on mobility.
Which effect dominates in practice is an empirical question. Our 
working hypothesis is that unemployment will increase the likelihood of
-26-
migration when we control for other personal characteristics.
The second effect of unemployment on migration operates through 
regional unemployment differentials. Regions with above-average 
unemployment should be losing population to other regions, even after we 
control for the effect of unemployment on those who suffer it. This 
effect, which may admittedly be weak having controlled for the effect of 
unemployment status, operates mainly through the probability of finding 
a job. Regions with above-average unemployment generally have 
below-average probabilities of job placement. Other things equal, this 
makes the high unemployment region less attractive than otherwise 
similar regions, especially for the unemployed. Regional unemployment 
differentials could potentially offset any inducement to migration 
offered by regional wage relativities, or indeed the reverse may be true
2. The employed, however, may perceive a sufficiently high re-employment 
probability in the event of any future job loss, which could limit the 
effect of the regional unemployment differential on their migration 
decision. LFS evidence suggests that between 45 and 75 per cent of 
employees in our sample remain with their original firms after migration
3. We explicitly test for a differential response to local economic 
indicators in section 2.5.
In our regressions we endeavour to capture the effect of 
differential job finding probabilities with three variables. These are 
the difference between the unemployment rates in the region of origin 
and the nation as a whole, the region's relative vacancy rate and a 
variable that measures the cost of the higher unemployment in the region 
of origin. The last variable is the product of the region's 
unemployment differential and the difference between the relative 
occupational wage of the individual and the replacement ratio. Thus, if
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an occupation's wage is only slightly above the level of unemployment 
benefit, the cost of higher unemployment to the worker is less than if 
the wage were a good deal above the benefit level. The effect of 
unemployment differentials on migration should depend, in general, on 
the cost of unemployment to the worker.
Finally, we argue that at higher aggregate levels of unemployment 
migration propensities are reduced. This should be especially true for 
unemployed migrants, though it is also likely to be true for employed 
migrants.
At times of high unemployment, jobs are more valuable to those who 
have them. New jobs are more scarce and the job security associated 
with them is not in general as good as the job security afforded by 
existing jobs. Employed workers have more to lose if they give up an 
established post at times of high unemployment than at times of low 
unemployment, when their market power is higher. The more risk averse 
the individual, the stronger the effect. It is known that job quitting 
is much less at times of high unemployment (see Nickell (1982)) and 
migration by the employed is also likely to be lower.
Unemployed workers are also less likely to move at times of high
unemployment, for several reasons. When unemployment is high, the
unemployed expect to spend a longer time in unemployment, wherever they
are. Thus, any gain in expected income, anticipated after a move, is
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partially mitigated, as expected employment probabilities fall.
The capital market constraints facing the unemployed are likely to 
be more severe at times of high unemployment. This is again related to 
the fact that re-employment probabilities are lower when overall 
unemployment is higher, so the unemployed workers' earning potential 
suffers. As expected re-employment is pushed further into the future,
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the unemployed expect to run down more assets and re-enter a job with 
less overall wealth. As a result, they are likely to become more 
thrifty during unemployment. One obvious economy is staying put in 
their place of residence, avoiding the necessary relocation expenses of 
a move. Any existing benefits, like subsidised housing, could become 
more valuable at the margin under these conditions, and those of the 
unemployed who enjoy them may be less keen to risk losing them by moving 
region.
The first two effects of unemployment on mobility, through own 
status and regional differentials, can be estimated from a single data 
source. But because aggregate unemployment (and the replacement ratio) 
are the same for each region, we cannot estimate their effects from a 
single source. Ideally we require a panel but as we do not have one, we 
follow the next-best procedure We estimate the same regression for
the probability of moving in two years of different aggregate 
unemployment rates, 1976 and 1983, and compare the results. The average 
replacement ratio in 1976 was 41 per cent and in 1983 it was 42 per 
cent, so it would not be reasonable to attribute any of the observed 
changes in migration behaviour to it.
In addition to unemployment and vacancies, we use one other regional 
economic variable in our regressions, the relative wage in the region of 
origin. Workers living in regions with high relative wages in their 
occupation are more likely to remain, even if unemployed, so 
out-migration from the region is likely to be less. We also 
experimented with the relative wage of each region with respect to 
London and the South East, because of the dominant role of this region 
in the economic life of the country, but the results were not 
sufficiently different to warrant separate reporting.
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2.3 Data and Estimation
Most of the data used in our study come from the United Kingdom 
Labour Force Surveys (LFS) and relate to migration in the periods 
1976-77 and 1983-84. The LFS is a random sample of approximately 0.5 per 
cent of all residential households. Detailed information is available 
on an individual’s regional and socio-economic circumstances both 
current and one year prior to sampling. Estimation is by logistic 
regression. Hence the individual annual probability of migration from 
region k is given by
Pik
1 + exp[- (0Xik + YZk)]
where Xi is a vector of personal characteristics and Zk is a vector 
of regional specific variables. We restrict our sample to household 
heads. Mincer (1978) argues that the decision to migrate is based on a 
consideration of a variety of household attributes, for example wifes' 
labour force status, or presence of dependent children. Yet the prime 
motivator in any decision to move remains the household head for whom 
any relationship between unemployment and subsequent mobility is likely 
to be the more direct 5. Similarly, in order to concentrate upon 
economically motivated mobility, our sample contains only those workers 
who were observed in the labour force in both reference years of the 
respective surveys and who belonged to the population of working 
age.
The data governs our definition of mobility, where now an individual 
is deemed to have migrated, if his region of residence (one of the 10
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standard regions in Great Britain) differs from that of one year ago. 
The dependent variable takes the value one if migration occurs and zero 
otherwise. We ignore the region of destination, so implicitly we are 
treating the rest of Great Britain as the single destination of all 
migrants from a given region. Migration to and from Northern Ireland 
and abroad is also ignored. It may be argued that migration is a 
two-step process, incorporating both an initial decision as to whether 
to migrate or not and a subsequent choice as to the region of 
destination. Molho (1987) provides an interesting attempt to model the 
second stage of the process using discriminant analysis. Here we 
concentrate on the initial migration decision which readily lends itself 
to the binary framework imposed by logistic regression.
The economic variables used in our study, reflecting a region's 
economic well-being, come from different sources. Since we cannot 
disaggregate below the ten standard regions the economic variables are 
not entirely perfect measures of local labour demand* which is perhaps 
best defined within the travel to work area Following Hughes and 
McCormick (1985a), who highlighted the distinction between blue and 
white collar workers which characterises British mobility, we 
disaggregate the economic variables as far as possible by occupational 
status. This is to take account of the fact that the labour market 
conditions facing manual and non-manual workers are different and that 
unemployment for manual workers deteriorated by much more between 1976 
and 1983 than unemployment for non-manual workers. Our estimates 
indicate that the male unemployment rate rose from 8.4 per cent in 1976 
to 18.2 per cent in 1983. This compares with a corresponding increase 
from 3.0 to 7.0 per cent for non-manual males. The unemployment rate 
used to calculate differentials is the one based on registrations, as
-31-
the rate based on the LFS definition is not widely reported and 
generally not known to potential migrants. The definitions and sources 
of all data are given in the Appendix.
Table 2.1 reports summary migration data from the LFS and the mean 
values of the economic variables used in our regressions in each of the 
two survey years. A very small percentage of households migrate in each 
year, just over 1 per cent, with more unemployed households migrating 
than employed relative to their number in the population as a whole. 
The percentage of employed households migrating has not changed much 
between the 1977 and 1984 surveys but the percentage of unemployed 
households migrating fell dramatically, from an average of 2.74 per cent 
of all the unemployed in 1977 to 1.77 per cent in 1984. Despite this, 
the overall average (absolute) net migration rate fell only slightly 
from 0.316 per cent in 1977 to 0.307 per cent in 1984. The pattern of 
net migration flows in column 3 shows that whereas in 1977 there was no 
clear discernible trend, by 1984 almost all the net flow was absorbed by 
three regions, East Anglia, the South West and Wales.
Column 4 shows the employment status of the migrant. In the period 
1976-77 the proprotion of the migrant stock who were unemployed exceeded 
the unemployment rate, given in column 5, in every region. This 
situation no longer held in 1983-84 and the ratio of columns 4 to 5 
declined over the period, confirming the fall in unemployed migrants. 
Column 6 gives the regional vacancy rate (uncorrected for partial 
notification and taken as a percentage of the labour force of each 
region). The vacancy rate is used as another complementary proxy of 
demand conditions in each region.
Column 7 gives the last of the economic variables used in our
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regressions, relative wages. The variation in relative wages across 
regions is much less than the variation in unemployment or vacancy
rates. The main feature of relative wages is the difference between the 
South East and the rest of the country, where wages appear to be largely 
uniform. The high wage in Scotland is probably due to North Sea oil 
operations whereas the high wage in the North in 1977 appears to be an 
aberation. The earnings disparity between the South-East and the rest 
of the country rose by some two percentage points over the period.
The personal characteristics used in our regressions refer to the 
head of household? and are largely the same variables used in earlier 
studies. These are age, educational qualifications, marital status,
sex, and the presence of a working wife or dependent children. We also 
use a dummy variable for manual workers to determine whether they are 
less likely to move when we control for other characteristics, together 
with various industry dummies, as some industries may be more 
location-specific than others.
An important variable in our regressions is housing tenure, shown 
previously by Hughes and McCormick (1981) to affect mobility. For 1977 
we do not, unfortunately, have data on housing tenure. Because of the 
importance of this variable in the migration regressions, rather than 
omit it we develop a prediction equation for tenure from the 1984 data. 
By multiplying the estimated coefficients with the equivalent variables 
in the 1977 LFS we calculate the probability that a household in 1977
belongs to one of three tenure categories, council housing, private
rental and owner occupation. A similar instrumentation approach was 
adopted by Mohlo (1987).
We estimate regressions for employed and unemployed workers jointly 
with and without interaction effects. The reason for the interaction
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effects is that employed workers may respond differently to the economic 
incentives than unemployed workers do. We have already argued that 
unemployed workers may be more responsive to unemployment differentials. 
Also, employed workers may be more responsive to relative wages than 
unemployed workers, for whom finding a job is likely to be more 
important than a small change in the earnings differentials of those 
already in work.
2.4 Migration Results for 1983-84
Table 2.2 reports the estimated equation for 1984, i.e. for 
households who migrated between 1983 and 1984. The effects of the 
household's socio-economic characteristics conform to prior expectations 
and we mention their main features briefly.
The likelihood of migration declines with age. The expected returns 
from migration will be lower the older the individual and the expected 
costs larger (particularly the psychic costs of moving). Location and 
family ties impose a greater barrier to mobilty for older households. 
Increased educational qualifications are associated with higher income 
profiles and more varied career structures. The labour market for 
graduates is often national rather regional. Hence workers with no 
formal qualifications face the greater difficulty in moving. All these 
effects are strongly significant and monotonic. Single household heads 
have fewer locational ties and a lower opportunity cost of moving. Hence 
their higher propensity to migrate. Female household heads, who are 
necessarily single, are less likely to migrate than married or single 
men. This is perhaps surprising , since single women will generally be 
primary workers and might be expected to behave in the same manner as
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mar ried men. It may be that the obesrved constraint on mobility imposed 
by the presence of dependent children operates more strongly in
households headed by women. The results on variables representing family 
circumstances suggest that the most likely migrant is a young married 
couple with non-working wife and no children.
The manual status dummy has no additional explanatory effect on
migration when we disaggregate our economic variables according to
occupation. Working in manufacturing, energy or construction has 
negative effects on migration, when compared with working in services, 
agriculture, forestry and fishing.
Living in council accommodation has a strong negative effect on
migration, confirming the results of Hughes and McCormick (1981, 1985) 
who used what we believe is an inferior data base, the General Household 
Survey®. Hughes and McCormick and others have written extensively how 
the policy of local authorities towards council tenancy may give rise to 
this effect. The nature of the housing system is such that when council 
house tenants migrate they lose their right to immediate occupation of 
another council property. Perhaps surprisingly, living in
privately-rented accommodation also reduces the probability of
migration, making owners-occupiers the most mobile group. However, the
number of people in privately-rented accommodation is small and many of 
them are in controlled tenancies, making them similar to council 
tenants. Our estimate, which is the only significant one that does not 
conform to expectation, is almost certainly due to the behaviour of a 
very small number of households and as we shall see later it is not 
robust.
The estimated economic incentives to migration are shown at the
bottom of the table. Households with unemployed heads are more likely
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to move than households with employed heads. Thus, our first effect of 
unemployment on mobility, through own status, is strong and significant. 
Our second effect, however, operating through unemployment 
differentials, is weaker and not always of the right sign. When we 
enter the regional unemployment differential interactively with the net 
gain from employment (relative occupational wage minus replacement 
ratio) we obtain a negative coefficient, contrary to expectation. The 
estimated direct effect of the unemployment differential is correctly 
signed but significant only at the 90 per cent confidence level. Taken 
together the two effects are jointly significant (Likelihood Ratio test 
=15.31 ~X^(2) ). The net effect of the two variables is to reduce the 
mean probability of migration by 0.3 percentage points^, so there is no 
evidence of a strong link between regional unemployment differentials 
and migration. Note that in Table 2.3, Model III produces a significant 
negative coeficient on the unemployment differential when entered alone 
without the interaction term.
Hughes and McCormick (1981) estimated a negative effect of regional 
unemployment differentials on migration, contrary to the theory, and 
early US studies failed to find a significant unemployment effect (see 
Greenwood, 1975). The estimated wrong sign cannot be attributed to 
regional fixed effects because if we introduce as many regional dummies 
as there are regional degrees of freedom (5 in Model II of Table 2.3) we 
obtain insignificant estimates for the regional parameters, with no 
important change in the unemployment coefficients. (The Likelihood Ratio 
test for the joint significance of the regional dummies =3.30 -X^(5), 
which is rejected at the 95 per cent level). Goss and Schoening (1984) 
suggest that the lack of significance of regional unemployment 
differentials in the US is due to a concentration of long-term
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unemployment, with a subsequent decline in search effort, in high
unemployment regions. Although we cannot replicate their results due to 
data limitations, (the LFS does not contain any retrospective
information regarding the unemployment durations of those unemployed one 
year prior to sampling), it is certainly true that high aggregate 
unemployment in the UK is associated with the growth of long-term 
unemployment and a reduction in job search activity. See Chapter 3 for 
some empirical evidence regarding the latter.
Of course, even a significant and wrongly-signed regional 
unemployment effect does not imply that regions with higher unemployment 
will be experiencing below-average outflow of migrants. Unemployment, 
as we saw, has a strong positive effect on those experiencing it. The 
overall effect of unemployment is the sum of the two effects and since 
the coefficient on the unemployment dummy is much higher than the total 
coefficient on the differential (i.e. the sum of the two estimated 
coefficients, with the one on the interactive term weighted by the 
income gain from employment), the overall effect of unemployment on 
migration is positive. 10 This is also confirmed by those time series 
studies, which find a positive relation between the regional 
unemployment differential and net migration from the region (Pissarides 
and McMaster (1984) , for example ) . Our estimates in this paper imply
that the reason for the effect is not a response to the unemployment
differential itself but the fact that the unemployed are more likely to 
move than the employed.
The inclusion of the region's relative vacancy rate as another proxy 
for the relative chances of finding a job in a region, produces an 
incorrectly signed but unstable coefficient.^  It is therefore unclear 
as to the type of signals that vacancies offered the potential migrant
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in the period 1983-84.
Model I of Table 2.3 gives the results of alternative 
specifications of the probability of migration. As an additional 
variable measuring the effect of housing costs on migration we tried 
relative house prices for each region. We included this variable on its 
own and interacted with the owner-occupier dummy. In a throwback to the 
old " gravity " models of migration, we also experimented with a 
distance variable, measuring distance as a population-weighted average 
of the mileage between the largest city in the region and the largest 
cities in all other regions as a means of defining the relative economic 
opportunities between areas. In each case the estimates were always 
insignificant, and our inferences regarding the other estimated 
coefficients did not change substantially.
Thus, to conclude our discussion of the effects of unemployment on 
mobility in 1983-84, we find that unemployment has a strong effect on 
the likelihood that those who experience it will migrate but that 
regional differentials in unemployment and vacancies do not appear to 
exert an independent influence on migration.
In contrast, regional wage differentials have the strong incentive 
effect on migration familiar from other studies. Households living in 
regions where their relative occupational earnings are low are more 
likely to move than similar households living in other regions. 
Combined with the effect of unemployment, what we therefore find is that 
regions with high unemployment and low relative earnings are likely to 
have higher out-migration than other regions.
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2.5 The Effect of Aggregate Unemployment
The effect of aggregate unemployment on migration decisions cannot 
be ascertained from data for a single year, so the regressions we have 
estimated so far are not helpful in this respect. As there is no panel 
in Britain where households are followed during a time of changing 
aggregate conditions,^  we compare identical regressions estimated with 
data from two surveys taken at times of different unemployment. The 
years we chose (1976-77 and 1983-84) are such that unemployment was 
stable and low in the former, 3.2 per cent on the LFS definition in 
1976, and stable and high in the latter, 8.6 per cent. No other 
aggregate variable of potential significance changed much between the 
two years. Nevertheless, the caveat should be borne in mind that our 
conclusions about the effects of aggregate unemployment depend on the 
comparison of two different samples taken at two different times and 
there may be other hidden factors that changed between the two years and 
which we have not been able to identify. Also, although our overall 
sample is large in each survey year, the number of migrants is small and 
so comparisons may be subject to small-sample bias.
Before estimating the migration regression for 1976-77 we have to 
deal with a potentially serious problem in the 1977 survey, the absence 
of data for housing tenure. We saw that living in council accommodation 
discourages mobility. Since council accommodation is likely to be 
highly correlated with unemployed head of household, if we omit housing 
tenure from the regressions we are likely to under-estimate the effect 
of unemployment on mobility. For this reason, we first develop a 
prediction equation for housing tenure utilising 1984 data and use this 
to estimate the probability that a household sampled in 1977 is in one
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of our three tenure categories.^  Xo identify correctly the housing 
tenure and migration probabilities we need one or more variables that 
influence the tenure probability in the region of origin but not the 
migration probability. For this we include the proportion of households 
in different tenures in each region, which should influence the tenure 
probability of randomly-sampled households but not the migration 
decision of any particular household. The tenure regressions also 
contain the same personal characteristics of the household as in the 
migration regressions. The results are given in Table 2.4. The 
identifying variable is highly significant in each regression with the 
expected sign, and the predictive power of the regressions is high.
An important finding of the tenure regressions is that unemployed 
households are much more likely to be council tenants than employed 
households. Since in the migration regressions we found that council 
tenancy is a deterent to mobility whereas unemployment is an inducement, 
the positive association between council tenure and unemployment 
confirms that if we omitted council tenancy from the 1977 regression we 
would be under-estimating the effect of unemployment on mobility. In 
contrast, the prediction equation for private rentals shows that 
unemployed workers are less likely to be in privately-rented 
accommodation than employed workers.
The effect of the socio-economic variables conforms with our 
expectations of how housing tenure is determined. Council tenants are 
more likely to be outside the prime age group, to have left school 
without many formal qualifications and to be manual workers. Single 
households, particularly those headed by women, are also more likely to 
be in local authority accommodation. This probability is further 
enhanced if the occupant is a single parent. The private rental housing
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market is also dominated by young, single people.
We use the predicted tenure probabilities as independent variables 
in the migration regressions, all of which are numbers between 0 and 1. 
We avoided the alternative of constructing a 0-1 dummy based on an 
arbitrary cut-off. For this reason, the coefficient estimated for 
tenure with the predicted probabilities is not directly comparable with 
the one estimated with the 0-1 dummy in the regression of Table 2.2. 
For direct comparability with the 1976-77 migration regression, we 
re-estimate the 1983-84 migration regression by substituting the 1983 
predicted probabilities of tenure for actual tenure. The results are 
presented in Table 2.5.
A comparison of the coefficients estimated with the 1984 data in the 
equations reported in Tables 2.2 and 2.5 shows that the estimates for 
unemployment, vacancies and relative wages are very similar across the 
two regressions. The coefficients on the personal and socio-economic 
characteristics are also similar to before. The effect of council 
tenure is less strong now, and the standard error of the estimate has 
increased, so we lost some precision. This change is to be expected 
when a variable is instrumented. The negative effect of private rental 
has collapsed and it now has a sizeable but insignificant positive 
effect. The change in this variable may be due to small numbers but if 
anything the estimate with the predicted values makes more sense than 
the one with the 0-1 dummy. As with 1983-84, private rental in 1976-77 
has a positive influence on migration, and council accommodation has a 
strong negative influence.
The important thing for our purposes is that the economic variables 
with predicted tenures in 1983-84 perform as before and that the new 
regression is directly comparable with the one estimated with the 1977
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data set. Comparing now the two regressions in Table 2.5 we find that 
the effects of the socio-economic variables in the two years are very 
similar, except for the effect of education and industry. Education, 
however, is not measured precisely in the 1977 survey^ and these 
differences may be due to the different measure of education in the 
earlier year. Nevertheless, the same monotonic increase in mobilty with 
educational attainment is observed across both years. The significance 
of the manual status dummy in 1976-77 may also reflect partly the 
imprecise measurement of education, as manual workers are likely to be 
concentrated in the low-education groups.
Notable differences between the 1977 and 1984 results exist in the 
effect of the economic variables. The effect of unemployment on the 
households experiencing it is twice as large and better determined in 
1976-77. This conforms with our priors: unemployed households are still 
more likely to move than employed households when overall unemployment 
is higher, but the incentive is reduced. The unemployment differential 
has a positive effect in 1976-77 , as in 1983-84, and relative vacancies 
are now significant and correctly-signed. But once again the
unemployment differential interacted with net gain from employment has 
an additional negative effect. The two effects of the unemployment 
differential combined imply that unemployment differentials have no 
independent role to play in migration decisions. In this respect, the 
1976-77 results are similar to the 1983-84 ones. But relative vacancies 
lose their significance in 1983-84 and their sign is reversed. Thus, if 
the differences between the 1976-77 and the 1983-84 results are due to 
the higher unemployment in 1983-84, we can conclude that higher overall 
unemployment reduces both the likelihood that unemployed workers will 
migrate and the effectiveness of the incentives to migrate provided by
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vacancy differentials. Unemployment differentials are ineffective in 
both cases.
In contrast, relative wages are correctly-signed and strongly 
significant in both years. The coefficient estimated in 1983-84 is 
higher than the one estimated in 1976-77 so, if anything, the incentives 
provided by relative wages are stronger in the high-unemployment year. 
However, as these are logit coefficients, direct comparisons between 
them can be made only if the baseline probability of migration is the 
same in the two years, (see footnote 9). This is certainly not true for 
the unemployed.
Utilising American data, Da Vanzo (1978) tested the hypothesis that 
the reason for the insignificant response to unemployment differentials 
was that only the unemployed are concerned with regional unemployment 
disparities. Since the unemployed comprise a minority of the labour 
force, their response would be subsumed by the employed majority. By 
interacting the economic variables with the unemployed household dummy 
she obtained significant and correctly-signed estimates of the response 
to economic regional differentials by the unemployed alone. Hughes and 
McCormick (1985) report similar but weaker findings for the UK. In 
Table 2.6 we report our attempts to replicate this exercise.
None of the interaction terms were significant. There is only weak 
evidence of a differential response by the employed and unemployed to 
economic signals. The signs of the coefficients on regional unemployment 
and wages are diametrically opposite for the two groups, but there is 
little consistency of response across the two years. The unemployed 
responded less to wage relativities and more to unemployment 
differentials in 1976-77, but this was reversed by the period 1983-84. 
Whilst it therefore appears true that the coefficients in Table 2.2
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ref lect primarily the response of the employed majority, the response by 
the unemployed is not perceptibly different.
2.6 A Comparison of Migration Probabilities. 1976-77 and 1983-84
Since calculations of the marginal effects of each variable on 
mobility are dependent on the choice of baseline probability, a better 
way of comparing the migration propensities implicit in the estimates 
reported in Table 2.5 is to calculate for each year the predicted 
probabilities for some typical household types based on a collection of 
socio-economic characteristics. We do this for three standard cases and 
then compare the effects of various factors on each. The results are 
given in Table 2.7.
Our first case concerns the group most vulnerable to unemployment: a 
manual worker in manufacturing. We take as our baseline a household 
head who is unemployed, because of our interest in the effects of 
unemployment on mobility, though obviously unemployed household heads 
are in a small minority. Our second case concerns another group 
vulnerable to unemployment but now non-manual and with some lower 
education qualifications. The third group we analyse is the group of 
household heads least likely to experience unemployment: married men
with university degrees working in the service industries. For this 
group all the probabilities we calculate are for employed households.
Housing tenure for each household is not given in the Table because 
it is predicted using the instrumentation equations in Table 2 .3 . 
Where there are regional characteristics in either the tenure equation 
or the migration equation we use sample means unless otherwise 
specified.
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The first four rows of Table 2.7 show the effects of personal
socio-economic characteristics on migration. Migration probabilities 
rise as we move from manual to non-manual and (for employed workers) to
professional. The most mobile group amongst the employed are couples
headed by young professional men whose wives are not in employment. Age 
has a large influence on migration, together with wife's labour-market 
status.
Comparing rows (1) and (2) we find that unemployed men are more 
likely to migrate than similar employed men. The differential is not as 
great as the coefficient on unemployment in Table 2.5 may suggest
because of the interaction between council tenure and migration. 
Households headed by manual men are most adversely affected by this 
interaction. For 1983 we predict a probability of 0.71 that an 
unemployed, manual man is a council tenant. The probability for similar 
employed men is 0.32. Unemployment raises the probability of migration 
but it also raises the probability of council tenure, which has a 
depressing effect on migration. Nevertheless, our first effect of 
unemployment on mobility - that unemployed household heads are more 
likely to migrate - is confirmed for all household types even when the 
effect of unemployment on housing tenure is taken into account.
Our second unemployment effect - that unemployment differentials 
should be an inducement to migration - is not confirmed, as comparison 
of rows (1) and (6) makes clear. If regional unemployment is above 
average, migration probabilities are (very slightly) lower. But 
relative vacancies have the expected effect in 1976-77 and relative 
wages have the expected effect in both years.
The most useful comparisons that can be made using Table 2.7 concern 
our third effect of unemployment on mobility, that at higher aggregate
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unemployment mobility declines. This is confirmed for all the 
unemployed household types we consider (subject always to the proviso 
that the main factor behind the differences between the 1976-77 and 
1983-84 probabilities is aggregate unemployment). The probabilities for 
employed manual and non-manual workers also fall but for the 
professional men they generally rise (though they fall for the most 
mobile age group). Aggregate unemployment also weakens the economic 
incentives to migration. We have already seen that relative vacancies 
lose their incentive effects entirely (they even change sign). Relative 
wages retain the same directional influence, but the response is weaker 
because the baseline migration probability is now much lower. ^
The effect of unemployment on the strength of the economic 
incentives (including own unemployment) is, potentially, more serious 
for the allocative function of migration than any direct effect on
average probabilities. The allocative function of migration depends 
mainly on net migration between regions. What we have found here is
that the average gross migration declines. But if the response to the
economic incentives remains strong, the only effect of the overall 
decline in flows would be slower adjustment at given relative regional 
performance. Increased divergences in performance would speed up the 
adjustment. With the collapse in the response to economic incentives, 
however, this is much less certain. If neither unemployment
differentials nor vacancy relativities have an effect on migration, 
however large the regions' differences in performance, adjustment will 
not take place. Unless of course relative wages are allowed to deviate 
by more between the regions and, when they do, they retain their strong 
allocative function that we have estimated. There is little indication 
from Table 2.1 that relative wages in Britain are sufficiently diverse
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for this to occur. The ability of regional labour markets to adjust 
effectively to relative economic distortions must therefore be 
questioned.
2.7 Conclusions
We have examined three potential channels by which unemployment may 
influence the inter-regional mobility of labour, using data from two 
Labour Force Surveys, 1977 and 1984. Our conclusions regarding each 
effect are:
(a) Unemployment experience increases the likelihood of migration. 
This is confirmed by both sets of data. The partial effect of own 
labour market status (i.e. when controlling for all other household 
characteristics) is stronger in 1976-77 than in 1983-84. When allowance 
is made for the fact that unemployed men are more likely to find 
themselves in council accommodation, which is itself an impediment to 
mobility, the effect is much weakened in both years. Yet it remains 
strong and significant for all household types.
(b) Households living in regions with higher unemployment are more 
likely to move. This is not generally confirmed by either set of data. 
Regions with above-average unemployment do have larger outflows of 
migrants than regions with average or below-average unemployment (other 
things constant) because of our first effect, not because of the 
incentive effects of unemployment differentials. Neither can we 
attribute this observation to a differential response to economic 
signals by the employed and unemployed, since we were unable to uncover 
any evidence of this in our investigation. In 1976-77, unemployment
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differentials exerted a small influence in the right direction on 
households headed by men in high-wage occupations. In 1983-84 the net 
effect was in the wrong direction (but again very small) in virtually 
all occupations. Two more relevant points can be made with regard to 
the incentive effects of unemployment differentials. Firstly, regional 
vacancy differentials influenced migration in 1976-77 but not in 
1983-84, so an incentive reflecting relative regional prosperities was 
operating effectively in the earlier year. Secondly, regional earnings 
relativities exerted a significant influence on migration in both years. 
Thus, when all the economic effects on migration are combined, there is 
evidence that there is a statistically-significant flow in the 
'right' direction: gross outflows from high unemployment, low vacancy
(in 1976-77) and low wage regions are higher than gross outflows from 
other regions.
(c) At higher overall unemployment rates, migration propensities are 
reduced. We examined this hypothesis by comparing the results from the 
low unemployment years 1976-77 with the corresponding results from the 
high unemployment years 1983-84. We found strong confirmation of our 
priors at two levels. First, the average propensities of all unemployed 
household types (and to a lesser extent those of employed manual and 
non-manual wage-earners) are lower in 1983-84 than in 1976-77. For 
employed professional men in service industries the migration 
probabilities are generally higher in 1983-84. Second, the response to 
the economic incentives, primarily provided by wages and vacancy rates, 
is reduced in the high unemployment years. Thus, when aggregate 
unemployment is higher the regional reallocation process functions much 
less effectively than when aggregate unemployment is lower, both on 
average and at the margin.
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Footnotes
* We are grateful to the Department of Employment, the Economic and
Social Research Council and the Esmee Fairbairn Charitable Trust for 
financial support.
1 The same article also shows that regional unemployment differentials 
tend to widen as aggregate unemployment rises.
2 Whilst an undoubtedly valid argument in the context of rural-urban 
migration as envisaged by Harris and Todaro, the situation is 
unlikely to hold in Britain because of the tendancy for high wage 
regions to be simultaneously low unemployment areas.
3 The proportion of migrant employed heads of household remaining with 
the same firm the same firm was 46.6 per cent in 1976-77 and 75.3 
per cent in 1983-84.
4 Alternatively, time series regressions with gross flow data can also 
be used to estimate the effects of these variables. Gordon (1985) 
estimated the effect of unemployment by using gross flow data for 
Scotland and found it to be significant. See also Ogilvy (1982). 
Some inferences about this effect can also be made with net flow 
data. See Pissarides and McMaster (1984).
5 Secondary workers may be obliged to change jobs or even suffer 
unemployment as a result of a decision to move by the head of the 
household.
6 For example in 1983 the unemployment rate within the Yorkshire and 
Humberside region ranged from 5.0 per cent in Pickering to 20.9 per 
cent in Mexbrough.
7 By Labour Force Survey definitions, the head of a household 
consisting of a married couple is always the male.
-49-
8 The General Household Survey that they used records only migration 
intentions (and not actual migration) for the unemployed.
9 The effect of a single explanatory variable, x^, on the probability 
of migration, P, is given by
6P _ Bj[ P[l-P]
5x^
where P is evaluated at the sample mean and is the estimated 
coefficient for x^ .
10 The two coefficients are comparable because on average if a region's 
unemployment rate goes up, say, by 0.01, the unemployment 
differential rises by 0.01 and the sample mean of the unemployment 
dummy for this region also rises by 0.01.
11 Tests with the differential in vacancy rates gave similar results. 
We prefer to use relative rates because of the lack of notification 
of many vacancies. If the unnotified vacancies are proportional to 
the notified ones across the regions our procedure corrects for lack 
of notification.
12 To our knowledge this has also not been done for the United States, 
where the panel on Income Dynamics provides a suitable data base.
13 Molho (1987) also instruments tenure in his regression because, 
although he has data for 1979, the year of the LFS that he uses, he 
does not have it for 1978, the year before migration. However, the 
variables that he excluded from the migration regression to obtain 
identifying restrictions appear arbitrary. See p.241 of his 
article.
14 The 1977 LFS disaggregates educational qualifications into 8 broad
categories. This compares with the 14 groupings in 1984 , not all of 
which are directly comparable with the earlier survey.
To give an indication of the effect of council tenure on migration 
we report here the mean predicted probabilities for our standard 
cases of manual and non-manual workers, obtained for 1983-84 from 
the regression of Table 2.2, when the respondents are council 
tenants and when they are not. For council tenants the migration 
probabilities are, respectively 0.15 and 0.23, and for owners 
occupiers they are 1.50 and 2.18.
The time series results of Pissarides and McMaster (1984) confirm 
that at higher unemployment the response of net migration rates to 
unemployment differentials is weakened, whereas that to relative 
wages is largely unchanged.
It may be argued that a rise in aggregate unemployment would widen 
absolute regional unemployment differentials and so increase the 
incentive to migrate from high unemployment areas. There are however 
a number of reasons why this may not hold. A decline in aggregate 
economic activity reduces labour turnover (see for example Burgess 
and Nickell (1987)). Fewer job hires mean less job openings 
everywhere. Further, Pissarides and Wadsworth (1987), (Centre for 
Labour Economics Discussion Paper No. 296), show that the existence 
of a risk averse utility function amongst workers is sufficient to 
make the subjective cost of migration a rising function of the 
average unemployment rate.
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Appendix A2
Data Sources
All socio-economic variables are taken from the 1977 and 1984 Labour 
Force Surveys as provided to us by the UK Office of Population Census 
and Surveys and the ESRC Data Archive. We include only households who 
in the year of the survey and one year prior to the survey were classed 
as 'economically active1, i.e. either employed or unemployed on the LFS 
definition. The information that we use is derived from the
'retrospective' question, which seeks information about the household's 
situation one year prior to sampling. Migrants are defined to be the 
households who report a different region of residence in the 
retrospective question from their region of residence at the time of 
sampling.
In addition we have supplemented the LFS datasets with information 
from the following sources.
1. Unemployment differential
Regional male and female unemployment disaggregated by
manual/non-manual status (seasonally adjusted) was obtained from 
Department of Employment Gazette, Table 2.12. These were converted into 
rates of unemployment by using employment estimates from the Labour 
Force Survey, for each sex and occupational group in each region. The 
unemployment differential is the difference between the regional rates
and the Great Britain average for each group at June of year t-1 (1976)
and November of year t-2 (1982).
2. Vacancies
Ratio of region's notified vacancies as a percentage of region's 
labour force to Great Britain average at June of year t-1 disaggregated 
by manual/non-manual status. Source: Department of Employment Gazette,
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Table 3.4.
3. Employment
All employees in employment disaggregated by region at June of 
year t-1. Source: Central Statistical Office Regional Trends, Table 
7.1.
4. Wages
Average hourly earnings of full-time men and women, disaggregated by 
region and 16 occupational groups measured relative to Great Britain 
average. Each household is allocated the relative wage relevant to his 
occupational group and region. Source: Department of Employment New 
Earnings Surveys (1976 and 1983), Part E, Tables 122 and 123.
5. Cost of Unemployment
This is an interactive variable. We multiply the region's 
unemployment differential by the difference between the occupational 
wage and average unemployment benefits, the last two divided by the 
average wage in Britain.
6 . House Prices
Average dwelling price disaggregated by region and relative to 
average British price in year t-1. Source: Central Statistical Office 
Regional Trends, Table 3.15.
7. Distance
This is an average of the distance between regional capitals 
(North=Newcastle, Yorkshire=Leeds, East-Midlands=Nottingham, East 
Anglia=Norwich, South-East=London, South-West=Bristol,
West-Midlands=Birmingham, North-West=Manchester, Wales=Cardiff,
Scotland=Edinburgh), weighted by the regional population. The higher the 
variable, the more 'distant' the region.
Table 2.1 
Regional economic data
(a) 1984 Labour Force Survey (data for 1983)
Employed 
out-migrants 
as % of 
employed 
stock
Unemployed Net % of Unemployment 
out-migrants migration out-migrants rate 
as % of as % of who (%) 
unemployed labour are (LFS
stock force unemployed definition)
Vacancy
rate
(%)
Relative
wage
(1) (2) (3) W  (5) (6) (7)
South East 0.95 2.91 -0.09 14.0 6.0 0.58 1.07
South West 1.79 2.98 0.67 9.8 6.1 0.75 0.93
East Anglia 1.20 5.80 0.52 21.0 5.2 0.66 0.95
East Midlands 1.21 1.23 0.20 6.7 6.5 0.57 0.94
West Midlands 0.98 1.32 -0.23 15.6 12.1 0.44 0.93
Wales 0.91 1.28 0.50 18.7 10.0 0.66 0.96
North West 1.10 2.02 -0.26 19.6 11.7 0.53 0.96
Yorkshire 1.33 1.32 -0.22 9.3 9.4 0.46 0.97
Northern 0.67 1.80 -0.16 26.7 11.8 0.52 0.97
Scotland 0.97 0.24 -0.22 4.3 11.5 0.75 1.01
Great Britain 1.06 1.77 0.00 13.6 8.6 0.58 1.00
Contd/.
Table 2.1 Continued
Regional economic data
(b) 1977 Labour Force Survey (data for 1976)
Employed Unemployed Net % of Unemployment 
out-migrants out-migrants migration out-migrants rate 
as % of as % of as % of who (%) 
employed unemployed labour are (LFS 
stock stock force unemployed definition)
Vacancy
rate
(%)
Relative
wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
South East 0.98 2.84 -0.12 6.98 2.5 0.56 1.05
South West 1.53 4.50 0.28 7.58 2.6 0.50 0.94
East Anglia 1.65 5.45 0.73 9.09 2.9 0.48 0.95
East Midlands 1.54 3.48 0.29 5.08 2.3 0.42 0.96
West Midlands 1.15 3.51 -0.38 11.11 3.2 0.25 0.97
Wales 1.01 3.45 0.33 10.71 3.3 0.46 0.99
North West 1.05 2.45 -0.15 9.72 4.3 0.37 0.97
Yorkshire 1.00 1.78 0.19 5.77 3.3 0.40 0.97
Northern 0.76 0.79 0.37 4.17 4.0 0.58 1.01
Scotland 0.65 1.69 -0.32 11.11 4.4 0.70 1.01
Great Britain 1.06 2.74 0.00 7.93 3.2 0.49 1.00
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Table 2.2
Logit Regressions for the Probability of Migration. 1983-84 (mean of
dependent variable — 0.0112)
Independent variable Sample Coefficient (Standard error)
Mean
Constant -4.66 (0.44)**
Age 16-24 0.06 1.01 (0.18)**
Age 25-34 0.25 0.38 (0.12)**
Age 50-64 0.29 -0.88 (0.19)**
Lower qualifications 0.18 0.53 (0.17)**
GCE 0.17 0.77 (0.16)**
Degree 0.15 1.08 (0.17)**
Female HOH 0.10 -0.44 (0.22)**
Single HOH 0.20 -0.22 (0.18)
Working wife 0.46 -0.70 (0.13)**
Dependent child 0.47 -0.49 (0.13)**
Manual HOH 0.49 0.15 (0.13)
Energy 0.04 -1.07 (0.43)**
Manufacturing 0.28 -0.52 (0.23)**
Construction 0.10 -0.59 (0.29)**
Services 0.48 -0.02 (0.22)
Council tenant 0.21 -2.28 (0.32)**
Private rental 0.10 -0.51 (0.17)**
Unemployed HOH 0.09 0.89 (0.22)**
Log regional relative wage -0.01 -3.73 (0.77)**
Unemployment differential 0.12 0.15 (0.08)*
Cost of unemployment 0.31 -0.42 (0.16)**
Relative vacancy rate 1.00 0.40 (0.32)
Diagnostics
Sample size 33956
- Log L 1870.05
Per cent correct predictions 98.9
Pseudo 0.091
Note: ** significant at 95 per cent level, * significant at 90 per cent
level.
Table 2.3
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Table 2.3
Alternative Specifications for the probability of migration. 1983-84 
(mean of dependent variable - 0.0112)
Independent variable Model
I II III IV
Unemployed HOH 0.88
(0.21)**
0.89
(0.22)**
0.87
(0.22)**
0.82
(0.21)
Log regional relative wage 
Relative vacancy rate 
Unemployment differential 
Cost of unemployment 
Relative house prices 
Distance
-2.80
(1.05)**
0.91
(0.45)**
0.17
(0.08)*
-0.45
(0.16)**
-0.60
(0.50)
-0.44
(0.32)
-3.39
(1.12)**
0.47
(0.45)
0.16
(0.09)*
-0.46
(0.16)**
-3.14
(0.74)**
0.25
(0.31)
-0.07
(0.02)**
-2.56
(0.74)**
0.55
(0.29)*
Regional Dummies No Yes No No
Diagnostics
- Log L
Pseudo Rz
1868.7
0.091
1868.4
0.089
1873.4
0.089
1877.1
0.088
Note: ** significant at 95 per cent level, * significant at 90 per cent
level. Each regression contains the same variables as in Table 2 
in addition to those reported above. Standard errors in parenthses.
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Table 2.4
Logit regressions for housing tenure. 1984
Council Private
Constant -5. 81 (0. 17)** -2.,07 (0. 21)**
Age 16-24 0.,65 (0.,06)** 1.,11 (0. 07)**
Age 25-34 0.,19 (0.,04)** 0.,41 (0.,04)**
Age 50-64 0.,46 (0.,04)** -0..23 (0.,05)**
Lower qualifications -0..68 (0.,06)** 0.,01 (0. 05)
GCE -1..14 (0.,04)** -0..15 (0.,06)**
Degree -2..41 (0.,09)** - 0. 22 (0..07)**
Female HOH 0. 76 (0.,03)** - 0,.20 (0.,07)**
Single HOH 0 ,.24 (0,,04)** 0..82 (0.,06)**
Working wife - 0 ,.35 (0.,03)** - 0 ,.17 (0..05)**
Dependent child 0,.33 (0.,03)** - 0,.38 (0.,05)**
Manual HOH 1,.05 (0,.04)** 0,.27 (0..05)**
Energy 0,.29 (0,,08)** - 1,.48 (0,.13)**
Manufacturing 0 .53 (0,.05)** - 1,.63 (0,.08)**
Construction 0 .58 (0,.06)** -1 .40 (0,.09)**
Services 0 .54 (0,.05)** -0,.95 (0,.07)**
Proportion Council properties 0 .67 (0,.02)**
Proportion Private rentals 0 .08 (0,.01)**
Unemployed HOH 1 .36 (0,,06)** - 0 ,.71 (0,.08)**
Diagnostics
Sample size 33956 33956
- Log L 13973.38 9982.65
Mean of dependent variable 0.2132 0.0984
Pseudo R.2 0.2054 0.0841
Note: ** Significant at 95 per cent level. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.5 
Migration regressions
1976-77 1983-84
Constant -4 47 (0 44)** -4 82 (0 56)**
Age 16-24 0 84 (0 23)** 0 72 (0 30)**
Age 25-34 0 58 (0 12)** 0 31 (0 .14)**
Age 50-64 -0 64 (0 15)** -0 84 (0 19)**
Lower qualifications 0 01 (0 14) 0 58 (0 19)**
GCE 0 32 (0 15)** 0 84 (0 20)**
Degree 0 53 (0 18)** 1 13 (0 24)**
Female HOH -0 33 (0 19)* -0 41 (0 24)*
Single HOH -0 40 (0 23)* -0 38 (0 26)
Working wife -0 62 (0 11)** -0 65 (0 13)**
Dependent child -0 27 (0 12)** -0 49 (0 14)**
Manual HOH -0 61 (0 15)** 0 08 (0 16)
Energy 0 26 (0 44) -0 84 (0 53)
Manuf ac tur ing 0 77 (0 35)** -0 31 (0 39)
Construction 0 44 (0 36) -0 42 (0 41)
Services 0 65 (0 28)** 0 09 (0 32)
Council tenant -1 10 (0 65)* -1 03 (0 71)
Private rental 3 32 (1 21)** 0 98 (1 51)
Unemployed HOH 1 50 (0 26)** 0 83 (0 30)**
Log regional relative wage -2 85 (0 79)** -4 06 (0 78)**
Unemployment differential 0 06 (0 62) 0 16 (0 08)**
Cost of unemployment -0 14 (1 06) -0 42 (0 16)**
Relative vacancy rate -0 .57 (0 21)** 0 29 (0 .33)
Diagnostics
Sample size 53888 33956
- Log L 2939.32 1915.18
Mean of dependent variable 1.0111 1.0112
Pseudo 0.086 0.069
Note: ** Significant at 95 per cent level , * significant at 90 per cent
level. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.6
Migration regressions including unemployment interactions
1976-77 1983-84
Unemployed HOH
Log regional relative wage 
Unemployment differential 
Cost of unemployment 
Relative vacancy rate
Unemployed*Relative Wage 
Unemployed*Unemp. Differential 
Unemployed*Cost of Unemployment 
Unemployed*Relative Vacancies
Diagnostics
L°g l
Pseudo Rz
1.,77 (0..82)** 1,.89 (1..10)
-2..70 (0..81)** -4,.22 (0. 81)
-0.06 (0..64) 0,.15 (0..09)
0,.10 (1..12) -0,.40 (0..17)
-0..48 (0.,24)** 0..46 (0.,36)
-4..07 (4. 26) 2.,72 (4.,39)
0.,71 (2. 14) -0.,06 (0. 73)
-1.52 (3. 70) 0.09 (1. 34)
-0.,36 (0. 81) -0.98 (0. 91)
2937.89 1914.97
0.084 0.068
Note: ** Significant at 5 per cent level, * significant at 90 per cent
level. Each regression contains the same variables as in Table 2.5 
in addition to those reported above.
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Table 2.7
Median predicted probabilities of migration (%)
Manual Non-manual Professional
1976-77 1983-84 1976-77 1983-84 1976-77 1983-84
(1) Standard case3 1.22 0.61 3.72 1.52
2.00 2.46
(2) But employed 0.44 0.40 1.11 0.87
(3) Aged 25-34 2.31 0.81 6.67 1.99 4.03 3.39
(4) With working wife 0.69 0.34 2.16 0.86 1.02 1.29
Region
(5) with w^/w — 1.05 1.05 0.51 3.29 1.02 1.76 1.65
(6) with u^-u — 0.05 1.20 0.54 3.62 1.29 1.94 2.08
(7) with v^/v — 1.5 1.00 0.70 3.03 1.75 1.62 2.83
Notes: a The standard cases are households whose heads have the following 
characteristics.
Manual: Age 34-49, married male, with no educational
qualifications, manual worker in manufacturing industry but now 
unemployed. Dependent children and wife not working.
Non-manual: As above, except occupation non-manual and with some
(lower) education qualifications.
Professional: Age 34-49, married male, with university degree or
equivalent, employed as non-manual worker in a service industry, 
with dependent children and wife not working.
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Chapter 3: On-the-Job Search : Some Empirical Evidence from Britain
3.1 Introduction
During the preceding chapter, we established that a worsening of 
aggregate conditions appeared to discourage inter-regional mobility. A 
necessary precondition for economically motivated mobility is that the 
worker must undertake some form of search in order to locate alternative 
employment. The next two chapters examine the determinants of that 
search process and the response of job search to economic signals. 
Chapter 4 concerns the unemployed. Here we concentrate on job search by 
those currently in employment.
Even in times of economic recession like the early 1980s, in Britain 
as elsewhere, voluntary job quitting comprises the majority of labour 
turnover. The Labour Force Survey (LFS) indicates that in the period 
1983-84, 75 per cent of all job separations were accounted for by
voluntary movements. Job-to-job changes account for around two thirds 
of all job quits (the other components being retirements, withdrawals 
from the labour force and quitting into unemployment). About half of 
all new hirings are of workers with jobs (see Jackman et al, (1989), for 
some UK evidence). The dominance of job-to-job flows lends itself to 
detailed empirical study. In Chapter 6 we describe the pattern of these 
movements in Britain. Here we study the necessary pre-requisite to 
inter-firm mobility, namely the idea that the worker must undertake some 
form of on-the-job search. The data we examine sheds light on the kind 
of workers who are more likely to search on the job than to either not 
search or quit into unemployment. We then proceed to examine the type 
of search methods undertaken by these employed job seekers. We show
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that firm and household characteristics, local labour market conditions 
and wages influence both the decision to search and the choice of job 
strategy.
Despite the importance of job-to-job changes, both theoretical and 
applied work on job search has concentrated on the search decision of 
the unemployed. Tobin (1972) was among the first economists to 
criticise this emphasis in the literature. Commenting on the lack of 
evidence to support the contention that search whilst unemployed was 
more efficient than when employed, Tobin noted that the mean duration of 
US unemployment would be halved were all employment accessions drawn 
from the unemployed. Since then, several studies have analysed labour 
turnover without unemployment i.e. job-to-job changes and the necessary 
precedent of on-the-job search. Parsons (1973) combines a theoretical 
consideration of on versus off the job search with an empirical study of 
manufacturing industry quit rates in the United States. Indeed the 
empirical results on turnover are based upon the assumption that workers 
quit only when an alternative job is located. The studies on which 
Parson's assumption is based are also cited, together with several 
others, by Matilla (1974) to reinforce his contention that around 50 to 
60 per cent of all turnover involves no unemployment. Matilla suggests 
that such behaviour is likely to occur if the expected costs of 
unemployed search exceed the extra return that more intensive full-time 
search may bring.
Barron and McCafferty (1977) introduce a formal model of employee 
job search in which the reservation wage, level of search intensity and 
labour supply are simultaneously determined by utility maximizing 
workers. The underlying rationale behind the theory is that increasing 
search intensity eventually crowds out labour supply and hence employed
job search. Here search costs are measured by foregone wages. In 
practice workers do not generally forgo wages when undertaking search on 
the job. Search costs are therefore more likely to be incured in the 
pursuit of job vacancies. Burdett (1978) offers an alternative
explanation for the existence of on-the-job search. If the cost of
employed relative to unemployed search is not too high then the strategy
with the highest expected payoff is to adopt two reservation wages, X 
and Y, with X<Y. Jobs with associated wage offers less than X are 
rejected, jobs with wages above Y are accepted with no further search 
taking place and wage offers between X and Y are accepted with search 
continuing on the job. In a similar manner, Hey and McKenna (1979) 
develop a model in which the cost of moving, not the cost of search, 
drives a wedge between the market wage and that needed to prevent search 
on the job. Both the models of Burdett and Barron and McCafferty view 
employee search behaviour as comprising part of an optimal search
strategy. Wilde (1979) notes that this need not be the sole reason for 
on the job search, if we relax the assumption that wage offers fully 
characterise a job. In this case i.e. there exist non-wage 
considerations, then on-the-job search may be initiated by jobs offering 
different rates of human capital accumulation (see Rosen, 1972). 
Wilde's preferred explanation is that certain non-wage characteristics 
may only be observed on the job. If these aspects eventually reveal 
themselves to be unsatisfactory than search by workers for alternative 
employment ensues.
The need for empirical verification of the determinants of on-the- 
job search is clear. Few empirical studies exist, certainly for the 
United Kingdom. Black (1981) reports regressions for on-the-job search 
in the US similar to those we present below. Hughes and McCormick
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(1985b), emphasise the influence of fixed moving costs (in particular 
occupational pensions) in a test of the Hey and McKenna (1979) version 
of on-the-job search and mobility, using a small micro-dataset taken 
from the 1973 and 1974 General Household Surveys (GHS), in the only 
other UK study of which we are aware. The dependent variable in the GHS 
asks whether the individual has "seriously considered" changing jobs, a 
not entirely satisfactory definition of on-the-job search. Use of the 
LFS enables us to measure search activity more precisely.
Kahn and Low (1982) have compared the expected wage outcome of 
unemployed and employed search, and estimated that on average, the 
reservation wage of unemployed job seekers was 10 per cent above that of 
on-the-job seekers. Kahn and Low (1984) follow the Barron and
McCafferty (1977) model, assuming employed search involves less search 
intensity, when estimating an ordered probit model of the determinants 
of on and off the job s e a r c h .2 Holzer (1987) presents data which 
support Barron and McCafferty's assumptions.
Once a decision to undertake on-the-job search has been made, then a 
subsequent decision as to the choice of search strategy is made by the 
employed job seeker. Barron and Gilley (1981) distinguish between three
possible types of unemployed job search in their analysis of the returns
to search. The employed are able to utilise, or have access to, similar 
search methods and outlets as their unemployed counterparts (though
their respective positions may differ with regard to informational flows 
from particular srategies). It seems reasonable therefore to model job 
search strategies of the employed in an analagous fashion. The choice of 
strategy, based upon individual optimisation criteria, determines the 
rate of arrival of job offers and hence the likely flow into alternative 
employment. Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the type of job search
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methods used by unemployed workers in Britain. This chapter employs the 
same concepts in the study of on-the-job search. We therefore proceed to 
estimate a multinominal logistic regression of the preferred search 
strategy, conditional on the decision to seek work whilst employed, and 
highlight the important determinants.
In the next section we discuss briefly the theoretical framework and 
list the likely influences on the job search decision of employed
workers. In section 3.3 we discuss the data used in this study and in 
Section 3.4 we discuss the results. Section 3.5 provides concluding 
comments.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
An employed worker may decide to look for a new job either if that 
worker is dissatisfied with the current job or the job is expected to 
end soon. Having decided to look for a new job, a decision is then made 
whether to quit the current job to search whilst unemployed, or whether 
to search on the job. Thus, the probability that a worker is observed 
searching on the job is the product of the probabilities of search and 
the decision not to quit into unemployment, given search takes place.
Consider first the latter decision. If the costs of search on and 
off the job are not too different from each other, a worker quits into 
unemployment if unemployment income and leisure accumulated over the
expected duration of unemployment exceed the wage rate net of the 
disutility of work, accumulated over the same period. Since in practice 
wages exceed unemployment income, an employed worker quits only if the 
nonpecuniary characteristics of the job held are sufficiently bad to
induce the surrendering of the income advantage from on-the-job
-66-
search. ^
From this condition we conclude that once a decision to search has 
been made, on-the-job search is more likely than quitting into 
unemployment if:
1. The ratio of wages to unemployment benefit is higher.
2. The expected duration of job search is longer.
3. The worker has had a longer tenure on the j ob.
The first effect follows immediately from the condition that 
quitting takes place when the nonpecuniary disadvantages of the job 
outweigh the income advantages. The higher the income advantage, the 
less likely are the nonpecuniary disadvantages to outweigh it.
The second effect follows from the property of diminishing marginal 
utility of wealth, which becomes particularly acute when there are 
liquidity constraints. If the expected duration of search is lengthy 
and the worker quits, then assets will be reduced by more than if the 
expected duration of search is short. At the margin this increases the 
monetary cost of quitting. As assets are run down the unemployed become 
liquidity-constrained, making the cost of more income loss higher. 
Full-time, i.e. unemployed, job search becomes less attractive when the 
opportunities for alternative employment are more scarce. Workers may 
prefer the security of work combined with less intensive search.
Once a decision to search has been made, job tenure influences 
quitting through the information that the worker has about the job. 
Nonpecuniary job characteristics are usually ’experience' goods - the 
worker discovers them only after the job is taken. Workers with short 
tenures are unlikely to have learned all the nonpecuniary 
characteristics of the job. They may still discover many adverse aspects 
to the job such that it will induce them to quit. In contrast, workers
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with long tenures are not likely to find the nonpecuniary 
characteristics unbearable if they decide to look for a new job. Such 
workers are more likely to stay on the job until a new offer arrives 
(Wilde, 1979).
Consider next the probability that a worker decides to search, 
regardless of whether search takes place on or off the job. Since job 
search is costly, a worker decides to search only if there is a 
sufficiently high probability expects that a better job will be found 
than the one currently held. The probability of locating a job offer 
depends on how many job vacancies there are, so job search is more 
likely when the number of vacancies is higher. Job search is also more 
likely when the worker expects to find a job that is sufficiently better 
to compensate for the cost of movement. From this we conclude that job 
search is more likely when:
1. The worker's wage is low relative to that of others with 
similar characteristics.
2. The cost of movement is low.
3. Job tenure is short.
The first effect is related to the potential monetary rewards from 
search and job change and it is self-explanatory. The second effect is 
also self-explanatory. Often job change involves movement to a 
different location. Workers who are less mobile because of family or 
other commitments to a given location are less likely to want a job
change. Lengthy job tenure could discourage job search because of
various seniority rights that the worker may accumulate on the job, for
example a non-transferable pension, promotion to a rank that is not 
easily available to an outsider in a new firm and so on. These effects 
introduce a fixed cost into the decision to search. The longer job
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tenure, the greater the sunk costs and the less likely job search can 
locate a preferential job offer. Job tenure also discourages search for 
the reason we discussed in connection with the choice between on- and 
off-the-job search. A worker who has spent a long time at the same job 
is likely to have developed a certain degree of affinity with the work 
and it's environment. In addition, the worker should have acquired 
job-specific human capital which is not transferable (see Jovanovic 
(1979b)). In contrast, employees new to a job might still not be fully 
aware of the job's attributes. The more unpleasant the non-wage 
characteristics of the job, the greater the likelihood of search for 
alternative employment.
Table 3.1 summarises the effects that we have discussed so far. A 
high own wage makes a desire to change jobs less likely. But if the 
worker decides to search for another job, it is more likely to take 
place on the job. So the effect of own wage on the unconditional 
probability of on-the-job search is ambiguous. However, the negative 
effect on the overall probability of search is almost certain to 
dominate, with a consequent negative effect on both on- and off-the-job 
search.
The same ambiguity on the unconditional probability of on-the-job 
search arises when we consider the effects of job vacancies, non-wage 
characteristics and job tenure. Vacancies influence the probability of 
search through their effect on job availability. Quitting into 
unemployment is more likely when there are more vacancies because the 
expected duration of search is less. We might still expect an increase 
in the number of vacancies to lead to an increase in the unconditional 
probability of on-the-job search, because of the increase in the overall 
search probability.
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Adverse non-wage job attributes encourage unconditional job search, 
but they may also encourage quitting into full-time search, should they 
be sufficiently unpleasant to offset the income effect of on-the-job 
search. Job tenure has a similar effect. Workers with shorter tenures 
are more likely to search both on- and off-the-job than similar workers 
with longer tenures. The link between on-the-job search and job tenure 
may be weakened by the fact that workers with short tenures may decide 
to quit into unemployment when looking for a new job.
Wages elsewhere have unambiguous effects on on-the-job search. An 
increase in wages elsewhere, given own wage, increases the probability 
of search with no apparent effect on the choice between on-the-job 
search and quitting into unemployment. The personal cost of moving jobs 
also has an unambiguous negative effect on search on the job.
The probability of job search is also likely to be affected by 
whether the job is regarded by the holder to be permanent or not. Those 
in temporary jobs are more likely to search, in anticipation of the 
termination of the job. Those in part-time jobs may also search more 
frequently on the job. If part-time jobs are not regarded as permanent 
career choices by many of their holders, they are likely to have a 
higher turnover rate than full-time jobs. Even for a given turnover 
rate, the holder of a part-time job is more likely to have the time to 
search on the job than the holder of a full-time job. So search on the 
job should be more common among holders of both temporary and part-time 
jobs.
Consider now the decision as to how to look for alternative work 
once the decision to search has been made. Following Barron and Gilley 
(1981), we can identify three main types of search strategy - random, 
indirect and self-directed search. Indirect search implies the use of
state or private employment agencies to make contact with jobs. Random 
search, most closely resembling the type of search behaviour envisaged 
in early theoretical models, involves direct contact with potential 
employers. Indirect search implies use by the job seeker of state or 
private employment agencies to make contact with vacancies. A self 
directed search strategy encounters job offers through newspaper 
advertisements or the help of friends and personal contacts. An 
employed job seeker will choose that strategy, or combination of
strategies, to maximise the probability of receiving an acceptable wage 
offer. Since this probability is the product of the probabilities that 
a job offer is received and then deemed acceptable, the optimum 
strategy need not necessarily be the one that yields the most employer 
contacts. Seater (1979) has demonstrated that diminishing returns to 
random job search will hold for unemployed job seekers. As the time 
spent on search increases, so the number of job offers elicited rises, 
but at a diminishing rate. It seems reasonable to suppose that this 
will also hold for employed job seekers. Further, on-the-job seekers 
can only devote a finite amount of time to search when combined with 
their commitment to work. Random search is perhaps the most time
consuming search strategy, though it can elicit the most job offers
(Barron and Gilley (1981)). Hence we might expect the characteristics 
of the worker's current job to influence the search strategy. Temporary 
or part-time working for example might enable greater opportunity to 
engage in random search.
Local economic conditions should also affect the type of search 
strategy used. Employed workers should not invest their time in
relatively expensive random search when the supply of vacancies and 
hence the probability of receiving an offer, is low, or the level of
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unemployment is high. A rise in unemployment creates more competition 
from full-time job seekers who are able to employ random search more 
efficiently. We would therefore expect the employed job seeker to adopt 
an alternative principal search strategy.
Each search strategy embodies differential amounts of search 
intensity. Pissarides (1979) ventures the idea that workers will vary 
their choice of strategy, and hence level of search intensity, in 
response to changing market conditions. Job matching is an increasing 
function of the number of vacancies and workers associated with each 
search method. We explicitly examine the response of strategy choice to 
differential local economic conditions in section 3.4.
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3.3 Data and Empirical Specification
The data used in this study are drawn from the 1984 Labour Force 
Survey, an annual cross-sectional survey of around 60,000 households in 
the United Kingdom. The sample consists of 54,132 persons (31,383 
males, 22,749 females) employed during the reference week of the survey 
in the Spring of 1984.
The regression equation for on-the-job search takes the form
Pi = f[X-£, Tenure^, Z^, NPC^] + e^
where P is the probability that an individual i is engaged in on-the-job 
search, is a vector of independent variables that describes the
respondent's personal characteristics, Tenure^ is a set of categorical 
dummy variables representing specific tenure intervals, is a vector 
of characteristics describing local labour market conditions including 
our wage variables, NPC^ is our proxy for non-penuniary wage 
characteristics of the job and e^ is a logistically distributed error 
term. Kahn and Low (1984) suggest that those variables contained in the 
X-£ vector characterise the likely wage offer distribution facing a job 
seeker. More educated workers, for example, may command high
alternative wage offers which could induce job search. The absence of 
direct information on earnings in the Labour Force Survey requires us to 
proxy aspects of the current wage distribution. To this end we utilise 
LFS information regarding an employee's region, occupation and industry 
to obtain two wage variables. Firstly we include the occupational wage 
(detailed definitions and sources are given in the Data Appendix) which 
we use to capture the effect of own wages. Workers from high earning 
occupations are on average more likely to be searching on the job,
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because by quitting into unemployment they forgo more income. Secondly, 
we include mean industrial earnings because many workers who change jobs 
also change industrial group. Industries with lower relative earnings 
are likely to lose workers, unless of course these relativities reflect 
compensating differentials.^ Workers in industries with high average 
earnings are less likely to be searching for another job than workers in 
industries with low average earnings. Thus, in a regression that has 
both average occupational earnings and average industrial earnings we 
should expect to estimate a positive coefficient on the former and a 
negative one on the latter.
Apart from earnings, we use three other variables reflecting 
economic conditions, regional occupational unemployment and vacancy 
rates and industrial redundancy rates. Workers from occupations with 
high vacancy rates are generally more likely to search but they are also 
more likely to quit to search off-the-job. So vacancies should have a 
positive effect on search on the job, though not necessarily a strong 
one. High unemployment is likely to discourage search by employed 
workers but once again its effect on search on the job may not be strong 
because immediate quitting by job searchers is discouraged. A high 
incidence of industrial layoffs should encourage unconditional job 
search behaviour if the worker perceives his/her job to be in danger. 
If, as required by law, an impending redundancy is accompanied by 
sufficient advance notice,5 then the worker is free to engage in 
on-the-job search. We measure the non-pecuniary aspects of the job by 
the appropriate industrial accident rate, a method also used by Viscusi 
(1979). We would expect workers in hazardous industries to be less 
satisfied with their jobs, compensating wage differentials 
notwithstanding.
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Interestingly, Hughes and McCormick (1985b) employ a measure of 
worker satisfaction as a simultaneous proxy for pecuniary and non-wage 
aspects of the job. The higher the level of worker satisfaction, the 
more utility is attached to the current job and the less likely search 
will take place. We do not attempt to replicate this method, prefering 
instead to try and isolate the separate effects contained within that 
single measure.
The LFS enables us to measure the degree of on-the-job search quite 
accurately. Our dependent variable is dichotomous taking the value one 
if the respondent states that he or she is actively looking for another 
job to replace the current one and the value zero otherwise. On average
5.3 per cent of respondents in our sample answered yes to the question 
as to whether they were looking for another job. This average is 
remarkably close to the one reported by Black (1981) for US males 
covered by the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics. This contrasts 
with a figure of 11 per cent estimated by Hughes and McCormick using GHS 
data and an alternative definition of on-the-job search, albeit at a 
different level of aggregate u n e m p l o y m e n t .^
Our second principal equation, measuring the determinants of 
preferred strategy, is by definition estimated across the sub-sample of 
2153 on-the-job seekers by multinominal logistic maximum likelihood. 
Hence the probability that worker i prefers search strategy j is given 
by:
exp [X^
pij 3
2 exp [Xlk(3+Zik7] j - 1, 2, 3
k-1
where is a vector of personal characteristics and a vector of
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variables measuring local economic conditions facing the individual 
concerned. The dependent variable takes one of three values according 
to whether the worker’s preferred method of search is random, 
self-directed or indirect.?
3.4._____ Results
3.4.1 Summary Search statistics
Our empirical analysis begins with Table 3.2 and some summary job 
search statistics from our sample. On-the-job search is extremely low 
in full-time jobs with long tenures. This is true for both men and 
women in manual and non-manual jobs. Job search is greater in short 
tenure jobs, with non-manual jobs having the highest rate. There are no 
important differences between men and women in average search rates. 
The higher incidence of on-the-job search in non-manual jobs is 
presumably due to the higher rates of pay in these occupations and to 
lower rates of quitting into unemployment.
Search by workers in part-time jobs exhibits some interesting 
patterns. For men, the rates of search are much higher than in 
full-time jobs, indicating that men do not, as a rule, regard these jobs 
as permanent. In contrast, female search activity is lower in part-time 
jobs than in full-time jobs. However, not much should be made of this 
difference in behaviour as our regression analysis shows having 
controlled for personal characteristics, women in part-time jobs are 
more likely to search than similar women in full-time jobs.
Rates of job search by workers in temporary jobs are high, 
especially for men. If anything, the surprising thing is that they are
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no t higher than our results suggest. The idea that most of those in 
temporary jobs are mainly workers who take a job to continue search on 
the job is not borne out by the data.
In the last row of Table 3.2 we present the number of unemployed job
seekers as a percentage of total employment. In all cases except for
men in non-manual jobs there are many more unemployed job seekers than 
employed job seekers. Since on average about as many new hires are made 
from employment as from unemployment (Jackman et. al. (1989)), employed 
job seekers must have much shorter search durations. Most of the 
difference in durations is probably due to individual heterogeneity - 
employed job seekers are more employable than unemployed ones - though 
duration dependence may also play a role as it is likely to affect
unemployed job seekers more than employed ones. The long term
unemployed will depreciate their human capital more quickly than any 
long term employed job searcher. We leave this issue to further research 
and focus our analysis here solely on the employed.
Table 3.3 outlines the types of search methods used by employed job 
seekers, disaggregated by various demographic groups. The average 
on-the-job searcher uses around three search methods, evidence that job 
search is quite extensive. There are no significant differences between 
men and women in the number or type of search methods used. The most 
common strategy for an employed job seeker is self-directed search. 
Over 97 per cent of workers make contact with jobs by placing or 
answering advertisements in newspapers, or with the help of personal 
contacts. Around 45 per cent of the sample pursue either indirect or 
random search. These search strategies are not mutually exclusive. The 
average on-the-job seeker combines at least two different strategies. 
This is perhaps unsurprising given the nature of on-the-job search.
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Chi rinko (1982) provides evidence of diminishing returns to time spent 
pursuing random search for unemployed job seekers. Random search is a 
time consuming process, especially if conducted in person rather than 
through the media. Just 9.8 per cent of our sample chose random search 
as their main strategy. In contrast, directed search methods are less 
time consuming and more efficient, given that they are more readily 
integrated into a normal working routine. Both Chirinko, and Barron and 
Gilley show that directed search methods produce fewer job contacts for 
the unemployed than random search. The fact that these measures also 
appear to be preferred by employed job seekers may imply that 
concentration of search effort leads to fewer but more acceptable job 
offers. The most common form of search is to combine self-directed with 
either random or indirect strategies.
Manual workers (column 4) demonstrate a preference for using 
personal contacts within self-directed search at the expense of vacancy 
persual in newspapers. This indicates that workers identify the more 
likely vacancy sources during the course of search. Manual workers
prefer government over private job agencies probably for the same
reasons. This is reflected in a higher incidence of indirect search, 
although this effect is not robust to the introduction of controls for 
other personal characteristics (see Table 3.7). Columns 5 and 6 suggest 
that part-time workers do not use more of their leisure to pursue random 
search but that temporary workers are more willing to approach
potential, alternative employers. Those temporary workers who do search 
(a minority of the sub-sample as we have seen in Table 3.2), do so more 
extensively than other workers. Not only are temporary workers more 
likely to pursue indirect or random search, they also utilise more
search methods in the process. The imminent termination of a job would
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appear to induce greater search effort. We analyse the choice of 
strategy more formally in the regression results of Section 3.4.3.
3.4.2 Determinents of On-the-Job Search
Table 3.4 reports the results of our logistic estimation of the 
likelihood of on-the-job search. The data indicates that we should 
present separate results for men and women (Likelihood Ratio Statistic 
on a male-female sample split =196.0 ~ ^(23)) . The determinants of
on-the-job search differ across the sexes. This probably reflects the 
division into primary and secondary employment.
Beginning with the variables indicative of local economic 
conditions, we see that the six estimated coefficients are of the 
expected sign but only two of them are strongly significant. The 
industrial wage has a strong negative effect. Workers in low-wage
industries are more likely to search on the job than other workers,
because the opportunity exists to improve earnings by finding 
alternative employment in a high wage industry. The coefficient on the 
industrial wage may be lower than otherwise since not all workers
perceive the chance of changing industry. For example, choice of 
industry may be limited in the area where workers live. Another reason 
may be that a low industrial wage encourages more search overall, 
including quitting to search whilst unemployed. Unemployed search in 
low-wage industries may be more important than in high-wage industries.
In Table 3.5, we show that the inclusion of occupational dummy 
variables to control for differences in the skills mix across industries 
reinforces the effect of industry wage on search for men. Thus it seems 
likely that this observed effect is a genuine response by workers to 
inter-industry wage differentials.
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The occupational wage performs more strongly in the female than male 
equation. Women in high wage occupations are more likely to search on 
the job. This may be a response to both to higher expected wage offers 
and the higher expected probability of receiving a job offer in a more 
active labour market. Higher wages probably reduce the likelihood of 
quitting into search unemployment. If we include a single dummy variable 
to capture the effect of manual workers, the coefficient is negative and 
significant in the male regression. Search by manual workers, if it 
takes place at all, occurs off the job. This probably reflects the 
increased likelihood of redundancy for manual workers.®
The effect of our industrial injury rate variable is also strong and 
significant in the male regression of Table 3.4. Men working in 
industries with a high accident rate are significantly less likely to be 
found searching on the job than other workers. We argued earlier that 
the injury rate will proxy the non-pecuniary characteristics of the job. 
Since a large incidence of accidents is indicative of unpleasant or 
dangerous working conditions, workers in such industries may be expected 
to search more. The implication of the negative coefficient is that 
these workers quit and search off the job. This result complements that 
of Viscusi (1979), who finds a significant positive coefficient for a 
similar variable in the quit intentions of US workers. The 
significance of this variable also supports the idea that workers have 
imperfect ex-ante information about jobs. Certain non-pecuniary 
attributes can only be learned by experience on the job. If these 
characteristics are revealed to be sufficiently unattractive, the worker 
quits into search unemployment.
The effect of variables capturing local labour market demand is 
mixed. The unemployment rate is negative and significant (at the 90 per
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cent level) in the male equation. The hypothesised fall in job search 
caused by the reduction in opportunities that high unemployment 
engenders, offsets any tendency to substitute on-the-job for full-time 
unemployed search. Vacancies however do not appear to exert any 
independent influence on the likelihood of on-the-job search. As we 
argued in previous sections these variables measure a combination of two 
effects working in opposite directions, so a negligible response is not 
too surprising. Redundancy rates do have a weak positive inducement to 
male, but not female, employed job search. Workers in industries with 
high layoff rates not only engage in more search, presumably as a 
response to the increased likelihood of losing employment, but do so 
whilst employed. The effect becomes significant when we introduce 
occupational dummies (Table 3.5). Women appear to base their job search 
decisions on factors unconnected with the condition of local labour 
demand. The introduction of industry dummies does not significantly 
affect the specification of the equations.^
Of the demographic variables, we found that workers over 50 are less 
likely to search for a new job. Older workers are more likely to have 
engaged in previous job shopping and found a lifetime job. They are less
likely to embark on a new career in a new firm because of their shorter
working horizon. Single men -behave very much like married men, but 
single women are more likely to be looking for a new job than married 
women. This effect is probably due to the fewer family commitments that 
single women have, making them more mobile than married women and
enabling them to assume a primary employment role. Although for men, 
family ties may be less important in the pursuit of a career, the 
similarity in the behaviour of married and single men is a little
surprising.
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Education exerts a strong positive influence on search on-the-job 
for men and women. A similar effect is also observed by Black (1981) 
for US males. This is probably caused by the higher earnings that are 
associated with more education, making voluntary unemployment relatively 
expensive. More highly educated individuals may also be in occupations 
where on-the-job search is actually easier than off-the-job search, as 
for example in the professions where informational vacancy flows are 
readily at hand. Highly educated workers are also more likely to be 
human capital investors and thus more ready to search for jobs offering 
preferential rates of human capital accumulation. More educated workers 
can expect to elicit a higher wage offer from search.
Tenants in council housing, who are known on average to be less 
mobile than others like them in private housing (see Hughes and 
McCormick, 1984) are more likely to be found searching on the job than 
others. A similar coefficient can be found in Hughes and McCormick 
(1985b) for UK heads of household. A plausible reason for this result is 
that council tenants are tied to a travel to work area by their housing. 
Search for alternative jobs is therefore limited to their immediate 
vicinity. Hence they are less likely to quit jobs and search for 
alternative emplyment elsewhere than other more mobile members of the 
community. In addition, council tenants are typically poorer than the 
rest of the community and in 1984 the typical tenant suffered much 
higher unemployment than others. Those tenants who voluntarily decide 
to change jobs avoid joining unemployment by searching on the job. Thus 
council housing, rather than being a cause of search, stands more likely 
for a package of characteristics that discourage voluntary quitting in a 
depressed market.
Employed men and women who recently moved into the region are less
likely to be looking for a new job. Male employees are more settled 
into their new jobs after a recent long distance move than others, when 
account is taken of all other likely influences on job search. In 
contrast, workers (both male and female) who were unemployed or employed 
in a different firm one year earlier are more likely to be wanting a 
change of job. These results are related to the effect of job tenure 
discussed in Section 3.2, which we also find here to be the most 
important influence on the likelihood of job search. The presence of 
these variables partially controls for heterogeneity (i.e. mover-stayer) 
biases embedded in our measure of tenure. Workers with a high 
propensity to move are more likely to search on the job at low tenures. 
The inclusion of a prior mobility term ensures that we do not attribute 
too strong a tenure effect to on-the-job search. Tenure up to two years 
still has the strongest effect on search, after controlling for this 
heterogeneity. Tenure in excess of ten years has the largest dampening 
effect on job search. These results support our earlier contention that 
job satisfaction evolves over time. The ensuing effect on job search is 
eventually reflected in tenure statistics. The results are also 
consistent with the idea that growth of firm-specific capital reduces 
the potential gain from job search (Jovanovic, 1979b).
The effect of short job tenure on search is stronger even than the 
effect of part-time or temporary work. We have already shown (Table 
3.2) that only a minority of those in part-time or temporary work are 
actively seeking alternative employment. Yet those who do search form a 
more significant grouping than amongst full-time workers, men more so 
than women. Hence the low mean search values observed in Table 3.2 are 
the result of the characteristics of those found in these jobs and not 
the relative attractiveness of part-time or temporary work. For males
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in particular, such jobs are inferior to full time employment and so 
encourage search. The number of male employees found in this type of 
work is small. Just 1 per cent of our sample of men is in part-time 
work whereas as many as 42 per cent of the women are in part-time work. 
It seems unlikely therefore that many unemployed men obtain part-time
work as a prelude to further search.
Table 3.6 summarises the results of Table 3.4 by a series of 
predicted probabilities of on-the-job search for workers with particular 
combinations of characteristics— these are outlined in a note at the 
foot of Table 3.6. Row 1 gives the probabilities for a typical worker, 
which is around 6 per cent for men and 4 per cent for women. Row 2 
shows that were the same worker to have a part-time job, then the 
likelihood of on the job search would triple for men and rise by around 
a one half percentage point for women. This emphasises the contrast 
between men and women in their perceptions regarding the status of 
part-time working. Similarly there is some divergence in the job search 
behaviour of men and women engaged in temporary work (row 6) . Both 
groups are more likely to be searching for alternative employment than 
similar workers in permanent jobs and men twice as much as women. Row 3 
indicates that single, female workers are more likely to look for a new 
job, though the effect for men is negligible. Rows 4 and 5 demonstrate 
the effect of differing job tenure on inducing search. Male workers
with under six months tenure are four times as likely to look for a new
job than similar workers with over ten years tenure. A similar 
differential also exists for women. Long job tenures are indicative of 
a successful job match and as such generate little search activity.
Rows 7 to 10 show the result of varying local economic conditions on 
employee job search. The magnitude of the effect is never large. Men
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respond more strongly to an increase in the local unemployment rate to 
15 per cent, reducing the likelihood of on-the-job search by around one 
percentage point. An increase in the accident rate to 2.5 per thousand 
workers generates a 2 per cent percentage point fall in on the job 
search activity. A 10 per cent rise in the occupational wage rate 
generates no perceptible search response, though as we have already 
suggested this may be because an increased likelihood of on-the-job 
search is offset by a fall in the unconditional probability of search 
activity. A 10 per cent increase in the industrial wage differential 
reduces search probabilities marginally since it lowers the 
attractiveness of alternative jobs in other industries. The implication 
for our estimation is that a large relative wage disparity is required 
to induce the observed job search behaviour.
Finally rows 11 and 12 present predicted probabilities for two 
differing types of workers, who differ in their propensities to engage 
in on-the-job search than the average employee. The more mobile and 
educated members of the workforce living in a buoyant labour market have 
a predicted probability of on-the-job search of over 30 per cent. For 
older workers with long job tenure in a depressed regional labour 
market, the search probability falls to around one half of one per cent. 
Job search by these individuals is hardly contemplated.
3.4.3 Determinents of Job Search Strategy
Table 3.7 presents our estimates of the determinants of the 
preferred search strategy of those workers who decide to seek 
alternative employment whilst still employed. The data again implies 
that the sample be split by sex (likelihood ratio statistic on a 
male-female sample split = 52.8 - . Thus although Table 3.3
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indicates similar choices of search strategies by males and females, 
there exist large discrepancies in the determinants of that choice 
between the sexes.
The duration of job search, for example, is a significant indicator 
of the type of strategy undertaken by male, but not female, employed job 
seekers. Men are more likely to prefer random search in the initial 
stages of their search. A similar pattern is observed for women but 
this is insignificant. This observation is consistent with the 
hypothesis of diminishing returns to (random) search. It may be that 
workers contact their percieved best job outlets directly, during the 
first months of job search. If these efforts subsequently prove 
unsuccessful then job seekers will adopt alternative strategies in the 
hope of generating acceptable job offers. Random search is expensive 
both in monetary terms and in time expended. As workers run down their 
resources, so the preference for this strategy declines. This effect is 
also reflected in the negative search duration coefficients observed for 
indirect and self-directed search.
The preferred search strategy for men and to a lesser extent for 
women engaged in part-time or temporary work, is indirect search i.e. 
registration with a government or private employment agency. Thus our 
earlier argument that part-time workers have more time to pursue random 
search does not translate directly into an observed preference for this 
type of search. Many temporary workers will be attached to an 
employment agency. It is unsurprising therefore that these workers 
perceive their best chance of receiving an acceptable offer is with an 
agency. A similar argument may apply to part-time working, although it 
is somewhat surprising that part-time workers do not prefer 
self-directed search through personal contacts and newspapers wherein
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many part-time jobs are advertised. However since over 90 per cent of 
job seekers undertake some form of self-directed search our results 
merely suggest that self-directed strategies have a secondary role in 
the job search activities of non full-time workers.
Local economic conditions also influence the choice of search 
strategy, though not always in the hypothesised direction. We find a 
strong (male) occupational wage effect. The higher the wage the less 
likely the preference for random search and the more likely indirect or 
self-directed search. This probably reflects the differing vacancy 
notification outlets across occupations. Low-wage jobs are most likely 
to be contacted via random approaches to employers. It is reasonably 
common in tight labour markets to see unskilled vacancies notified at 
factory gates and in shop windows. High vacancy rates are associated 
with less random search and increased preferences for indirect search 
amongst employed men.^® One might expect that more vacancies and 
competition for workers amongst firms would encourage firms to advertise 
through agencies or in newspapers. In practice job seekers appear to 
concentrate their search efforts in response to a rise in labour demand, 
choosing to search within pre-defined areas afforded by indirect or 
self-directed search. In this way job search efforts are made to 
respond more efficiently and effectively to increased vacancy supply. 
Table 3.4 indicates that employed job search may be reduced by a rise in 
unemployment. Table 3.7 suggests that of those workers who continue to 
search, preferences move away from random and self-directed strategies 
toward indirect search, particularly for women. Random search is 
unlikely to generate many job offers when there is increased competition 
for jobs. Indirect search is the most secure method of contacting such 
vacancies as do exist in a slack labour market.
Table 3.8 reports predicted search strategy probabilities for 
selected groups of workers. The typical worker chosen to illustrate the 
likelihood of on-the-job search in Table 3.6 is seen to prefer random to 
indirect search, if male, and the reverse if female (row 1). 
Self-directed search dominates the preferred categories of all our 
groups. Extensive search duration halves the likelihood of men adopting 
a random strategy, consistent with the notion of decreasing returns to 
this approach (row 3). This is complemented by row 4, which shows that 
with a 15 per cent unemployment rate, workers consolidate their position 
in bad times by concentrating search effort on job agencies. Workers 
with larger potential gains from search (high wage and vacancy rates), 
also move away from random search (rows 5 and 6). The individual 
magnitude of these economic effects is not great. Large movements in 
these indicators would be required to induce a perceptible change in 
worker behaviour. If we combine these variables with changes in base 
characteristics, we can obtain an insight into the type of workers more 
prone to a particular strategy. Young single workers for example, are 
far more likely to prefer indirect search. This probably reflects their 
lack of knowledge of the labour market. Young workers (row 7) will not 
have developed the informational flows and contacts that are associated 
with age and experience. In contrast (row 8), older employees accumulate 
sufficient information that enables them to express a preference for 
random search even in a depressed local economy.
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3.5: Conclusions
On-the-job search is an important activity for study since 
job-to-job changes account for most of labour turnover. Job search, as 
a prelude to future mobility, is a necessary means by which to try to 
improve the qualities of a job match, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary. 
This chapter has attempted to provide empirical confirmation of the 
theoretical determinants of on-the-job search for men and women in 
Great Britain and of the types of methods of search subsequently 
undertaken. Our regressions indicate that job search is responsive to 
varying economic conditions. Inter-industry wage differentials and 
tight labour market conditions are positively correlated with on-the-job 
search. The latter also influence a worker's preferred means of locating 
job offers.
The strongest influences on the likelihood of search are however job 
characteristics. Men and women with long job tenures are much less 
likely to search on the job. The acquisition of firm-specific capital 
reduces the potential gain from search. Workers engaged in temporary 
jobs are more likely to search than those in permanent employment. Yet 
these job seekers are a minority of those with temporary jobs. The 
remainder presumably wait until the termination of their job before 
resuming search. Part-time working also elicits greater job search 
efforts. Workers react to adverse non-wage aspects of the job by 
reducing employed job search, presumably moving into full-time 
unemployed search.
Once a decision to seek alternative work has been made, the employed 
job searcher then chooses the preferred methods with which to contact 
job offers. The most commonly chosen form of on-the-job search is to
combine a self-directed strategy with either indirect or random search. 
Self-directed search strategies . are more readily integrated into a 
normal working routine than the more time consuming random search. 
Hence employed workers increase search efficiency by concentrating 
search efforts within a pre-determined area defined by indirect or 
self-directed search. Temporary workers search more extensively than 
others in anticipation of a pending job termination. A worker's choice 
of search strategy is heavily influenced by the duration of search and 
the strength of local labour market activity. Lengthy search durations 
and slack labour markets encourage movements away from random search and 
into self-directed or indirect search. The concentration of search 
activity increases the likelihood of contacting an acceptable job offer.
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Footnotes
* This study has been financed by the Department of Employment.
1. The two studies referred to are the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Surveys of 1955 and 1961 in which all those employees who quit jobs 
within the survey year were asked whether they moved directly into 
new j obs.
2. The model therefore carries the unrealistic assumption that workers 
can freely adjust their labour supply in accordance with the optimal 
search outcome.
3. It may be of course that unemployed search allows a greater search
intensity and hence a greater probability of receiving a job offer
which may offset the income disadvantage. However since search
intensity is itself a function of time and income, even if
unemployed workers are observed to search more intensely, the 
advantage of off-the-job search does not follow immediately.
4. This of course assumes that there exist inter-industry wage 
differentials for given occupations and not merely because of the 
different occupational mix across industries. See Dickens and Katz
(1987) for evidence from the United States in favour of this 
hypothesis.
5. Current UK regulations as embodied by the Employment Protection Act
1975 require at least 30 days advance notification of any
redundancy, and 90 days notice if the planned layoff incorporates 
over 100 workers.
6. See chapter 6 for some evidence that inter-firm mobility is 
pro-cyclical. It therefore follows that on-the-job search will also 
follow the same pattern.
7. The LFS asks job seekers whether they have used any of 8 possible
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search methods, as outlined in Table 3.2. Respondents are then 
asked to identify their main method of search, from which we obtain 
our dependent variable.
8. The presence of the manual status dummy reduces the significance of 
the economic variables rather like the full set of occupational 
dummies in Table 3.5. Hence its exclusion in the final 
specification. The negative manual worker effect can be seen in the 
wage, vacancy and unemployment coefficients in Table 3.4.
9. Not one of the 5 occupational and 9 industrial dummies proved 
individually significant. This contrasts with Hughes and McCormick 
(1985b), who report significant negative coefficients on the search 
intentions of professional and skilled manual workers, although 
these estimates are regression specific.
10. We exclude a manual status dummy in the final specification for the 
same reasons as discussed in footnote 8. The inclusion produced a 
significant negative coefficient on indirect search in the male 
regression and no other strong effects elsewhere.
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Appendix A3
Data Sources
Information on individual socio-economic characteristics is taken
from the 1984 Labour Force Survey as provided to us by the UK Office of
Population Census and Survey and the ESRC Data Archive. We include 
individuals classed as employed on the LFS definition (Males aged 15-64 
years and females aged 15-59). An employed job seeker is defined to be 
one who, during the reference week of the survey, has looked for a new 
job to replace the existing one. The LFS derived variables are:
AGE1624 - 1 if respondent aged 16-24; - 0 otherwise
AGE5064 — 1 if respondent aged 50-54; 0 otherwise
SINGLE = 1 if single, divorced or widowed; 0 otherwise
DEGREE — 1 if highest qualification is degree or membership of
professional institute; 0 otherwise.
GCE = 1 if highest qualification is GCE 'A* or ’O' level or equivalent;
0 otherwise
OTHER — 1 if highest qualification is of technical or vocational nature; 
0 otherwise
COUNCIL = 1 if living in local authority housing; 0 otherwise
MOVE = 1 if moved region in year preceding interview; 0 otherwise
DIFFIRM = 1 if employment by different firm one year prior to interview; 
0 otherwise
UNEMP = 1 if unemployed one year prior to interview; 0 otherwise 
INACTIVE = 1 if outside the labour force one year prior to interview;
0 otherwise
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TEMPORARY = 1 if current job is temporary or of fixed contract length;
0 otherwise
SMALL = 1 if current establishment contains less then 25 employees;
0 otherwise
PTIME * 1 if respondent reports current job to be part-time; 0 otherwise 
TENLT6M = 1 if current job tenure 6 months or less; 0 otherwise 
TEN624M = 1 if current tenure between 6 and 24 months; 0 otherwise 
TEN210Y = 1 if current tenure between 2 and 10 years; 0 otherwise 
L00KLT3M =■ if duration of job search 3 months or less; 0 otherwise 
LOOK36M = 1 if duration between 3 and 6 months; 0 otherwise 
LOOK612M=» 1 if job search duration between 6 and 12 months; 0 otherwise 
In addition we have supplemented the LFS dataset with information 
relating to the first quarter of 1984 from the following sources.
1 . Unemployment
UOCCRATE — Log of regional male and female unemployment rate 
disaggregated by occupation. Source: 1984 Labour Force Survey.
2. Vacancies
VOCCRATE — Regional vacancies expressed as a percentage of employees 
in employment disaggregated by occupation. Source: Department of
Employment Gazette, Table 3.6.
3. Employment
All employees in employment disaggregated by region. Source: 
Central Statistical Office Regional Trends, Table 8.1.
4. Wages
OCCWAGE/INDWAGE = Log of average hourly earnings of men and women 
disaggregated by region and a) occupation, b) industry. Source: 
Department of Employment New Earnings Survey (1984), Part E, Tables 
118-121, 122-123.
-94-
5 . Redundancies
REDRATE - Number of redundancies confirmed to the Department of 
Employment under the Employment Protection Act 1975 by industry. 
Source: Department of Employment Gazette, Table 2.31.
6. Accident Rate
ACCRATE = Fatal and Major injuries per 1000 employees, reported to 
authorities by 2 digit SIC. Source: Health and Safety Executive Health 
and Safety Statistics, 1984-85, Table 2.1A.
-95-
Table 3.1
Properties of on-the-1ob Search
Variable
Probability 
of search
Conditional 
probability of 
on-the-job search
Unconditional 
probability of 
on-the-job search
Own wage - + ? (-)*
Wages elsewhere + 0 +
Job vacancies + - ? (+)
Adverse Non-Wage 
Characteristics + - ? (-)
Job tenure - + ? (-)
Mobility Cost - 0 -
Note: * The bracketed sign indicates the likely direction of the effect.
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Table 3.2 
% Employees engaged In job search
Type of Job
TOTAL 
Men Women
MANUAL 
Men Women
NON-
Men
-MANUAL
Women
1. Full-time,
Tenure > 20 years 1.69 1.52 1.32 0.97 2.16 1.75
2. Full-time,
Tenure < 20 years 6.58 6.36 6.43 5.61 7.95 7.24
3. Part-time 15.88 4.65 25.67 5.44 13.61 4.36
4. Temporary 33.96 16.59 34.92 14.70 32.12 17.92
Total Employed Job 
Seekers 5.08 5.51 5.05 5.39 5.11 5.56
Unemployed Job Seekers 
(as % of Employment) 13.20 12.21 19.97* 14.71* 4.81* 11.01*
Note: * The Labour Force Survey gives the previous occupation of those who 
lost their job within the previous three years only. For the 
remaining unemployed we used the weights in the occupational 
classification of unemployment, for the most recent year for which 
there is aggregate information, 1982.
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Table 3.3
Search Methods and Strategies of On-the-Job Searchers
Percentage Using Status
Search strategy/method ------------------------------------------
Total Male Female Manual Temp. Part-
time
1 2 3 4 5 6
Self Directed 97.5 97.9 97.0 97.2 98.5 97.6
Advertising in newspapers 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.6
Answering advertisements 52.9 52.6 53.2 43.9 56.5 50.4
Studying situations vacant 
in newspapers 50.5 51.0 49.8 56.5 46.4 54.2
Personal contacts (friends, 
colleagues, trade unions) 57.2 59.6 54.1 66.5 67.6 61.7
Indirect 45.7 43.8 48.1 49.5 60.8 57.3
Visiting Job Centre, Govt.
Employment Office etc. 36.6 34.5 39.4 45.4 51.2 53.5
Private Agency 13.5 13.3 13.9 7.2 16.6 8.8
Random
Direct approaches to firms/ 
employers 47.4 47.2 47.6 47.5 56.5 44.0
Other 47.5 48.1 46.8 39.7 46.9 39.4
Mean number of Search
Strategies 2.47 2.49 2.43 2.42 2.41 2.24
Mean number of Search 
Methods 3.07 3.08 3.06 3.07 3.43 3.14
Sample Size 2,291 1,303 988 1,080 416 548
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Table 3.4
Logit Regressions for the Probability of Search on the Job
(a) Males aged 15-64
Independent Variable Sample Mean Estimate Standard
Error
Constant 0.30 (1.17)
AGE5064 0.24 -0.81 (0.10)**
SINGLE 0.27 -0.02 (0.06)
EDUCATION: DEGREE 0.15 0.86 (0.10)**
: GCE 0.34 0.43 (0.07)**
: OTHER 0.08 0.23 (0.10)**
COUNCIL 0.20 0.12 (0.07)*
MOVE 0.03 -0.24 (0.15)
Situation 1 year ago
: DIFFIRM 0.07 0.15 (0.11)
: UNEMPLOYED 0.04 0.47 (0.12)**
: INACTIVE 0.02 -0.04 (0.14)
Current Job Attributes
: TEMPORARY 0.03 1.31 (0.10)**
: SMALL 0.30 -0.08 (0.06)
: PART-TIME 0.01 1.23 (0.13)**
: TEN LT6M 0.06 1.36 (0.14)**
: TEN 624M 0.13 1.44 (0.10)**
: TEN 210Y 0.38 1.11 (0.08)**
Local Economic Conditions
: UOCCRATE -2.73 -0.14 (0.08)*
: VOCCRATE 0.56 -0.07 (0.11)
: OCCWAGE 6.02 -0.16 (0.24)
: INDWAGE 6.03 -0.63 (0.19)**
: REDRATE 0.20 0.24 (0.17)
: ACCRATE 0.80 -0.22 (0.04)**
Diagnostics
Log L
Model L.R. Statistic (d.f.) 
Per Cent Correct Predictions 
Mean of Dependent Variable 
Sample Size
-5,697.47 
1,380.26 (22) 
94.8 
0.052 
31,303
Note: ** significant at 95 per cent level, * significant at 90 per cent
level 2-tailed t test.
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Table 3.4 (ctd)
(b) Females aged 15-59
Independent Variable Sample Mean Estimate Standard
Error
Constant -3.36 (1.32)**
AGE5064 0.19 -1.00 (0.14)**
SINGLE 0.32 0.60 (0.07)**
EDUCATION: DEGREE 0.10 0.68 (0.12)**
: GCE 0.36 0.50 (0.08)**
: OTHER 0.11 0.49 (0.10)**
COUNCIL 0.21 0.10 (0.08)
MOVE 0.02 -0.08 (0.17)
Situation 1 year ago
: DIFFIRM 0.08 0.24 (0.12)
: UNEMPLOYED 0.03 0.54 (0.14)**
: INACTIVE 0.09 -0.09 (0.12)
Current Job Attributes
: TEMPORARY 0.06 0.89 (0.09)**
: SMALL 0.43 -0.09 (0.06)
: PART-TIME 0.42 0.19 (0.09)**
: TEN LT6M 0.10 1.23 (0.17)**
: TEN 624M 0.20 1.27 (0.14)**
: TEN 210Y 0.47 1.04 (0.13)**
Local Economic Conditions
: UOCCRATE -2.80 -0.07 (0.11)
: VOCCRATE 0.62 0.10 (0.12)
: OCCWAGE 5.61 0.37 (0.23)
: INDWAGE 5.59 -0.63 (0.22)**
: REDRATE 0.11 -0.29 (0.28)
: ACCRATE 0.45 0.01 (0.09)
Diagnostics
Log L
Model L.R. Statistic (d.f.) 
Per Cent Correct Predictions 
Mean of Dependent Variable 
Sample Size
-4,500.47
750.69 (22) 
94.5 
0.055 
22,749
Note: ** significant at 95 per cent level, * significant at 90 per cent
level 2-tailed t test.
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Table 3.5
Specification Tests on the Probability of Search on the Job
Independent Variables Estimates
a) Males
UOCCRATE -0.12 (0.12) -0.13 (0.08) -0.12 (0.12)
VOCCRATE -0.09 (0.16) -0.13 (0.12) -0.07 (0.16)
OCCWAGE 0.63 (0.52) -0.34 (0.24) 0.66 (0.57)
INDWAGE -1.31 (0.28)** -0.48 (0.23)** -1.39 (0.39)**
REDRATE 0.44 (0.18)** 0.77 (0.45)* 0.79 (0.45)*
ACCRATE -0.20 (0.04)** -0.19 (0.09)** -0.18 (0.09)*
Occupation Dummies Yes No Yes
Industry Dummies No Yes Yes
Log L -5,688.9 -5,680.4 5,672.3
Model L.R. Statistic (d.f.) 1,397.4 (27) 1,414.3 (31) 1,430.6 (36)
Per Cent Correct Predictions 94.8 94.8 94.8
b) Females
UOCCRATE -0.16 (0.12) -0.07 (0.11) -0.17 (0.12)
VOCCRATE -0.13 (0.19) 0.09 (0.12) -0.11 (0.19)
OCCWAGE 0.76 (0.28)** 0.27 (0.25) 0.65 (0.29)**
INDWAGE -0.56 (0.25)** -0.44 (0.28) -0.12 (0.36)
REDRATE -0.26 (0.30) 0.12 (0.73) 0.40 (0.75)
ACCRATE -0.01 (0.09) -0.04 (0.17) -0.11 (0.29)**
Occupation Dummies Yes No Yes
Industry Dummies No Yes Yes
Log L -4,496.2 -4,497.5 -4,491.4
Model L.R. Statistic (d.f.) 759.3 (27) 756.6 (31) 768.8 (36)
Per Cent Correct Predictions 94.5 94.5 94.5
Note: All equations include the same variables as reported in Table 
3.4 in addition to those above.
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Table 3.6
Predicted Probabilities of on the job search for given characteristics
Predicted Probability
Men Women
1) Base characteristics 0.0659 0.0402
2) As 1) except PTIME-1 0.1945 0.0482
3) As 1) except SINGLE-1 0.0647 0.0709
4) As 1) except TENLT6M-1 0.0831 0.0482
5) As 1) except tenure ^ 10 years 0.0227 0.0146
6) As 1) except TEMPORARY-1, TEN624M-1 0.2668 0.1137
7) As 1) except UOCCRATE = 15% 0.0590 0.0380
8) As 1) except 10% increase in OCCWAGE 0.0649 0.0416
9) As 1) except 10% increase in INDWAGE 0.0621 0.0378
10) As 1) except ACCRATE = 2.50 0.0430 0.0410
11) As 1) except AGE5064-1, no formal 
qualifactions, tenure in excess of 10 
years, living in high unemployment, 
vacancy region 0.0058 0.0030
12) As 1) except SINGLE=1, DIFFIRM-1, 
TENLTGM-1, living in high vacancy, low 
unemployment region, low industry wage 0.3421 0.309
Note: Base characteristics define worker aged 16-49, Married, Education
= GCE, living in owner-occupied accommodation. Employed full-time 
by same large firm for between 2 to 10 years. Local economic 
variables assume mean values.
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Table 3.7
Multinominal Estimates of the Preferred Job Search Strategy
Independent Strategy
Variable Indirect Random Self-Directed
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Constant -5.27 -3.59 6.28 -4.97 0 0
(3.27) (3.41) (4.21) (4.23) (normalised)
AGE1624 0.43** 0.02 -0.12 -0.03 -0.33 0.01
(0.16) (0.14) (0.18) (0.21)
MANUAL -0.53** -0.15 -0.06 0.13 -0.07 0.02
(0.24) (0.13) (0.14) (0.16)
TEMPORARY 0.36** 0.15 -0.02 0.13 -0.34 -0.28
(0.14) (0.17) (0.17) (0.21)
PTIME 0.27 0.23 -0.10 -0.09 -0.20 -0.14
(0.18) (0.18) (0.24) (0.22)
L00KLT3M -0.22 0.10 0.51** 0.28 -0.26 -0.38
(0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.21)
LOOK36M -0.34* 0.24 0.50** 0.04 -0.13 -0.28
(0.18) (0.21) (0.20) (0.26)
LOOK612M -0.32* 0.08 0.50** -0.10 -0.18 0.02
(0.17) (0.21) (0.19) (0.28)
VOCCRATE 0.34* 0.02 -0.61** -0.14 0.17 0.12
(0.21) (0.25) (0.27) (0.32)
UOCCRATE 0.32* 0.54** 0.19 -0.35 -0.30 -0.19
(0.18) (0.25) (0.18) (0.29)
OCCWAGE 0.83* 0.35 -1.00** 0.01 0.17 I o OJ O'!
(0.43) (0.46) (0.51) (0.53)
Diagnostics Males Females
At Zero At Convergence At Zero At Convergence
Log L -1347 -921.6 -1018 707.2
Degrees of ]Freedom 2452 2438 1854 1812
Per Cent Correctly
Predicted 33.,3 71.2 33.3 70.0
Sample Size 1226 927
Notes: ** indicates significant at 95 per cent level, * significant at 90 
per cent level 2-tailed t test. Normalisation constraint requires 
sum of coefficients across the 3 states equals zero. Equation also 
contains dummy variables measuring Age, Education, Marital Status, 
Children, Housing Tenure and Job Tenure. Sample shares of 
dependent variable were: (.70, Self-directed, .18 Indirect, .12 
Random) for males and (.69, .21 and .10) for females respectively.
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Table 3.8
Predicted Probabilities of Prefered Search Strategy
Predicted Probability
Men Women
Indirect Random Indirect Random
1) Base characteristics 0.094 0.159 0.113 0.051
2) As 1) except PTIME—1 0.145 0.164 0.154 0.052
3) As 1) except LOOK ^ 1 year 0.103 0.080 0.073 0.049
4) As 1) except UOCCRATE = 15% 0.118 0.162 0.199 0.040
5) As 1) except 10% increase in OCCWAGE 0.102 0.144 0.121 0.052
6) As 1) except 10% increase in VOCCRATE 0.098 0.149 0.112 0.050
7) As 1) except SINGLE-1, DCHILD-0, 
TENLT6M-1, AGE1624-1,living in 
high wage, high vacancy, 
low unemployment region.
0.289 0.102 0.364 0.070
8) As 1) except AGE5064-1,DCHILD-0, 
LOOK612M-1, OTHER-1, 
tenure in excess of ten years, 
living in low wage, low vacancy, 
high unemployment region.
0.103 0.221 0.268 0.011
Note: Base characteristics define worker aged 20-49, Married, Education
= GCE, living in owner-occupied accommodation. Employed full-time 
by same large firm for between 2 to 10 years. Local economic 
variables assume mean values. In addition we now assume job search 
has currently lasted for less than 3 months. The probability 
of observing self-directed search is one minus the sum of the 
probabilities of indirect and random search.
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Chapter 4: Unemployment Benefits and Search Effort in the UK Labour
Market
4.1 Introduction
We now turn our attention to the determinants of job search by the 
unemployed. In particular, this chapter examines the role of 
unemployment benefits as an aid to job search, and an enhancement to a 
more efficient working of the labour market. If labour is to become more 
mobile, it must be able to adapt more readily to periods of 
unemployment. The provision of unemployment related benefit should 
facilitate job search effort, if recipients use this additional income 
to subsidise job search rather than leisure. Indeed these principles 
were incorporated into the world's first national system of compulsory 
unemployment insurance scheme introduced in Britain in 1911.
Yet from the inception of the scheme under the National Insurance 
Act of 1911, the idea that the unemployed should receive income support 
whilst out of work has attracted some criticism. Much of this criticsim 
concerns the issue of whether unemployment benefits encourage workers to 
remain unemployed longer than otherwise. In theory any system should 
guard against this. The setting of benefit at a level sufficiently below 
that attainable from employment was incorporated into the original UK 
scheme. The payment of benefit was also limited to three months in any 
one year, though as demand conditions worsened this time period was 
gradually extended. Income receipt was made conditional on the worker 
being available for work and confined to those who had been 
involuntarily separated from their jobs. The current administrative 
system retains many of these original features. It is now possible
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however, for unemployed workers to obtain some form of government
assistance indefinitely provided the worker is deemed to have satisfied 
a series of conditional requirements primarily relating to work 
availability and alternative income sources. (See Matthewman and Sloss
(1988) for an outline of the current benefit administration system in 
the UK).1
These social security regulations inevitably mean that some workers 
qualify for financial support whilst others do not. Government
unemployment statistics are calculated on the basis of those claiming 
unemployment benefit. Yet not everyone out of work and looking for a job 
is entitled to receive benefits — those who left their previous 
employment voluntarily and people with insufficient National Insurance 
contributions are two notable e x a m p l e s .^ The Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
provides an alternative definition of unemployment based upon principles 
outlined by the International Labour Organisation. This definition 
refers to persons available for work, who have actively sought work
within a specified period. The LFS unemplyment statistics therefore
include persons within and without the government's administrative 
definition. Indeed this survey based measure of unemployment should be 
largely unaffected by changes in legislation and regulation.
More importantly for our purpose, the LFS provides a sound empirical 
base from which to analyse whether benefit payments induce a change in a 
worker's job search behaviour. Comparison of the search activities of 
recipients and non-recipients should help assess the validity of the 
disincentive argument. This chapter analyses differences in job search 
effort between these two groups.
Empirical estimates of the relationship between unemployment rates 
and benefits in the UK, followed the introduction of redundancy payments
-106-
in 1965 and Earnings Related Supplement in the National Insurance Act of 
1966. Gujarati (1972) was one of the first to present results indicating 
that the UV curve had shifted outward at around the same time. This he 
attributed to increased worker choosiness arising from the increase in 
unemployment benefits enshrined in the 1966 Act. Maki and Spindler
(1975), in their study of the same phenomena ventured, but did not 
pursue, the idea that increases in unemployment benefit would be an 
inducement to greater search activity. Of course such ideas cannot be 
addressed without access to micro data.
An established finding of the job search literature is that the 
probability of gaining employment is the product of the probabilities of 
(a) receiving a job offer and (b) the acceptability of any such offer. 
Theoretical and empirical analysis of the role of unemployment benefits 
in the job search process has concentrated upon the latter - the 
reservation wage criterion. Mortensen (1970, 1977) was among the first 
to demonstrate that the provision of unemployment benefits would reduce 
both the cost of search and the expected gain from future employment. 
The resulting increase in worker choosiness raises the reservation wage 
and hence the duration of unemployment. Hitherto, the majority of U.K. 
empirical studies using micro data have examined this duration effect. A 
number of authors from Nickell (1979) and Lancaster (1979) through to 
Narandranathan (1989) all rely on the reservation wage hypothesis to 
explain their estimated elasticities of duration with respect to 
benefits, taking no account of the potential for unemployment benefit to 
influence the probability of receiving a job offer.
The rate of arrival of job offers will be dependent on the level 
of demand in the particular labour market in which the individual is 
searching. It must also be dependent on the level of effort with which
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individuals search the market. This paper attempts to establish an 
empirical link between unemployment benefits and search effort using 
U.K. micro data. The direction of such an effect will have important 
implications for the study of unemployment duration. If the receipt of 
unemployment benefits induces individuals to search harder (so 
increasing the probability of receiving a job offer) this will then 
limit the reservation wage effect of benefits on unemployment duration. 
Conversely, the reservation wage effect could be accentuated should 
benefit claimants reduce their search effort.
In the next section we discuss briefly the theoretical framework. 
This includes an outline of a potential selectivity problem which arises 
from the nature of our dataset. Since we only observe economically \ 
active claimants and non-claimants, we may be open to some form of ■ 
heterogeneity bias were we not to control for behavioural differences 
between those included in our sample and those excluded because they do 
not belong to the labour force according to LFS guidelines. The 
appropriate sample selection correction technique is therefore based 
around search theoretic considerations of the decision to participate in 
the labour market. In Section 4.3 we discuss the data used in this 
study and in Section 4.4 we present results, which indicate that benefit 
claimants search more extensively than non-claimants. Section 4.5 
provides concluding comments.
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4.2 Theoretical Framework
Those 'unemployed actively seeking work' who are not eligible to 
receive unemployment related benefits consist mainly of new labour force 
entrants, re-entrants, people who left their previous job voluntarily. 
There are reasons to believe that the job search behaviour of these 
individuals will differ systematically from that of benefit claimants, 
even after accounting for any observed heterogeneity.
The probability that an unemployed worker will obtain employment is 
the product of the probability, q, that the worker will receive a job 
offer and the probability w that the offer will be deemed acceptable.
Pe - qw
Most empirical studies have established, if with little agreement as to 
the magnitude of the effect, that ^w/db < 0.^ An increase in
unemployment benefit reduces both the cost of further search and the 
expected gain from employment so rendering fewer job offers acceptable. 
This paper is primarily concerned with the potential for unemployment 
benefits to influence the likelihood of receiving a job offer.
We therefore endogenise the job offer probability, q, which 
therefore becomes a function both of the level of demand, z and the 
degree of search activity undertaken by job seekers, s.
q = q(z,s) dq, dq > 0
dz ds
Search effort generates information about alternative job offers. It 
includes activities such as the use of state or private employment 
agencies, direct approaches to firms or the placing of advertisements in
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newspapers and journals. The more effort expounded the larger the 
amount of information accrued and the higher the probability of 
contacting a job offer. The first attempt to justify empirically the 
claim that unemployment benefit could influence the degree of search 
activity appears in Barron and Mellow (1979) using US data. Here search 
effort is given by
S = S(e,t,x)
where e and t represent the expenditure and time respectively devoted to 
search activity per period and x represents the influence of personal 
characteristics. Unemployed workers derive a utility over the
unemployment spell defined in terms of income and leisure
U - U(y + b ,L)
where y is non-labour income, b is unemployment benefits and L is
leisure. On undertaking search the utility function becomes
U - U[y + b - e, L - t]
On the assumption that search time and expenditure, are separable 
inputs in the search effort function, Barron and Mellow derive expected 
utility optimization conditions which show that the existence of 
unemployment benefit will reduce search time but increase expenditure. 
Empirical evidence is produced to support the first contention. As
income rises with the provision of unemployment benefits, so more
leisure is purchased at the expense of time spent searching the labour 
market. The authors use this evidence to support their contention that 
benefits will reduce the job offer contact probability. In a subsequent 
paper (Barron and Mellow (1981)), the authors show that the monthly 
probability of employment accession is lower for benefit receipients.
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(See chapter 5 for some UK evidence which does not entirely support this 
result).
In contrast, Tannery (1983) presents a model in which search time 
and expenditure are complementary rather than separable inputs into the 
search effort function, s. In this case the increased expenditure 
afforded by benefits can be used to enhance the productiveness of time 
spent on job search. So the overall effect of benefits on search effort 
may be positive, even though the length of search time may fall. 
Empirical evidence is presented of a positive coefficient of benefits on 
search time. This intimates at the sensitivity of Barron and Mellow's 
results to choice of data. Ben-Harim and Zuckerman (1987) show that 
such an effect can offset the reservation wage effect and reduce 
unemployment duration. This is likely to be the case if there exist 
capital market imperfections and liquidity constraints among the 
unemployed. Unemployment benefits will then be used to help finance and 
intensify search effort from limited resources.
The productivity of search effort by benefit claimants will be 
higher if they use their job contacts more efficiently. The provision 
of benefits could enable workers to target likely job offer sources more 
effectively. We might expect to observe a movement away from time 
intensive search methods. More vacancies can be contacted by telephone 
or by post than by direct approaches to firms. Information could be 
more accessible and easily processed by someone who has closer ties with 
the labour market as benefit claimants may have, compared to new 
entrants or re-entrants. (The other group who form part of 
non-claimants, job quitters, will have less incentive to look for work, 
at least in the initial stages of their unemployment when their marginal 
value of leisure is still high.)
-111-
It would appear therefore, that the sign of the unemployment benefit 
effect on search effort is a matter for empirical verification.
We examine the benefit impact by contrasting the number of search 
methods used by benefit claimants and non-claimants. St Louis, Burgess 
and Kingston (1986) argue that the most apposite measure of search 
effort is the number of actual job contacts made, since this accurately 
conveys the intensity with which the inputs of time and expenditure are 
combined. Given the absence of such information in our dataset we proxy 
search effort by the extensiveness of job search, a measure which also 
incorporates the notion that search expenditures and time are combined 
to produce a search output. The use of such a variable is preferred to 
that found in Barron and Mellow (1979) namely the reported hours spent 
searching, which as we have shown captures only one component of search 
effort.
In the only other UK study of which we are aware, Jackman and 
Williams (1985) utilised the number of job applications made by members 
of the DHSS Cohort Study of 1978-79 as an alternative measure of search 
intensity. In their model, unemployment benefits discourage job 
applications because they reduce the expected returns from so doing 
This measure does not however incorporate any notion of search 
extensity. Workers may make any number of applications using only one 
particular method of search. Benefit claimants may use their income to 
target potential vacancies more precisely. The wider the field of 
search, the more likely a job may be targeted. This would not be 
apparent from an analysis of job applications that did not control for 
number of search methods used. A similar argument applies to Barron and 
Mellow's (1979) examination of search time. Benefit claimants may choose 
methods that involve less time but offer greater search productivity.
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Nevertheless the idea that benefits reduce search effort because workers 
perceive the expected return from employment has fallen remains a 
hypothesis worthy of empirical attention.
We therefore model the number of search methods used by unemployed 
job seekers as a function of the claimant status of the individual, a 
vector of personal characteristics, and a set of variables intended to 
measure the impact of local economic conditions. We would expect 
favourable economic conditions to encourage greater search extensiveness 
as a response to an increased return from search. This may be mitigated 
if individuals were to become less concerned about gaining immediate 
employment in the face of improved job opportunities. This would be 
akin to the reaction of reservation wages under similar conditions noted 
by Mortenson (1970). The personal characteristics vector includes 
controls for observed heterogeneity and differences in search effort 
attributable to the length of search spell. As the duration of 
unemployment increases we might expect effort to decline if the worker 
were to contact his (or her) most favourable options at the outset of 
the spell (see Holt (1970) for example). The indefinite nature of 
benefit provision in the United Kingdom, unlike in the United States or 
Japan, should ensure that claimants can prolong search effort relative 
to non-claimants. Any observed increases in effort with duration would 
be more likely to come from non-claimants nearing the exhaustion of 
finite search resources.
Before proceeding we must first deal with a statistical problem that 
arises from our analysis of search effort that is necessarily 
conditional upon an initial decision by the worker to participate in the 
labour market. Search theory suggests (see for example Pissarides
(1976), Burdett and Mortensen (1978)) that participation is dependent on
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an evaluation of the relative costs and returns from so doing. The 
provision of unemployment benefits will encourage participation, for 
those eligible to receive them, by simultaneously reducing the cost and 
increasing the return from labour market entrance. In practice this 
ensures the majority of claimants remain in the labour force. However 
some claimants do drop out.^- We therefore involuntarily exclude those 
claimants whose expected returns from entering the labour market are 
sufficiently low as to render participation sub-optimal. Similarly the 
unemployed stock contains only those non-claimants with a sufficiently 
large expected return from job search to compensate for their higher 
entry and search costs relative to claimants, other things equal.
To counteract this selectivity bias problem we follow the approach 
outlined in Maddala (1983). We include in our analysis of search effort 
an additional regressor, calibrated from an initial equation to 
determine the probability that an individual is actively seeking work. 
We model this selection equation as a three way likelihood, which allows 
us to distinguish between those actively seeking work, discouraged 
workers and the wholly inactive. If, benefit claimants maintain a 
closer attachment to the labour force we would expect them to posess 
positive desired hours of work^ even if the costs and expected returns 
from search preclude participation. In other words benefit claimants 
are more likely to be discouraged rather than wholly inactive, relative 
to non-claimants.
Our model therefore takes the form
^si ^si^s + ^si 
*si “ ^sia + V s ± (i * 1,2,...N)
(S = 1,2,3)
The subscript i refers to the i ^  individual, the subscript s refers to
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the labour market status of the individual (1 — unemployed, 2 = 
discouraged, 3 — inactive). We observe Ns , the number of search methods 
used, if and only if I - 1; where
1 = 1  iff Is* > max Ij* j * s
Let es = max Ij* - rjs , then
Pr (ex < Z^a) — Pr(I=l) = exp (Z^a)
3
I exp(Z-ja)
j“l
- F(Zia)
i.e. we estimate the probability of participation as a trichotomous 
logit, obtain estimates 6t of the parameters a, transform the error term 
es into a standard normal variable
«*s - “ 4-1 [F(«s>]
and estimate the equation
N = X(3 - orpp(J(Zi&)) + v 
^(J(Zxd))
by ordinary least squares, where cr^=Var(u) and p is the correlation 
coefficient between u and es*. The second term on the right hand side 
is the selectivity correction variable to control for the sample 
censoring.
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4.3 Data and Estimation
The data used in this study are drawn mainly from the 1984 Labour 
Force Survey (LFS). The information therein allows us to differentiate 
between the search activities of those unemployed (according to the LFS 
definition)^ who are claiming unemployment related benefit and those 
not. Our sample contains 7610 individuals unemployed in the spring of 
1984.
In our analysis of the particpation decision, the dependent variable 
takes one of three possible values according to whether the individual 
is classified as unemployed, discouraged or inactive on LFS definitions. 
A discouraged worker is so counted if he/she replies that a belief that 
no jobs were available was the main reason for not searching for work 
during the survey week. Any other response and the individual is deemed 
inactive.
Each year the unemployed are asked a number of questions regarding 
their search activities. As outlined in Section 4.2 we measure search 
effort by the number of different methods the individual has used to 
look for work, according to the options given by the LFS questionnaire.7 
Holzer (1987) uses a similar method to ours in his analysis of job 
search by unemployed youths in the United States. These categories are 
reproduced in Table 4.1. The LFS does not contain any information 
regarding the time expended on job search. We have argued that the 
latter captures only one component of search effort. Furthermore, 
studies which have access to such information, have documented large 
measurement error (see Jackman and Williams (1985) for UK evidence). We 
experiment with the removal of attendance at job centres from the
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dependent variable in our search effort regressions. This avoids any 
potential misinterpretation of our results that could arise were 
claimants to posess a stronger attachment to job centres owing to the 
administration of the benefit system in the United Kingdom.®
In addition to those variables drawn from the LFS, we have 
supplemented the data set with data on earnings, unemployment and 
vacancies. Following Narendranathan et al (1983) it seems reasonable to 
assume that the unemployed will restrict job search to a subsection of 
the total labour market. This avoids wasting effort contacting jobs 
with which the individual would not require, or could not acquire a 
match. We therefore combine our external data with personal information 
from the LFS to produce unemployment, vacancy and expected wage rates 
pertinent to the region and broad occupational group in which the 
individual is assumed to be s e a r c h i n g .^ Our expected wage variable 
represents the mean wage offer of each particular labour market 
subsection.
The LFS does not contain information on the amount of unemployment 
related benefits individuals receive. Instead our regressions
incorporate a dummy variable, taking the value one if the individual 
reports the receipt of any unemployment related benefits and zero 
otherwise. We cannot therefore make any judgements regarding the amount 
of benefit the individual receives and its effect on search effort. The 
other variables we use to explain search effort control for observed 
heterogeneity in personal and socio-economic characteristics.
Estimation of the participation (selection) equation utilises the 
choice based maximum likelihood technique developed by Manski and Lerman 
(1977). The sample is not random, but consists of a disproportionate 
number of discouraged workers. This is necessary because of the small
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number of discouraged workers in our sample and the size restrictions 
imposed by the computer program used to estimate the selection equation. 
The likelihood equation is suitably weighted to reflect this. The 
technique consists of weighting the appropriate component of the 
likelihood by the ratio Qi/Hi where Qi is the true proportion of those 
choosing option i and Hi is the choice based sample proportion of those 
choosing i . ^  The resulting estimates presented in Table 4.2 are 
consistent but the standard errors are inefficient. The sample 
selection correction technique when applied to models of polychotomous 
choice is analogous to that in models of binary choice. We present 
results for men and women separately. This accords with the separate 
treatment of men and women in the analysis of labour supply.
4.4 Results
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics on the number of methods used 
by individuals to look for work. The penultimate row shows that the 
average male or female unemployed benefit claimant uses more search 
methods than does the non-claimant seeker. Both groups, on average, use 
more than two methods simultaneously in their search for work. This 
implies that job search is not a uniform activity. The average for 
claimants of 3.16 is remarkably close to the mean value of 3.07 search 
methods used by employed job seekers in Chapter 3. This could suggest 
that a similar level of search effort is undertaken by on-the-job 
seekers and the claimant unemployed alike and that this is greater than 
the effort expounded by non-claimants.
Fewer benefit non-claimants visit job-centres than claimants. This
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despite the fact that the receipt of unemployment benefit is no longer 
contingent on attendance at the job-centre. Whilst we have already 
alluded to the institutional factors linking the benefit and job centre 
systems, it could suggest that claimants have a somewhat closer 
attachment to the labour force. Conversely, it may imply that claimants 
and non-claimants search in different areas of the labour market. Given 
that around one third of total vacancies in the economy are notified to 
job centres and that the majority of those vacancies are manual, 
non-claimants would be less likely to register if they believed the jobs 
they desired would not be offered there. A similar argument has been 
advanced by Holzer (1988) who suggests that individual differences exist 
in the relative cost and productivity of each available search method. 
This influences the choice and number of search methods and hence our 
measure of search effort. Unemployment benefits imply the existence of 
differing opportunity sets for recipients and non-recipients.
Female non-claimants are more likely to use personal contacts or 
study situations vacant in newspapers than use job centres. This would 
support a segmented labour market hypothesis for female claimants and 
non-claimants. Claimants of both sexes are more likely to use personal 
contacts or make direct contact to firms, which supports our contention 
that claimants will have closer ties with the labour market by virtue of 
more recent experience. Male non-claimants are still more likely to use 
job centres than any other search method, suggesting they search in 
similar labour markets to their claimant counterparts. This contrasts 
with US evidence (see Holzer (1988)) where use of friends and relatives 
and direct contact with firms are consistently the preferred methods of 
search. Our results complement those of Jackman and Williams (1985) who 
produce similar search classifications from the 1978 Cohort Study. It
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would indicate that job search is organised differently in the two 
countries, being more institutionalised within the United Kingdom.
4.4.1 Participation and Benefits
We now consider the econometric evidence on the determinants of 
search. We begin with an analysis of our selection equation which 
determines the probability that an individual is observed in our sample 
of unemployed workers. Table 4.2 presents the results of our selection 
equation based on the likelihood that an individual is observed in one 
of three possible non-employed states. The likelihood ratio test for a 
sample split between male and female is highly significant (LR — 254.0 ~ 
x 2(40)). A s expected, benefit recipients are more likely to participate 
in the labour force. More interestingly, they are also more likely to 
be observed as discouraged workers rather than wholly inactive. Even if 
the costs and expected returns to job search preclude participation, 
claimants retain a closer market attachment than non-claimants by 
maintaining positive desired hours of work. Should conditions improve 
then this former group will be more likely to re-enter the labour 
market.
The effect of aggregate conditions is weak and not always of the 
right sign. Men facing high vacancy rates are more likely to seek work 
and less likely to be discouraged or wholly inactive. We were unable to 
identify a strong response toward local economic conditions for women, 
for whom the participation decision may be more relevant.
The effect of the socio-demographic variables is well documented in 
the participation literature, see for example Layard, Barton and Zabalza 
(1980), so we mention their effects only briefly. The young are
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primarily actively seeking work or wholly inactive. The incidence of 
discouragement rises with age as the expected returns from participation 
fall. Increased human capital in the form of higher education generally 
ensures a higher return from seeking work and reduces the chances of 
discouragement. Health problems, unsurprisingly, are associated with a 
greater incidence of labour force inactivity. Individuals living in 
households with other unemployed members are more likely to be 
participants than discouraged or inactive. This added worker effect 
holds for both men and women. We also find that the presence of 
employed household members induces job search activity. It may be that 
any household that maintains close labour market ties, generates a 
larger flow of information which enhances the expected return from job 
search. Prior labour market experience helps foster higher expected 
returns that induce male, but not female job search. Work experience 
also helps discouraged workers maintain a taste for work, even if job 
search is not viable. As the time spent out of employment increases, so 
the likelihood of discouragement or inactivity rises at the expense of 
job search. Finally we note that those made redundant retain a stronger 
attachment to the labour force than job quitters.
4.4.2 The Effect of Benefits on Search Effort
We now take the estimated probabilities implicit in Table 4.2 and 
adjust for any selection bias present in our analysis of the effects of 
unemployment benefits on search effort. The results are presented in 
Table 4.3. The Chow Test on the male/female sample split is 3.35 
(~F(26,7558)), against a 95 per cent significance level of 1.50.
Receipt of unemployment benefits exerts a positive and significant
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influence on search effort. Benefit claimants search more extensively 
than non claimants. Our result holds across both sexes and if we remove 
attendance at a government job centre from the dependent variable (Model 
2 rather than Model 1). Movement from Model 1 to 2 reduces the size of 
the claimant coefficient somewhat, as we lose the correlation between 
job centres and the benefit administration system. Nevertheless the 
magnitude of the coefficient, and hence the implications for benefit 
receipt on search effort, remains strongly positive. Around ninety per 
cent of male job seekers claim benefits. It is to be expected that they 
will be primary earners in the household, embodied with a more immediate 
incentive to find work than any male non claimant who is more likely to 
be a job quitter or re-entrant. Job quitters have a higher marginal 
value of leisure. That the result holds for female job seekers,H  
reinforces the view that benefit claimants have closer ties with the 
labour market. Just over fifty per cent of female job seekers report 
receipt of unemployment related benefit. The majority of female non 
claimants will be women who re-enter the labour force following a period 
of economic inactivity (looking after young children, for example). Not 
only will they be less familiar with the labour market facing them, but 
their ineligibility for unemployment benefit may limit their ability to 
finance search effort. The fact that men search more extensively than 
women reflects partly the observation that men are more likely to 
receive benefits.
This result is somewhat at odds with the findings of Jackman and 
Williams (1985), who estimated a small negative effect of benefits on 
the number of job applications of unemployed men. However their sample 
consists entirely of benefit receipients and the benefit variable is 
measured continuously, so that their results pertain to within-claimant
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status differences. Our results contrast the search efforts of claimants 
and non-claimants. The evidence presented here indicates that the former 
search more widely which we take to be indicative of a larger degree of 
expended effort.
Of the effect of economic variables on job search effort, we found 
some evidence. The wage rate is of the expected sign, i.e. positive, 
and significant for men but not women. This offers some confirmation 
that an increase in the expected wage rate will induce greater search 
effort as workers endeavour to capture higher returns in the labour 
market. Our intended measures of demand conditions in the job seekers' 
local labour market are also correctly signed. The significance of the 
coefficients depends on the model chosen. Removal of job centres from 
the dependent variable reduces the significance of the vacancy rate and 
increases that of the unemployment rate. The implications are that a) a 
rise (fall) in unemployment deters (encourages) job search efforts other 
than job centre attendance and b) alternative search methods are less 
responsive to changes in notified vacancy rates.^  These estimates 
appear to be robust to the inclusion of regional dummies (see Table 
4.4). So individuals increase, rather than relax, search effort in the 
face of both a rise in the job offer probabilities and a fall in the 
competition for jobs.
The effect of the demographic variables on search effort is straight 
forward. Older workers, both male and female, search less than their 
prime age counterparts. The expected return from search will be lower 
given their shorter time horizons. Increased education raises the 
productivity of search effort. This observed effect may also be 
consistent with the idea that differently qualified individuals search 
in different labour markets, which in part determines their level of
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search effort.
Single men search less than married men. Fewer commitments to the 
home or family enable single people to value leisure more highly. 
Consequently their search intensity is reduced. A converse effect is 
observed for married women. This latter group being more likely to be 
supported by a working spouse during search. Council house tenants 
search more extensively than others in private housing. It is 
established that the former are more prone to unemployment. Perhaps 
their experience of being out of work more frequently enables them to 
make better use of the available job help facilities. The presence of 
other unemployed members in the household generates a discouraged rather 
than added worker effect for women. The major effect of this variable 
is therefore to encourage participation, as we have shown in Table 4.2. 
Once present in the labour market, women under such circumstances do not 
search any harder. The presence of employed workers in the household is 
of the expected sign and significant for men. Not only do employed 
workers provide more information about the labour market to potential 
job seekers, they also provide an additional source of income with which 
to finance search effort.
The characteristics of the job held (if any) immediately prior to 
the current spell of unemployment significantly affect search effort, 
although the magnitude of effect differs across the sexes. Male manual 
workers are more likely to search harder whereas there is no discernible 
effect for their female equivalents. This may indicate a greater desire 
by male manual workers to escape unemployment. This is supported by the 
layoff coefficient which is both strong and positive for males and 
females. Table 4.2 indicates that redundant workers have closer ties 
with the labour market. There is additional evidence in Table 4.3 of a
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higher associated wish to re-enter the work environment. This contrasts 
with results from the US (Holzer (1987)), which find a negative layoff 
effect. Individuals laid off in the US have a greater chance of being 
recalled by their previous employer, which could account for the 
negative sign. It cannot be attributed to their being more likely to 
receive benefits, since we have explicitly controlled for such an 
effect. Men looking for part time work search less extensively but 
there is no discernible impact for women. Since part time work entails 
generally lower wages, the returns from search are comparatively 
smaller. It is also indicative of a lower attachment to the labour 
force. However, men looking for part-time work form only 2 per cent of 
the unemployed male work force, compared to 35 per cent of women. That 
a negligible effect is observed for women, may be attributable to the 
increased availability of part-time work. A higher likelihood of 
obtaining part-time work may offset the full-time wage premium so that 
the expected return from part-time work is greater.
Table 4.3 provides evidence of a duration effect amongst male and 
female job seekers. Search effort increases during the initial stages 
of unemployment. Workers spend the first few weeks of their 
unemployment adjusting to their new status. They may also find a job 
relatively quickly without the need to search extensively. Thereafter 
as the unemployment spell lengthens, it may be that workers begin to 
explore their most promising job opportunities. If they are 
subsequently unsuccessful, then the productivity of search will decline 
over time. Skills may atrophy and close ties with the labour market 
recede as the unemployment spell increases. As they do, so the expected 
return from search falls and with it search effort.
There is evidence of selectivity bias in the female, but not male,
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search effort equations. The omission of the correction term reduces 
the magnitude of the claimant coefficient to such an extent, that it 
becomes insignificant in Model 2 of the female regressions (see Table
4.4 ). The implication is that without allowing for the fact that only 
those individuals with the highest expected returns from participation 
are observed actively seeking work, we would not attribute a 
sufficiently large effect of unemployment benefit on search effort. The 
selectivity correction term enables the true claimant effect to emerge. 
That selectivity bias is more important in the female regressions 
reflects the secondary nature of much female labour force participation, 
where the decision to enter the labour market is more of a choice 
variable.
Finally Model 3 examines the validity of our earlier statement that 
benefit recipients should be a) more responsive to economic signals, by 
virtue of their closer attachment to the labour market and b) more able 
to prolong job search, by virtue of the additional income provided by 
benefits. We do this by interacting the claimant status dummy with the 
appropriate right hand side variables. Both our hypotheses are 
confirmed for women but only the latter for men. Female claimants 
increase search effort by more than non claimants when the expected 
returns from job search (as measured by a rise in vacancy or wage rates 
or a fall in unemployment) improve. Male claimants only respond 
relatively more to variations in the unemployment rate. The majority of 
male non-claimants are job quitters rather than re-entrants. It would 
appear they pay similar heed to aggregate informational flows as 
claimants. Benefits claimants of both sexes do however prolong search 
effort relative to non claimants. Non claimants search harder during 
the initial stages of unemployment, when benefits may provide a
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temporary leisure subsidy. As unemployment duration lengthens and 
search activities of both groups fall with the loss of informational 
contacts and access to the labour market in general, benefit recipients 
seem able to maintain a higher level of search effort, thereby 
maintaining a relatively higher probability of receiving a job offer. 
The net effect^ ©f benefit receipt on search effort, taking into 
account all the interaction terms, remains strongly positive.
If benefits operate in this manner then the consequences for job 
matching efficiency are twofold. First, the increased search intensity 
of claimants relative to non-claimants, generates a negative externality 
for the latter, whose chances of contacting a vacancy are reduced. 
Secondly, Pissarides (1984) shows that the increased likelihood of a job 
match generated by increased search effort, creates a positive 
externality by saving society the search costs of both firm and worker. 
If, as Pissarides shows, the second externality dominates the first, 
then the net effect of unemployment benefit on job offer receipt will be 
beneficial
4.5 Conclusions
Unemployed labour will be more mobile if it is more able to readily 
locate alternative offers of unemployment. The provision of unemployment 
benefits facilitates the job matching process and therefore mobility, by 
enabling unemployed workers to finance their job search activities more 
readily. Increased search effort raises the probability of contacting a 
vacancy and hence the expected duration of employment, other things 
equal. This chapter has shown that non claimants are less attached to
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the labour market and that benefits can improve job matching efficiency 
by improving job search productivity. After controlling for personal 
characteristics and aggregate economic conditions we find that benefit 
claimants search more extensively than non-claimants, thereby increasing 
the rate of job offer arrival. Further, individuals increase, rather 
than relax, search effort in response to favourable demand conditions. 
There is no strong evidence of a differential response by claimants and 
non-claimants to these signals.
That is not to say the probability that workers gain employment is 
necessarily increased by their claiming benefit. Benefit provision may 
simultaneously raise the reservation wage. Rather, it should be 
recognised that unemployment benefits will have two distinct effects on 
job search - reservation wage and job offer effects - which can work in 
opposing directions. The results in this paper indicate that studies of 
unemployment duration should incorporate an explicit allowance of these 
latter effects when attempting to establish linkages between benefit 
provision and duration. Only then will it be possible to assess these 
interactions effectively.
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Footnotes
* This study has been financed by the Department of Employment and the
Economic and Social Research Council
1 This publication is revised annually to take account of ongoing 
changes in the social security system.
2 Other groups ineligible for unemployment benefit include those who 
were dismissed from a job due to misconduct, those who refuse the 
offer of a suitable alternative job and workers who lose employment 
whilst directly involved in a trade dispute. Some of these groups 
may be entitled to other forms of benefit.
3 Narandranathan (1989) estimates a reservation wage elasticity with 
respect to benefits of 0.23. This compares with a figure of 0.14 
given by Lancaster and Chesher (1983) and 0.16 found in 
Narandranathan and Nickell (1985).
4 The proportion of claimants classified according to LFS definitions
as either unemployed, discouraged and inactive were 0.77, 0.08, 0.15 
respectively for males and 0.62, 0.06, 0.32 for females. The
equivalent figures for non claimants were 0.09, 0.03, 0.88 (males) 
and 0.09, 0.02 and 0.89 (females).
5 The term "positive desired hours of work" implies that the utility 
gleaned from working exceeds that obtained from being out of the 
labour force.
6 The U.K. LFS definition of unemployment requires that the individual 
is without a paid job and actively seeking work, waiting to start a 
job, awaiting the results of an application or temporarily sick, 
during the reference week of the survey. Note that this does not 
conform to the ILO standard guidelines which require the unemployed
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to have looked for work in the past four weeks, and be available to 
begin work within a fortnight.
7 Since the dependent variable can take values from zero to eight, OLS 
estimation should be more or less valid. The density function of 
the dependent variable does not appear particularly skewed or show 
signs of skewness (see Table 4.3). The Kolmogorov D statistic tests 
for normality were 0.196 and 0.174 for men (inclusive and exclusive 
of job centre attendance respectively) and 0.192 and 0.157 for 
women. None of these values can reject the null hypothesis of 
normality.
8 Until October 1982, the unemployment count was based upon numbers 
registering at job centres, rather than the number claiming 
unemployment benefit. Even allowing for this discontinuity the 
interaction between government job finding agencies and social 
security offices is likely to be strong.
9 The LFS only contains information on a workers previous occupation 
if he/she has been unemployed for less than three years. For those 
with missing observations we use the average vacancy/wage rate in 
each region.
10 In our sample the true proportions were 0.42, 0.05, 0.53 for
unemployed, discouraged and inactive males, respectively and 0.16,
0.02, 0.82 for women. The choice based sample numbers are given at 
the foot of Table 4.2.
11 This contrasts with similar work by St. Louis et al (1986) who find 
a significant negative impact of benefits on search effort (as 
measured by the number of actual job contacts made) for men and an 
insignificant positive effect for women.
-ISO-
12 Only around one third of total vacancies are notified to job 
centres. It is therefore unsurprising that certain search methods 
are unresponsive to notified vacancies.
13 The net effect of benefit equals the coefficient on the claimant 
status intercept dummy plus the sum of the claimant interaction 
coefficients multiplied by the respective means of the independent 
variables concerned.
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Appendix A4
Data Sources
Information on individual socio-economic characteristics is taken 
from the 1984 Labour Force Survey as provided to us by the UK office of 
Population Census and Survey and the ESRC Data Archive. We include all 
individuals classed as unemployed on the LFS definition (Males aged 
15-64 and females aged 15-59). All LFS based independent variables 
enter our equations as zero-one dummies.
In addition we have supplemented the LFS dataset with information 
from the following sources:
1. Vacancies.
Regional vacancies notified to Job Centres expressed as a percentage 
of employees in employment - disaggregated by 6 occupational groups. 
Source: Department of Employment Gazette, Table 3.6.
2. Employment.
All employees in employment disaggregated by region. Source: 
Regional Trends (Central Statistical Office), Table 8.1.
3. Wages.
Average weekly earnings of men and women disaggregated by region, 16 
broad occupational groups and full-time/part-time status. Source: 
Department of Employment New Earnings Survey (1984), Part E, Tables 
122-123 and Part F, Table 180.
4. Unemployment.
Regional unemployment rates disaggregated by 6 occupational 
groupings. Source: 1984 Labour Force Survey.
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Table 4.1
Job Search Method Use by Unemployed Workers
Type of job search method Benefit
Claimant
Non
Claimant
Total Male Female Total Male Female
Visiting a job centre, 
Government Employment 
Office, etc. 81.5 82.4 79.4 47.4 59.7 43.6
Name on private agency books. 8.4 7.7 10.2 8.8 8.7 8.8
Advertising in newspapers 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.5 3.3 2.2
Answering advertisements 42.0 42.3 41.1 36.7 29.6 38.9
Studying situations vacant 
columns in newspapers 53.6 53.7 53.3 54.0 49.9 55.3
Direct approach to firms/ 
employers 42.6 44.5 37.5 34.4 39.7 32.8
Personal contacts 62.5 65.1 55.8 52.0 55.2 51.2
Other methods 4.6 5.1 3.4 6.2 8.4 5.5
Mean number of search 
methods used 
(Standard Deviation)
3.16
(1.44)
3.22
(1.43)
2.98
(1.44)
2.36
(1.53)
2.30
(1.73)
2.39
(1.46)
Note: Sample sizes are 4957 (3520 males and 1387 females) for claimants, and 
1608 (415 males and 1193 females) for non-claimants.
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Table 4.2
Choice Based Multinomial Estimation of the Status of Non-Working
Individuals
Independent Variable Unemployed 
Male Female
Discouraged 
Male Female
Inactive 
Male Female
Constant 2.29 -2.94 -0.96 1.53 0 0
(5.31) (5.17) (9.46) (13.89)
Age: 16-24 years 0.16 0.09 -0.36 -0.61 0.20 0.52
(0.19) (0.29) (0.31) (0.50)
: 50-64 years -1.09** -0.48* 0.49** 0.22 0.60** 0.26
(0.14) (0.27) (0.21) (0.39)
Education: Degree -0.20 0.29 -0.03 -0.64 0.23 0.35
(0.30) (0.54) (0.45) (0.94)
: GCE 0.28* 0.19 -0.31 -0.56 0.03 0.37
(0.17) (0.27) (0.28) (0.48)
: Other 0.22 0.36 0.08 -0.39 -0.30 0.03
(0.22) (0.34) (0.33) (0.60)
Dependent Children -0.17 0.13 0.06 -0.49 0.11 0.36
(0.13) (0.21) (0.20) (0.36)
Single -0.23* 0.08 0.13 0.21 0.10 -0.29
(0.14) (0.23) (0.19) (0.37)
Council Tenant -0.15 -0.02 0.18 0.09 -0.03 -0.07
(0.12) (0.21) (0.17) (0.33)
Others in household
: Unemployed 0.46** 0.08 -0.31 0.02 -0.15 0.10
(0.15) (0.24) (0.24) (0.38)
: Employed 0.19* 0.29 0.01 -0.15 -0.20 -0.14
(0.11) (0.22) (0.17) (0.34)
Worked Before 0.17 -0.40 0.69* 0.44 -0.86 -0.04
(0.25) (0.35) (0.42) (0.60)
Previous job
: left <1 year ago 0.55** 0.53* -0.96** -0.11 0.41 -0.42
(0.22) (0.29) (0.34) (0.50)
: left 1-3 years ago 0.23 0.24 -0.51* 0.03 0.28 -0.27
(0.21) (0.31) (0.30) (0.52)
: Manual -0.07 0.11 0.20 0.20 -0.13 -0.31
(0.18) (0.29) (0.29) (0.48)
: Made redundant 0.42** 0.20 0.35* 0.39 -0.77 -0.59
(0.15) (0.30) (0.23) (0.49)
Health Problems -0.07 -0.07 -0.17 -0.10 0.24 0.17
(0.11) (0.20) (0.16) (0.32)
Benefit Claimant 1.34** 1.06** 0.56** 0.44 -1.90 -1.50
(0.13) (0.23) (0.19) (0.37)
Local Economic Conditions
: Vacancy Rate 0.43* 0.02 -0.26 -0.03 -0.17 0.01
(0.25) (0.44) (0.38) (0.72)
: Wage Rate -0.44 0.41 -0.10 -0.86 0.54 0.45
(0.76) (1.15) (1.16) (1.94)
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Table 4.2 (Contd')
Diagnostics
MALE
At
Convergence
At
Zero
FEMALE
At
Convergence
At
Zero
Log L -877.5 -1931 -589.8 -2589
Degrees of Freedom 3472 3512 4670 4710
% correct predictions 82.0 33.0 91.7 33.3.
Sample size 1756 2355
Notes: i) Standard Errors in parenthesis
ii) Figures in final column obtained from normalisation 
requirement that the sum of the coefficients for each variable 
equal zero.
** denotes significance at 95 per cent level,
* denotes significance of 90 per cent level 2 tailed t test.
-135-
Table 4.3a (Males)
Estimated Determinants of Job Search Effort
Independent Variable Sample Mean 1
Model
2 3
Constant -0.20 -0.96 -4.07
(1.12) (1.02) (2.61)
Age: 16-24 years 0.35 0.09 0.04 0.04
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
: 50-64 years 0.18 —0.47** -0.42** -0.42**
(0.13) (0.12) (0.11)
Education: Degree 0.04 0.23** 0.32** 0.32**
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
: GCE 0.23 0.42** 0.39** 0.39**
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
: Other 0.11 0.37** 0.34** 0.34**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Single 0.50 —0.12** -0.13** -0.13**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Dependent Children 0.45 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Council Tenant 0.51 0.15** 0.10** 0.10**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Presence of others in household
: Unemployed 0.22 0.04 0.01 0.01
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
: Employed 0.45 0.09* 0.08** 0.08**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Health Problems 0.31 -0.11** -0.08* -0.08*
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Moved to seek work 0.04 0.19* 0.25** 0.25**
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Worked Before 0.90 0.22** 0.20** 0.21**
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Previous job
: Manual 0.53 0.14** 0.16** 0.16**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
: Manufacturing 0.22 0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
: Made Redundant 0.45 0.20** 0.17** 0.17**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Duration Seeking Work
: 3 to 12 months 0.28 0.06 0.05 0.15
(0.06) (0.06) (0.17)
: 12 to 24 months 0.17 0.03 -0.01 0.21
(0.07) (0.07) (0.21)
: 24 months + 0.38 -0.23** -0.24** -0.45**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.15)
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Table 4.3a (contd)
Independent Variable
Sample mean 1
Model
2 3
Looking for Part-Time Work 0.01 -0.53** 
(0.18)
—0.56** 
(0.16)
-0.55** 
(0.16)
Benefit Claimant 0.89 0.95**
(0.25)
0.70** 
(0.22)
4.10
(2.72)
Local Economic Conditions
: Vacancy Rate 0.70 0.16**
(0.08)
0.11
(0.07)
0.47** 
(0.23)
: Wage Rate 5.10 0.41** 
(0.19)
0.51** 
(0.18)
1.05**
(0.48)
: Unemployment Rate 2.33 -0.09
(0.06)
-0.16** 
(0.05)
-0.11
(0.14)
Selectivity Correction 1.22 0.08
(0.09)
0.09
(0.08)
0.09
(0.08)
Claimant * Duration 3-12 months 0.26 - - -0.10
(0.18)
Claimant * Duration 12-24 months 0.16 — -0.22
(0.22)
Claimant * Duration 24 months* 0.35 0.24
(0.16)
Claimant * Vacancy Rate 0.63 — -0.39
(0.24)
Claimant * Wage Rate 4.55 — — -0.59
(0.49)
Claimant * Unemployment Rate 2.10 -0.05
(0.15)
Diagnostics
R2 0.096 0.084 0.085
Standard Error 1.409 1.289 1.289
F Value (k,N-k) 19.652 16.864 13.888
Mean of Dependent Variable 3.140 2.365 2.365
Skewness 0.06 0.34 0.34
Kurtosis 0.08 0.003 0.003
Sample Size 4647 4647 4647
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses ** indictates significance at 95 per
cent level, * indicates significance at 90 per cent level 2 tailed
t test.
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Table 4.3b (Females)
Estimated Determinants of Job Search Effort
Independent Variable Sample Mean 1
Model
2 3
Constant 1.42 0.43 1.03
(1.32) (1.19) (1.22)
Age: 16-24 years 0.38 0.03 -0.03 -0.01
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
: 50-64 years 0.10 -0.47** -0.49** -0.45**
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
Education: Degree 0.05 0.07 0.20* 0.22**
(0.13) (0.12) (0.11)
: GCE 0.31 0.18** 0.18** 0.20**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
: Other 0.05 0.15* 0.18** 0.16**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Single 0.46 0.13* 0.17** 0.13*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Dependent Children 0.54 -0.15** -0.13** -0.13**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Council Tenant 0.37 0.11* 0.07 0.07
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Presence of others in household
: Unemployed 0.21 -0.10 -0.13* -0.14**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
: Employed 0.70 0.07 0.11 0.09
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Health Problems 0.30 -0.09 -0.05 -0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Moved to seek work 0.03 0.25 0.19 0.22
(0.16) (0.14) (0.15)
Worked Before 0.87 0.02 0.07 0.04
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Previous job
: Manual 0.27 -0.01 0.04 0.05
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
: Manufacturing 0.15 -0.14* -0.15** -0.13*
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
: Made redundant 0.25 0.29** 0.28** 0.26**
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Duration Seeking Work
: 3 to 12 months 0.41 0.18** 0.13** 0.22**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.09)
: 12 to 24 months 0.19 0.20** 0.09 0.02
(0.09) (0.07) (0.11)
: 24 months + 0.22 -0.15* -0.17** -0.26**
(0.09) (0.08) (0.10)
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Table 4.3b (contd)
Independent Variable Sample Mean
1
Model
2 3
Looking for Part-time work 0.35 -0.11 0.07 0.04
(0.21) (0.19) (0.19)
Benefit Claimant 0.54 0.70** 0.59** -0.47
(0.26) (0.24) (0.69)
Local Economic Conditions
: Vacancy Rate 0.71 0.16 0.15 -0.04
(0.11) (0.10) (0.15)
: Wage Rate 4.66 0.11 0.18 0.02
(0.24) (0.21) (0.22)
: Unemployment Rate 2.13 -0.12 -0.21* 0.01
(0.10) (0.09) (0.11)
Selectivity Correction 3.49 0.12 0.18** 0.15*
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Claimant * Duration 3-12 months 0.22 - - -0.14
. (0.13)
Claimant * Duration 12-24 months 0.10 - - 0.14
(0.15)
Claimant * Duration 24 months+ 0.12 - - 0.24*
(0.14)
Claimant * Vacancy Rate 0.38 - - 0.34*
(0.20)
Claimant * Wage Rate 2.43 - - 0.37*^
(0.13)
Claimant * Unemployment Rate 1.13 - - -0.45*^
0.15
Diagnostics
R2 0..083 0,.051 0 . 060
Standard Error 1 ,.418 1 ,.279 1,.274
F Value (k, N-k) 10,.570 6,.329 6,.004
Mean of Dependent Variable 2..718 2..116 2..116
Skewness 0..17 0..39 0 .,39
Kurtosis -0..16 -0..08 -0..08
Sample size 2963 2963 2963
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses ** indicates significance at 95 per
cent level * indicates significance at 90 per cent level 2 tailed
t test.
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Table 4.4
Alternative Specification of Search Effort Equation
Independent Variable Male Female
Claimant 0.47
(0.06)**
0.60
(0.22)**
0.10
(0.06)*
0.46
(0.24)*
Vacancy Rate 
Wage Rate 
Unemployment Rate 
Selectivity Correction
0.10
(0.07)
0.51
(0.18)**
-0.15
(0.05)**
0.17
(0.11)
0.50
(0.21)**
-0.16
(0.08)**
0.05
(0.08)
0.14
(0.10)
0.20
(0.22)
-0.16
(0.08)**
-0.17
(0.16)
-0.23
(0.31)
0.02
(0.13)
0.13
(0.09)
Regional Dummies No Yes No Yes
R2
Standard Error 
Sample Size
0.0834
1.288
4647
0.0892
1.653
4647
0.0496
1.638
2963
0.0513
1.622
2963
Notes: (i) Standard errors in parentheses.
(ii) Regressions contain same variables as in Table 4.3 
in addition to those reported above.
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Chanter 5: Labour market Transitions in England and Wales:
Evidence from the Labour Force Survey
5.1 Introduction
Job search is a necessary means by which to ensure future mobility. 
Decisions made by workers in the present will shape their labour force 
experiences in the years that follow. In this way, individuals will move 
continuously into and out of labour market states, conditional on their 
own and other!s previous actions. This dynamic worker behaviour 
determines the composition of unemployment, employment and labour market 
inactivity. The following two chapters attempt to analyse aspects of 
this dynamic process using a previously unused characteristic of the 
Labour Force Survey (LFS), namely the ability to follow individuals over 
two discrete points in time. We concentrate our attention here on the 
relationship between movements of workers across labour force states and 
personal and environmental characteristics.
Given that the labour market is not static, but in continuous 
motion, then the ability to measure the movements of workers across 
discrete states facilitates a more complete understanding of how labour 
markets function. Dynamic issues have long been the focus of much 
empirical and theoretical research in the United States. Hall (1970), 
advanced the idea of worker heterogeneity as a possible explanation for 
the persisitence of unemployment in tight labour markets. These 
differences led to the propensity of certain groups of workers to 
experience unstable employment relationships over time. Perry (1972) 
pursuing the same argument, explicitly adopted a probablistic approach 
to modelling these flows into and out of employment. To capture
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individual heterogeneity, the probability of state experience was 
allowed to vary across workers, though interestingly Perry modelled 
these probabilities solely as a function of aggregate variables. Marston 
(1976) conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the flows between all 
labour market states including the previously neglected area of 
non-participation. Using a technique followed closely in this study, 
Marston modelled state transition probabilities as a function of 
personal characteristics and aggregate conditions. The former dominated 
the explanation of observed turnover behaviour.
The observation that the unemployment stock was characterised by 
simultaneously large flows into and out of the state was seen by many 
economists (see Feldstein (1975) for example), as evidence that 
unemployment was caused by the employment instability of certain 
demographic groups and that remedial policies were to be directed at 
encouraging longevity in jobs. Clark and Summers (1979) utilised dynamic 
micro data to counter this argument. The authors demonstrate that the 
majority of unemployment experience was comprised of spells with 
extensive state duration.
All these studies were made possible by micro-economic survey data 
which follow individuals over a period of time. The monthly Current 
Population Survey (CPS) or Denver Income Maintenance Experiment (DIME) 
are notable examples of longitudinal datasets rich in labour market 
information. No comparable dataset exists for the United Kingdom. 
Hitherto, in order to address dynamic issues the researcher had to 
utilise the retrospective data contained within the LFS. Every year the 
LFS incorporates a series of questions which seek to ascertain the 
respondent's circumstances one year prior to sampling. The range of this 
information is somewhat limited and the responses are open to the
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possibility of recall error bias. Individuals cannot always remember 
with clarity their status one year earlier. Hence the scope for detailed 
retrospective analysis is restricted.
This chapter shows how it is possible to expand the capability of 
the LFS to provide dynamic information. We study labour market behaviour 
over the interval 1983-1984 using a dataset obtained by matching 
individuals observed in consecutive surveys. This considerably enhances 
the amount of information from which to launch an empirical 
investigation of labour force flows, whilst simultaneously removing the 
possibility of recall error germane to the retospective data.
In analysing labour force turnover, we adopt the Markovian framework 
first used by Marston (1976). We model gross and individual 
probabilities of transition between the states of employment, 
unemployment and non-participation. The likelihood of any observed 
transition is therefore solely dependent upon the initial state in which 
the worker occupies. We then employ a reduced form approach to model the 
probability that an individual will be observed employed, unemployed or 
a non-participant one year later, as a function of personal and origin 
state characteristics.
We do not estimate transition rates, that is the instantaneous 
probability of a change of state, since there is no guarantee that our 
sampling interval corresponds to the time taken for any change of state 
to occur. Our results for annual labour force transitions are however 
dependent on the effects of the explanatory variables on these
transition rates.
Section 5.2 outlines the theoretical framework to our study. Within 
the broad context of Markovian analysis we outline the possible factors 
affecting movements out of employment, unemployment and
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non-participation. Search theoretic considerations apply to many of 
these flows, particularly labour force or employment entry. Section
5.3 describes our dataset and the manner of its construction, whilst 
section 5.4 presents the results of our investigation. Section 5.5 
provides concluding comments to the effect that worker heterogeneity is 
the dominant influence in unemployment and participatory flows, whilst 
state spell length dominates employment outflows. Individuals exhibit 
differential transition probabilities and therefore experience different 
employment, unemployment and inactivity rates.
5.2 Theoretical Framework
5.2.1 Measuring Transitions
We seek to model the movement of individuals across labour market 
states. Assume there are three states of the world to which an 
individual can belong; employment, unemployment and labour force 
inactivity. Individuals move continuously between these states of the 
labour market. This dynamic behaviour has been modelled as a continuous 
time Markov process by Marston (1976), Clark and Summers (1979,1982a) 
and Burdett et. al. (1984), among others. Given three potential 
states, nine annual flows can be determined. These movements between 
states can therefore be captured by a 3x3 matrix of transition 
probabilities, Pi where
'ee1 eu1 en1’
Pi = ueL uu1 un*-
.ne1 nu*- nn1.
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and eu*-, for example, represents the probability that an individual is 
observed unemployed at time t, conditional upon being employed at time 
t-1. The approach adopted in this paper acknowledges this Markovian 
framework. We model individual annual labour force transitions by a 
series of multinomial logit regressions. This enables us to estimate 
the probabilities of state transition as a function of personal 
characteristics pertaining in the origin state and local economic 
conditions.
We do not attempt to model the instantaneous probability of 
transition, i.e. the hazard rate, since our data do not permit it. If 
labour market dynamics do indeed follow a continuous time Markov 
process, then the time between transitions is a random variable. As 
Singer and Spillerman (1976) point out, given discrete panel data, such 
as ours, there is no guarantee that the time unit between labour market 
changes corresponds with the sampling interval. Knowledge of transition 
rates, does however make possible inferences regarding state duration 
and steady state equilibria. Indeed Marston (1976), and a series of 
studies by Clark and Summers (1979, 1982a, 1982b) consider monthly
movements as being synonymous with transition rates, an approach which 
in view of the above discussion appears flawed.
Our data set contains annual observations. Coppock, commenting on 
Clark and Summers (1982b) demonstrates the problem of modelling annual 
labour force transitions as if they corresponded to the instantaneous 
rate of change. In a two state continuous time Markovian world, the 
distribution of state spell length is an exponential function that is 
independent of the time the worker enters the state. The probability of 
movement from state j between times u and t, is given by
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fj(t/u) = rj exp U^rj
where r. is the instantaneous rate of transition from state i. In a 
J
three state world the analagous density function becomes
" rjk rjl exP (“rjkcjk -rjlcjl>
where tjk and tj^ are the time between transitions into states k and 1 
respectively and rjk and rji are the corresponding transition rates. 
Coppock shows that the probability of moving to state k, for example, 
over a fixed time interval and allowing only a single transition, is 
given by the integral of the above product with respect to tjkd  and 
tjk^jl-
i.e. PJk - rjk [ 1-exp(-rjk-rjk)] 
rjk+rjl
The explanatory variables at our disposal determine not the 
transition probabilities P but transition rates, r. Hence ex-ante 
theorising regarding the effect of a particular variable on the 
transition rate rjk say, would not necessarily appear in any regression 
of that variable on Pjk , since there may be a simultaneous opposing 
effect from rj]_. 0ur results presented in section 5.4 should therefore 
be interpreted with this important caveat in mind.
In modelling labour market dynamics as functions of individual and 
state characteristics we explicitly forego the assumptions of the pure 
Markovian framework of stationary, homogenous transition rates. It is 
likely that our estimates will exhibit some form of population 
heterogeneity or time dependency. Heterogeneity, the variation of 
transition rates between individuals with different characteristics both
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unobservable and latent, results in the greater propensity of certain 
individuals to experience particular states. If, for example, certain 
groups are more likely to experience unemployment and therefore have a 
low probability of transition, then over an extended period of time the 
probability of observing the same individual in the same state, 
approaches unity. Over time the aggregate probability of escape from 
unemployment falls as those with high transition rates move away and 
those with low transition rates remain. This same effect could be 
observed however, were transition rates conditional upon the duration of 
spell. If experience of unemployment (or any other state) somehow 
affects the probability of movement, then the transition rates, as with 
sorting, will be time dependent. The nature of our data set prevents us 
from explicitly discriminating between these competing hypotheses (see 
Tuma and Hannan (1979) or Heckman and Borjas (1980) for possible tests 
requiring detailed information on state duration and transition times 
which are missing from our dataset). Instead we introduce variables 
into our regression analysis that are supportive of both contentions and 
assess their relative merits.
We now outline the principal variables that could be expected to govern 
these labour market flows.
5.2.2 Exit from Unemployment
Over a period of one year an unemployed individual may leave 
unemployment either by gaining employment or by withdrawing from the 
labour force. In the search theoretic context used by Toikka (1976), 
Burdett and Mortensen (1978), or Barron and Mellow (1981), optimising 
individuals will choose that state which offers the highest expected 
return. Mortensen and Neumann (1984) extend this earlier work into a
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structural form approach, dividing transitions into the "chance” 
component of informational arrival and the "choice" of whether to change 
state. The greater the opportunity for movement, the more likely future 
mobility. The dataset at our disposal is insufficiently detailed to 
follow this line, which requires information on wage offers, realised 
wages and state duration. Instead, our reduced form approach can be 
expected to capture elements of both these influences. Jovanovic (1984) 
offers a similar explanation within the context of a job matching 
explanation of turnover. We can summarise the expected effect of our 
explanatory variables as follows:
U=U[Effort, Benefits, Duration, Z,X]
UE* + ? - + ?
UN* - - + - ?
Consider the likely flow into employment. The probability of a 
worker engaged in active job search becoming employed over the period is 
the product of the probability of contacting a job opening and the 
probability that the vacancy is acceptable to the worker. The 
likelihood of receiving a job offer is partly dependent on the economic 
conditions, Z prevailing in the labour market in which the worker is 
searching. The tighter the labour market, the greater the demand for 
labour and the higher the probability of receiving or indeed contacting 
a job offer. Improved economic conditions should lead to increased wage 
offers, thereby increasing the returns to search. This should also 
enhance the acceptability of any offer, assuming reservation wages do 
not rise correspondingly with the increased availability of work.
We argued in chapter 4 that the more effort spent searching the
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labour market, the higher the likelihood of meeting a job offer and, 
assuming a negligible effect of variable search effort on reservation 
wages, the greater the probability of gaining employment. Hence the 
positive sign on effort. Should there exist any form of duration 
dependence, then the probability of generating a job offer will diminish 
with the time spent in unemployment. Long term unemployment may act as 
a hiring deterent to potential employers. The unemployed may find their 
stock of human capital depreciating as skills become obsolete and
contacts with the labour market recede. Against this, it is conceivable 
that the long term unemployed will reduce their reservation wage over 
the spell, becoming more likely to accept any job offers. Individuals 
embodied with differential amounts of human capital, as captured in the 
vector of personal characteristics, X, may possess heterogeneous
reservation wages and job offer probabilities. The higher the stock of 
human capital the higher the probability of gaining employment, other 
things equal.
Now consider the transition from unemployment to out of the labour 
force. Such a movement is only feasible if the expected returns from 
non-participation exceed those from remaining in the labour force. One 
would expect adverse economic conditions, Z to reduce the expected 
return from search and raise the flow from unemployment into 
non-participation. The greater the degree of search effort, the greater 
the value to staying within the labour force. A similar argument can be 
applied to those embodied with larger amounts of human capital - the 
returns from continued participation are potentially higher. Individuals 
possessing only small amounts of human capital, or the long term
unemployed, may find that the likelihood of receiving a job offer is
diminished and the subsequent probability of labour force withdrawal
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increased.
Finally, Barron and Mellow (1981) have argued that the receipt of 
unemployment benefits in the US, increases the cost of leaving the 
labour force, since they are foregone upon cessation of job search 
activity. Barron and Mellow also argue that benefit recipients will 
reduce their probability of gaining employment over a period because of 
resulting increased reservation wages and purchases of leisure at the 
expense of time spent searching the labour market. Chapter 4 has however 
shown that benefits can increase search effort and hence the probability 
of receiving a job offer, by facilitating job search productivity. If 
claimants are more committed to the labour force, they have a lower 
marginal value of leisure, this too should enhance job offer 
probabilities. We investigate whether this or the reservation wage 
effect dominates unemployment transitions in section 5.4. Stronger 
commitment and the type of entitlement effect envisaged by Hammermesh 
(1979), whereby a condition of benefit receipt is that the indvidual 
should be actively seeking work, should ensure benefit claimants remain 
in the labour force.
5.2.3 Employment Separation
Workers leave jobs either voluntarily i.e. they quit, or 
involuntarily - they are laid off. Only job quits are consistent with a 
search theoretic interpretation of employment out-flows. Layoffs result 
from the optimising decisions of firms regarding the productivity of job 
matches. We do not distinguish between quits and layoffs, unlike 
Marston (1976), since any employment terminations occur after our 
initial sample observation and the manner of job separation is therefore 
endogenous. It is likely that our estimated coefficients will reflect
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elements of both quit and layoff behaviour. We postulate that
E=E[Tenure, Job Characteristics, Z, X]
EU=* - ? ? ?
EN=* + ? - ?
The more job-specific capital a worker has acquired the more 
valuable the firm and worker are to each other and the less likely a 
flow into unemployment, involuntarily or otherwise. In practice 
firm-specific skills are captured by job tenure; the longer the tenure, 
the more profitable the job match and the less likely a separation. A 
reduced rate of flow into unemployment with increased tenure, having 
controlled for any population heterogeneity in the propensity to move, 
would be evidence of a positive form of state dependence. Individuals 
will enter into search unemployment if the expected returns from so 
doing exceed both the cost of not searching and on-the-job search. We 
argued in chapter 3 that this is generally only valid if economic 
conditions are such that the expected duration of unemployed search is 
low or the non-pecuniary aspects of the current job are sufficiently bad 
to induce the worker to give up on-the-job search. Involuntary 
employment to unemployment flows are however likely to be generated by 
adverse economic conditions, Z, which would tend to offset the effect 
from job quits. It is well established that manual workers are more 
prone to layoffs and hence flows into unemployment. This flow may be 
reinforced by the undesirable non-pecuniary nature of many manual jobs. 
Individuals less skilled, educated or able are more open to lay-offs. 
If these individuals also find themselves in the secondary labour 
market, there may well be an enhanced flow into unemployment from job
quits.
It is likely that job quits will dominate the flow into inactivity. 
However, since our sampling interval is one year, it is conceivable that 
our dataset contains individuals who spent (a short) time searching the 
labour market before withdrawal. The UK benefit administration system, 
which disqualifies job quitters from receiving social security payments 
for twelve weeks after leaving work, should also enhance this flow out 
of the labour force^. We would expect such flows to appear at either end 
of the age spectrum. Clark and Summers (1979, 1982b) have commented
extensively on the ambiguity of the unemployed and out of the labour 
force states for young workers, for whom the costs of (temporary) labour 
force withdrawal are slight given their potential working time horizon. 
A similarly observed flow for older workers, in contrast, is more 
indicative of permanent labour force withdrawal. The likelihood of 
re-employment and the expected returns from such will often be 
insufficient to retain a labour force commitment given the existence of 
pensions and other non-labour income. Many women may enter 
non-participation directly from employment in order to engage in home 
production. The status of many women as secondary household workers 
ensures a lesser commitment to the labour force.
5.2.4 Labour Force Participation
The decision to enter the labour force is contingent upon the 
expected returns from so doing exceeding the value of non-market time. 
Flows into employment or unemployment can be envisaged as incorporating 
a two tier reservation wage system, whereby individuals enter search 
unemployment if the value of non-market time falls below the first 
reservation price, and subsequently enter employment from unemployment
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if a wage offer exceeds the second reservation price, that evaluating 
continued market search. The closer the two reservation wages the more 
likely it is we observe a direct flow from non-participation to 
employment over an extended period of one year. Hence
N-N[Duration, Z, X]
I
NU# - + ?
NE=» - + ?
One might expect aggregate conditions to influence the participation 
decision. The higher the market wage, the greater the cost of remaining 
outside the labour force. The lower the unemployment rate, the higher 
the expected return from participation. Such conditions should enable 
discouraged workers to re-enter the labour force and resume job search. 
Conversely adverse economic conditions may encourage the added worker 
effect of labour force entry of secondary household workers, responding 
to the unemployment of the primary worker, in an endeavour to maintain 
household income levels. If a two tier reservation wage system does 
indeed operate then the two wages are likely to be closer for secondary 
than primary workers. If a secondary worker has been induced to 
substitute some or all non-market time for labour force activity, then 
it is likely that the worker will be more willing to accept the first 
offer that exceeds the value of non-market time. Hence the probability 
of an (almost) direct transition from non-participation to employment is 
increased.
Differential reservation wages are not sufficient to guarantee 
differential non-market to market transitions. Such movements must also 
be governed by the probability of receiving job offers which is in turn
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dependent upon search intensity, the area of search and human capital 
accumulation, as in the case of transitions from unemployment. We would 
expect a similar form of negative duration dependence on transitions by 
primary workers to that of the unemployed. As time spent outside the 
labour force increases, job related informational flows are likely to
fall, search intensity may decline, and with it the probability of
labour force entry. If secondary workers do not retain as close an
attachment to the labour market then a constant flow of information is 
not as necessary should they desire to resume participation. In this 
way, excepting any heterogeneity effect, there may be no clear link 
between time spent out of the labour force and the likelihood of
re-entry. Household composition should exert a strong influence on the 
participation decision of secondary workers. In particular the presence 
of a working spouse and dependent children would be expected to act as 
deterrents to labour market entry. The entry into employment of 
secondary household workers may lower an unemployed spouse's benefit 
entitlement. If the expected earnings of the latter are higher, this may 
deter the former from participation.
5.3 Data and Estimation
Our analysis of labour market transitions is based on a dataset 
constructed from the 1983 and 1984 Labour Force Surveys (LFS). The LFS 
contains information regarding the labour market activity, personal and 
family characteristics of around 0.5% of the households in Great 
Britain. In each year since 1984 the LFS has incorporated an 
approximate 30 per cent overlap of the addresses sampled in the previous
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year’s survey. By matching personal characteristics of the recall group, 
(for example month and year of birth, sex, age of dependent children, 
housing tenure), across the two surveys, we have obtained a dataset 
containing detailed labour force information for 1983 and 1984 on 7,172 
individuals resident in England and Wales (the identifying re-sample 
variable does not extend to Scotland or Northern Ireland). By observing 
an individual’s labour market status in 1983 and 1984, we can obtain 
estimates of annual flows between states.^
Our sample is not entirely random since the LFS re-interviews 
addresses and not individuals. We are therefore unable to identify 
households who moved away during the course of a year or new households 
created in the interval between surveys. If there is a correlation 
between household and labour mobility we may introduce a form of 
selectivity bias into our analysis.  ^  in addition we are unable to 
prevent spurious transitions that arise from the mis-reporting of labour 
force status, often by a third party respondent to the survey. The 
effect of the latter could however work in the opposite direction to 
that of the former. An annual survey should however avoid the problems 
which characterise the monthly Current Population Surveys in the United 
States, namely the conditioning arising from the continuous interaction 
between respondent and interviewer (Sexton (1986)).
It may be argued that a year is a sufficiently long interval to 
enable the numbers in each state to approach their equilibrium, 
steady-state values. We would then gain no extra information in our 
panel than from two consecutive surveys. The period 1983-84 was however 
characterised by rising unemployment. In none of our three states did 
inflows equal outflows, which would characterise an equilibrium.^ Table
5.1 provides some indication as to the representativeness of the sample,
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by presenting the composition of our panel alongside the equivalent 
Labour Force Survey estimates. In general the compositions are broadly 
similar. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the samples are from the 
same distribution (the test for equality is 0.25 ~ X^(2) )5* The 
unemployed are marginally under-represented in 1983. We are unable to 
identify those members of the unemployed with a high propensity to move. 
Chapter 2 showed that the unemployed are more likely to move regions. 
Hughes and McCormick (1985) provide a complementary analysis which 
suggests that the unemployed are more likely to consider a change of 
address. Similarly we lose those in employment who simultaneously engage 
in inter-firm mobility and a change of address (some 25 per cent of all 
inter-firm moves). This may have a corresponding effect on our estimated 
transition probabilities. In addition, some of the estimated flow 
probabilities may be subject to small sample bias, particularly the 
unemployment outflows which are based around an initial stock of just 
554.
Since our matched data set contains no information regarding wage 
rates we have supplemented it with the wage rate pertinent to the 
individual’s local labour market (one of 16 identifiable areas 
disaggregated to metropolitan county level). In addition, we include 
measures of the local vacancy and unemployment rates as proxies for the 
level of demand (see data appendix). All local economic variables enter 
the equations in log form.
The Markovian framework adopted in this chapter posits that the 
gross annual probability of transition from state i to state j , Pij , is 
given by
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Fij
Pij = i.j = 1,2,3
Si
where Fij is the number of individuals observed in state i in 1983 and 
state j in 1984 and Si is the stock of individuals occupying state i in 
1983.
Individual transition equations are estimated by multinomial logit 
regression. Since our analysis is essentially Markovian we recognise 
the possibility that the probability of transition will depend upon the 
original state in which the individual is observed. The inclusion of 
duration variables implies we estimate a semi-Markov process in effect. 
We present separate equations for each of the three origin (1983) 
states, employment, unemployment and out of the labour force. The 
dependent variable is evaluated according to whether the individual is 
observed employed, unemployed or inactive one year later. Hence the 
probability of transition from state k to state j
We confine our estimates to the population of working age (men aged 16 
to 64 and women aged 16 to 59). All explanatory variables relate to the 
individual's circumstances at the time of the 1983 Labour Force Survey. 
We do not restrict the set of explanatory variables to be the same for 
each regression, unlike Kiefer and Neumann (1982) or Burdett et al 
(1984), since as we have outlined in section 5.2, a transition from any 
state is dependent on that state's particular characteristics.
m  - j
exp [Xj/3]
j , k * 1,2,3.
2 exp [Xk0] 
k“l
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5.4 Results
5.4.1 Gross Labour Force Flows
Table 5.2 presents gross annual transition probabilities for various 
age and sex groups. If the transitions were governed by a Pure Markov 
process (homogeneous, stationary rates) then each individual would face 
transition probabilities given by row 1.
Although we cannot discount the possibility of multiple transitions 
over our sample interval, the continuity of employment, and to a lesser 
extent inactivity, is most apparent. Ninety-three per cent of 
individuals employed in 1983 continued to be so one year later and 76 
per cent of those out of the labour force were observed in the same 
state over the period. In contrast, fifty per cent of the 1983 
unemployed stock were similarly placed in 1984. These changes in 
unemployment were characterised by large flows into and out of the 
state. There exists an almost equal probability of flowing into 
employment or out of the labour force. New labour force entrants were 
twice as likely to enter employment rather than unemployment over the 
period. Employment separation resulted in an equal likelihood of 
flowing into active job search or labour force withdrawal.
One of the advantages of our dataset is that it can be used to 
determine inflow and outflows for our three state model. In a steady 
state with a homogenous population these flows will be equal and a panel 
would contain no more information than a single cross section. We 
calibrate these flows by multiplying the transition probabilities in row 
one by the initial stocks of each state (given in the note at the foot 
of Table 5.2)^. For example a constant unemployment rate would require 
the following flow equality
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eu*U + nu*N - (ue + un )*U
Similar expressions can be derived for stability in the other two 
states. The results do not support the steady state hypothesis.
Inflows and outflows from each state are never equal.7 it would appear 
our dataset does indeed contain some additional explanatory power.
These aggregate flows do however disguise important differences 
between the various demographic groups. Teenagers, (rows 3 and 7) for 
example, are more likely to flow into unemployment from employment than 
other workers. They are also more likely to flow out of unemployment 
back into employment, indicating the relative brevity of teenage 
unemployment spells and the tendancy for teenagers to engage in job 
shopping early in their careers, (see Wadsworth (1989) for some UK 
evidence on the high incidence of job quits among young workers). Males 
demonstrate a stronger attachment to the labour force by being less 
likely to flow into non-participation than women, either from employment 
or unemployment. The likelihood of males gaining employment (UE or NE) 
declines notably over the age cycle. Above the age of fifty the 
probabilty of male labour force withdrawal exceeds the likelihood of 
gaining employment (row 5). In contrast the probability of women 
obtaining employment shows no systematic trend over the age cycle (rows 
7 to 9). Female labour force entry remains high until the age of fifty. 
In part this will reflect the opportunities for secondary employment, 
particularly part-time work.
Clark and Summers (1979) question the distinction betwen 
unemployment and out of the labour force status, on the basis of monthly 
flows of United States teenagers and young adults. They argue that 
because a large proportion of youth unemployment ends in labour force
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withdrawal and that youth flows into employment from outside the labour 
force dominate similar flows from unemployment, then there is little to 
distinguish the two states of unemployment and out of the labour force. 
Flinn and Heckman (1983) counter this argument by maintaining that the 
state of unemployment must involve some form of active job search which 
will increase the likelihood of receiving a job offer. In this way one 
would expect differential transition probabilities into employment from 
unemployment and out of the labour force. Although the figures in Table
5.2 do not control for all observed or any unobserved characteristics,
the flow probabilities into employment from unemployment are between 
fifty to three hundred per cent higher than the equivalent flows from 
out of the labour force. This would seem to imply that the LFS data are 
not subject to Clark and Summers1 criticisms.
Perry (1972) uses the difference in the transition probabilities, EN 
and UN as a measure of involuntary labour force withdrawal. The rate of 
exit from employment is said to represent 'normal' turnover, due for 
example to retirement, illness or domestic demands. On this basis row 1 
suggests that 3.4 per cent approximates the normal turnover rate. In 
contrast 20.9 per cent withdrew from unemployment. Most labour force 
exits from unemployment would appear to be influenced by the chances of 
finding a job. At the same time, such a flow will be self-reinforcing, 
since, as Table 5.2 shows, any movement out of the labour force reduces 
the likelihood of subsequent employment.
It may be constructive to now compare our results with those that
can be derived using retrospective LFS data. Following Sexton (1987) we
estimate transition flows using recall data and construct the ratio of 
the true to the retrospective flow figure as a measure of the divergence 
between the two concepts. Table 5.3 presents the results. The
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transition ratio is given by A jj/R-jj where A-fj is the actual number of 
individuals moving from state i to state j and R^j is the equivalent 
figure arrived at using retrospective responses. A value exceeding 
unity indicates that the recall data under-estimates the true flow.
Transition rates estimated using recall data generally under-predict 
the true rate. Individuals asked to define their status one year 
earlier, tend to align themselves with current status (row 1). In 
particular there are large discrepancies between the flows into and out 
of employment and unemployment from out of the labour force. The 
retrospective flows for prime age males are the most consistent with our 
matched flows. One obvious explanation for these differences is a 
failure by the respondent to recall the exact timing of state 
transitions. Individuals may recall a continuity of state experience 
over the year, when in fact a change of state occured within the period.
Secondly, there is no exact correspondence between true and recalled 
status, the latter being much less precise in defining economic 
activity.® It is therefore conceivable that many people who believed 
themselves to be unemployed one year ago were in fact classified as 
outside the labour force, under a more detailed classification. 
Similarly, many women and older men (rows 6 and 5 respectively) who 
recalled their main status as being outside the labour force (household 
duties or retirement, for example) may be simultaneously engaged in 
part-time or temporary work and as such would be classified as employed 
using the true status criterion.
The potential for misleading inference when using retrospective data 
to analyse flow rates is therefore clear. The problems are magnified 
the smaller the sample size. A matched sample explicitly avoids these 
recall problems.
The effect of these estimated differential flow probabilities does 
however depend upon the size of the initial stock, ( Marston (1976)). 
For example, using our matched dataset, a 1 per cent flow from 
employment into unemployment would increase the unemployed stock by an 
equivalent amount that a 9 per cent unemployment outflow would reduce 
it. Table 5.4 indicates the impact of these flows on labour force 
composition. Column 1 illustrates the importance of labour force entry 
and exit in explaining employment, particularly of teenagers and women. 
Sixty-five per cent of these employment accessions occured from 
individuals outside the labour force one year earlier. Prime age males 
however demonstrate a stronger labour force attachment since over 80 per 
cent of employment inflows of this group come from those unemployed one 
year previously. Column 4 suggests around 50 per cent of labour force 
exits come from employment. Clark and Summers’ estimates indicate a 
figure in excess of 70 per cent. This appears to stem from the greater 
propensity of US teenagers to leave the labour force. Sixty-eight per 
cent of male teenagers left the labour force from unemployment in the 
course of a month in the US study compared with just 16 per cent in our 
study over one year. The thrust of Clark and Summers’ argument is 
however that youth labour force withdrawal is only a temporary 
phenomenon. Our results are diluted by the sampling interval. We 
cannot discount the possibility of multiple changes of state between 
survey dates. It is probable that during a year many teenagers will 
re-enter the labour market and this will be reflected in a lower annual 
exit probability. The fact that our exit flows are dominated by older 
workers indicates the reduced likelihood of gaining employment for such 
groups. Around 25 per cent of the flow in column consists of entry into 
discouragement rather than general inactivity.^
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Column 3 suggests that the majority of adult male unemployment is 
composed of inflows caused by job separations. In contrast, teenage and 
female unemployment is caused by an inability to find work upon labour 
force entry. Yet most teenagers and women experience little difficulty 
gaining work (column 5). This indicates a degree of heterogeneity 
within these groups that renders certain individuals more likely to 
experience employment than unemployment. We explore the possible 
explanations in our regressions below.
5.4.2 Transitions From Unemployment
Table 5.5 presents the results of our multinomial logit regressions 
on the probability of leaving unemployment. Estimates are given by 
destination state. We provide separate estimates for men and women. We 
present coefficient estimates only for the effect of the explanatory 
variables on a change of state, since the normalisation constraint in 
our programme requires the sum of the coefficients on each variable 
across all three states to equal zero.
The results indicate that those individuals with the most to gain 
from active job search are the most successful in terms of obtaining 
employment. Educational qualifications help build human capital. Young 
people with longer potential working horizons are more attractive to 
employers who have more chances of recouping hiring and training costs 
than from older workers. In a similar manner the expected returns from 
employment to an older worker faced with a shorter work horizon, may not 
justify search expenditure and labour force exit becomes a more viable 
option.
Surprisingly single women are less likely to gain employment. Given 
the relatively lower value single women will place on non-market time,
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one would expect single women to search harder. It may be that the 
coefficient, which is not robust, reflects the increased opportunities 
for part-time work relative to full-time and that such jobs are more 
attractive to married women. The presence of an employed spouse greatly 
increases the likelihood of an employment accession. The flow of 
information regarding job offers is likely to be enhanced if the
household contains members actively engaged in the labour market.
Council tenants maintain a stronger attachment to the labour force but 
are simultaneously less likely to obtain work. This effect is well 
documented. The presence of council tenure in our regressions partly 
controls for differential human capital stocks.
The hypothesised effect of search effort on unemployment flows is 
confirmed, albeit insignificantly for women. As in chapter 4, this
variable captures worker search extensiveness. The more informational 
flow outlets an individual utilises, (employment agencies, newspaper
advertisements, personal contacts for example) ^  the greater the 
likelihood of receiving a job offer and the more likely the flow into 
employment. Such actions also help to keep the individual inside the 
labour force. The additional effect of unemployment benefit receipt, 
for a given measured level of effort, is not clear. In the case of 
males, benefit claimants are more likely to enter employment. The 
effect of benefit receipt in generating increased labour force 
commitment more than offsets any reduction in job acceptance resulting 
from an increased reservation wage. Clark and Summers (1982a) also 
report an insignificant positive coefficient from an imputed benefit 
variable in their analysis of unemployment outflows. The reverse is 
however observed for women. Neither effect is significant, though we 
would certainly dispute Barron and Mellow's (1981) claim that 'receipt
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of UI benefits implies a sharp decline in the employment probability'. 
Benefit claimants are also less likely to withdraw from the labour 
force, supporting Hammermesh's (1979) contention that entitlement to 
unemployment insurance will increase labour supply.
The effect of duration on unemployment outflows is not strong and 
differs between the sexes. Unemployment outflows are dominated by 
heterogeneity. We argued in section 5.2 that evidence of duration 
dependence would be consistent with a declining unemployment to 
employment escape probability as the length of unemployment spell 
increased. Our results for men give only weak support to this 
hypothesis. The longer an unemployment spell proceeds the smaller the 
likelihood of gaining employment and the greater the chance of labour 
force withdrawal. Whether this observation is indeed due to state 
dependence or to any uncontrolled heterogeneity, we are unable to say.
No such effect is observed for women. The probability of employment 
entry appears initially to increase with unemployment spell. Whilst not 
significant, this observation suggests that a high reservation wage 
strategy operates in the initial stages of unemployment which 
subsequently declines as the number of job opportunities begins to 
recede. Women unemployed for between one and two years retain a stronger 
commitment to the labour force than any other duration grouping. 
Narandranathan (1989) also finds that the conditional probability of 
leaving unemployment shows no sign of decreasing with duration. Given 
the necessary caveats regarding how we measure transitions in this 
dataset, heterogeneity appears to exert a stronger influence on 
unemployment outflows. Only by removing all the observed heterogeneous 
variables from the regression do the duration variables become 
significant and signed consistently (for men) to accord with state
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dependence .
Individuals laid off from a previous job have a higher probability 
of regaining employment and are less likely to leave the labour force 
than job quits. If job losers possess a lower marginal value of leisure 
then it is likely they will search harder and as a result increase the 
chances of receiving a job offer. In contrast, job leavers may have 
higher reservation wages in the search for a more acceptable job, at 
least in the initial stages of unemployment. This probably explains the 
negative coefficient on the degree qualifications dummy. These workers 
are more likely to have quit their previous jobs. The larger flow of job 
quitters out of the labour force is somewhat puzzling. It cannot be a 
retirement effect since we have explicitly controlled for age. Clark and 
Summers (1982a) report a similar result for the US. It may be that the 
higher values of non-market time determine a worker's attachment to
jobs.
Finally, we were unable to capture many strong effects of aggregate 
conditions on unemployment outflows. Men living in high wage areas are 
more likely to flow into employment and less likely to leave the labour 
force. This is consistent with the idea of high expected returns from 
work encouraging active job search and participation. However, the sign 
of the wage coefficient is reversed in the female regression. If
anything this suggests some form of female added worker effect. We
experimented with a real wage variable, deflating regional earnings by a 
local house price index, with little success. The effects of local 
demand conditions are somewhat difficult to interpret. Males are
equally likely to flow into employment from high vacancy and high 
unemployment areas and for women the opposite is observed. Although in 
the case of males, neither coefficient is robust to the inclusion of
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regional dummies. The small size of our sample makes it hard to assess 
the magnitude and direction of any effect from aggregate conditions.11 
It may also be that by removing the more mobile members of the 
population from our sample we inadvertantly eliminate those more likely 
to respond to economic signals.
5.4.3 Transitions from Employment
Table 5.6 presents estimates of the impact of our explanatory 
variables on the transition out of employment. We argued in section 5.2 
that evidence of both quit and layoff behaviour could register in our 
results. The estimated effect of job tenure, for example, is consistent 
with both interpretations. We find strong evidence that the probability 
of flowing into unemployment declines with the length of time spent on 
the job particularly for men. This supports both the idea that firms 
will retain workers with more job-specific capital and that these 
workers are simultaneously less likely to quit. Workers capable of 
extracting more rent within a firm are likely to have discounted any 
non-pecuniary aspects of the job. Long service workers dominate the 
flows into non-participation. This probably represents early retirement 
decisions. It may also be due in part to the job severance of workers 
endowed with large amounts of firm specific capital, who on subsequently 
facing less attractive re-employment probabilities, are more likely to 
retire from active job search than similarly aged workers with shorter 
tenures.
Manual workers are more likely to flow into unemployment, presumably 
because of their high chances of layoff, though this effect is 
insignificant. We were unable to obtain any significant effect from any
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fur ther disaggregation of the occupation variables or the inclusion of 
industry dummies, and the remaining coefficients were largely unchanged. 
This is again probably attributable to the small number of movers in our 
sample.
Those engaged in work of a temporary nature are however 
significantly more likely to become unemployed within a year. Males in 
particular demonstrate continued labour force commitment by being less 
likely to withdraw from the labour force. Men employed at workplaces 
with fewer than twenty-five employees are marginally more likely to
experience unemployment, but significantly less likely to escape the
labour force. This may reflect the occupational and industrial 
distribution of small plants. ^  If the prospects for re-employment are 
sufficiently good, the incentive to remain in the labour force is 
stronger. The major effect of part-time working on the employment
transitions of men and women, is to increase the likelihood of labour 
force withdrawal. For women, this is supportive of a secondary worker 
hypothesis, with women dividing their working hours between market-time 
and home production. Upon termination of employment, whether voluntary 
or involuntary, many women will withdraw from the labour force and
concentrate on household work until such times as a new employment 
opportunity presents itself. It is also known that for many older men, 
part-time working facilitates the movement from labour force into 
retirement.
Individuals engaged in on-the-job search demonstrate strong labour 
force attachment. Yet surprisingly they are significantly more likely 
to be observed unemployed one year after sampling. If workers have 
undertaken on the job search then it must be because the expected 
returns from so doing are greater than quitting into search unemployment
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(Burdett (1978)). Our observations may therefore be due to a change in 
the respective opportunity sets of on and off the job search inducing a 
quit into full time (unemployed) search. Alternatively, we saw in 
chapter 3 that workers in industries with high redundancy rates were 
more likely to engage in on-the-job search. This effect may therefore 
capture job search by employees with the knowledge that an employment 
termination is imminent, (advanced notification of a redundancy is a 
condition of the 1975 Employment Act), who are subsequently unsuccessful 
before leaving work. Indeed two thirds of all male and 50 per cent of 
female job seekers subsequently found to be in unemployment report that 
they were laid off from their previous work. Of course some job seekers 
are successful. The normalisation constraint implies that the 
coefficient for remaining employed (i.e. the flow EE), are also 
positive. We estimate that 20 per cent of this EE flow of on-the-job 
seekers involves inter-firm mobility. We pursue this further in chapter 
6 .
The impact of personal characteristics on employment transitions, 
differs across the sexes. We have already seen that the young are more 
likely to flow into unemployment and the elderly into non-participation. 
This is confirmed in Table 5.6. Quits into search unemployment and 
layoffs are more likely among the young, but the returns to staying in 
the labour force remain greater. The longer the working horizon, the 
greater the ability to engage in job shopping. The more educated a 
worker the less likely an unemployment inflow and the more likely a 
labour force withdrawal. This reflects the value of a skilled worker to 
a firm and in part the nature of the work in which more educated people 
are placed. The dominance of layoffs in the male EU flow^-3 and quits in 
the EN flow, implies the education variables partly capture the
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voluntary-involuntary nature of these movements. Chapter 3 has 
demonstrated the capacity of more highly qualified workers to search on, 
rather than off, the job. Hence we‘ are less likely to observe a 
transition into search unemployment. Similar arguments apply to the 
effects of council housing tenure on labour market status. Single women 
maintain a closer attachment to the labour force, since the need to work 
is paramount. The presence of dependent children only significantly 
effects the labour force transitions of male employees, simultaneously 
keeping them in the labour force but rendering them more liable to 
unemployment.
The effect of local economic conditions is again weak. Men working 
in high wage areas are more likely to flow into unemployment.^ This is 
inconsistent with a search theoretic explanation of events, though may 
suggest a greater tendency of workers in high wage areas to be more 
prone to layoff. A similar signed wage variable was obtained by Marston 
(1976) in an OLS estimation of US employment outflows. We speculated 
earlier that the sign of the effect of local demand conditions was 
ambiguous, dependent on the dominance of quits and layoffs in employment 
outflows. Quits tend to be pro-cyclical, layoffs counter-cyclical. 
There is weak evidence that layoffs dominate male unemployment inflows 
and that workers remain in the labour force where there is more 
opportunity for employment renewal and a consequent higher expected 
return from job search. No clear pattern emerges from the female flows. 
Female unemployment inflows are composed almost equally of job quits and 
layoffs. Hence these two opposing influences may render the economic 
indicators insignificant.
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5.4.4 Transitions into the Labour Force
Table 5.7 examines the annual probability of labour force 
participation of those classified inactive in 1983. Men with previous 
labour force experience who lost their last job through layoff, are 
demonstrably less likely to regain employment, should they resume 
participation, than job quitters. This effect is probably linked to the 
coefficient on discouraged workers. A laid off worker is more likely to 
suspend job search if the perceived opportunities for re-employment are 
sufficiently low, only returning to active search if the expected 
returns improve. In contrast a job leaver may view a spell out of the
labour force as leisure. The young in particular face a higher
probability of re-hiring, as captured in the gross flows in Table 5.2. 
As a consequence they lose less from a temporary period of labour force 
withdrawal. Female job losers are more likely to regain employment from 
out of the labour force, although this effect is likely to be connected 
with the secondary-primary division of female employment. Female 
discouraged workers are again more likely to enter unemployment than 
employment. If discouragement is the result of a decline in the
perceived re-employment probability then it is conceivable there will be 
an accompanying attrition of job search skills. The loss of
informational flows and contacts will make it harder to locate job 
offers upon resumption of participation. The positive coefficients on 
the NU flow of discouraged workers emphasise the ambiguity of labour 
force status for this group. A large part of this flow may be 
attributable to measurement error. Unemployed re-entrants differ only 
from the unemployed in general in their subjective estimates of labour 
force returns.
The longer a male spends out of the labour force the more difficult
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it is to gain employment. Whether this observation is due to duration 
dependence or sorting cannot be determined here. Women experience the 
opposite circumstances. The longer the time spent outside the labour
force, the greater the chance of re-employment and the lower the
likelihood of unemployment entry. The high unemployment inflows of 
those women with only short spells outside the labour force is
consistent with the Clark and Summer's notion of a temporary suspension 
in job search activities. The high employment inflows probably capture 
the movement of women back into the labour force after time spent 
looking after children. Interestingly, the presence of dependent 
children encourages rather than impedes female participation. We were 
unable to detect any deterrent effect of younger children by
disaggregating this variable into age categories. The increased 
availability of part-time work may facilitate this flow. The need for 
additional household income may stimulate the transition.
The effect of demographic variables is generally as expected. Young 
workers flow largely into employment and older workers tend to refrain 
from participation. These results confirm the gross flows of Table 5.2. 
Yet we saw in Table 5.3 that much teenage unemployment was caused by an 
inability to find work upon labour force entry. What Table 5.7 shows is 
that those teenagers with some work experience face the greatest 
barriers to employment entry, particularly if they were made redundant 
or dismissed. Unsuccessful job experiences scar workers relative to 
labour force newcomers. The more educated the individual, the higher the 
chance of flowing into employment rather than unemployment. The 
presence of a working spouse significantly raises the likelihood of 
observing a direct transition from outside the labour force into 
employment over the year. As in Table 5.5, the enhanced flow of labour
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market information from a working household member appears to increase 
the probability of contacting a job offer. Those households with 
unemployed or inactive spouses therefore face an informational 
disadvantage. In addition, the potential for benefit loss of an 
unemployed partner appears to discourage participation. Most NE flows 
are from individuals with employed spouses.
With regard to local economic conditions, we find only a significant 
effect of vacancies on male inflow rates. In general, individuals 
living in high vacancy areas face a higher probability of receiving a 
job offer, and are more likely to enter the labour force with 
employment.
5.2.5 Estimated Impact on Labour Force Flows
Finally, in Table 5.8, we present some representative transition 
probabilities, for various demographic groups, based upon our results in 
Tables 5.5 to 5.7. The predicted probabilities emphasise the diversity 
of escape rates according to personal and state characteristics. For 
example, an unemployed, unskilled male aged between fifty and 
sixty-four, living in council accommodation seeking work for over two 
years after being laid off from his previous employment, claiming 
benefit but using only minimal search effort (row 4) is ten times less 
likely to obtain employment over the year then a prime age married woman 
living in owner-occupied housing who left her previous job voluntarily, 
not claiming unemployment benefit but using several search methods (row 
7) . (The former are also 55 per cent more likely to withdraw from the 
labour force.) Row 2 indicates that short unemployment durations still 
effect some influence on increasing the likelihood of successful job 
search and row 7 emphasises the beneficial effects of increased search
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intensity. Row 5 confirms that a 10 per cent increase in the wage offer 
distribution has a marginal effect on labour force retention.
Row 9 shows the estimated transition probabilities for a typical 
employed male. The likelihood of an employment separation over the year 
is just 9 per cent and the individual is three and a half times more 
likely to continue searching for work than to withdraw from the labour 
force. The probability of an employment separation falls with increased 
education, skill and owner-occupied housing tenure, to a little over 1 
per cent (row 10) . A 10 per cent rise in the wage distribution trebles 
the likelihood of an employment separation (row 12) . The chancejs of an 
employment separation ending in labour force withdrawal appear higher 
for women than men (rows 13 to 15). The continuity of an employment 
spell for most groups is apparent. The likelihood of an employment 
interruption being higher for the young and unskilled would be 
supportive of a segmented labour market hypothesis.
The probability of successful labour force entry is higher for 
mature women and teenagers, and those who left their previous jobs 
voluntarily (rows 16 to 22). Note the differential employment 
probabilities of inexperienced and experienced teenagers (rows 19 to 
20). The scarring effect more than halves the employment probability. 
Discouraged males do not sever their connections with the labour force 
entirely. The probability of a typical discouraged worker re-entering 
the labour force within the year is high (91 per cent), despite the 
relatively low probability of gaining employment in the short term.
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5.5 Conclusion
Having recognised that the labour market is shaped by large flows 
between states, it becomes important to try and measure these movements, 
particularly at the micro level where information is most scarce. A 
thorough knowledge of individual transitions facilitates a more complete 
understanding of the labour market. It is apparent from this chapter 
that individuals differ in their propensities to experience specific 
states. This study has attempted to highlight some possible 
explanations of these differences, within a general Markovian analysis 
of turnover.
We model labour market dynamics from a large disaggregated data-set 
not specifically designed for that purpose. We estimated gross and 
individual annual probabilities of transition between labour market 
states. In the period 1983-84, 50 per cent of those unemployed in 1983 
were no longer in that state one year later. With an unemployment stock 
of 2.9 m i l l i o n ^ ,  this represents a change of circumstance of around 1.4 
million individuals. Given similar sized estimated movements out of 
employment and inactivity, the implication is that over 4 million 
individuals can be expected to change labour market states within a 
year. It is clear from Table 5.2 that the probability of transition
varies substantially across demographic groups. This chapter has 
endeavoured to further identify the more mobile members of the
population of working age.
Analysis of the gross flow data enabled us to assess the impact of
estimated flow probabilities on the unemployment, employment and
inactivity rates of several heterogeneous demographic groups. We 
contrasted the labour market experiences of prime age males with the
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rest of the population. The unemployment of the former is largely due to 
employment severance and subsequent difficulties in regaining work. 
Teenage and much female unemployment is caused by an inability to find 
work on labour force entry. In order to understand within-group 
heterogeneity, we examined individual transition probabilities. Table 
5.8 summarises many of our results.
We were able to find a number of coefficients that conformed to our
prior expectations, in particular, the importance of state spell 
duration in determining employment transitions. Increased length of 
spell will reduce the likelihood of transition if employed. This is 
consistent with firm-specific capital and job matching hypotheses of 
employee turnover. We are however unable to say whether this 
observation is due to true state dependence or unobserved heterogeneity. 
In contrast, unemployed and participatory flows are dominated by the 
individual's characteristics and environment rather than the experience 
of a specific state. Thus for example, unemployed workers laid off from 
their previous job are more likely to regain employment. Worker 
discouragement appears to be only a temporary phenomenon. The impact of 
identical personal characteristics often differs between the sexes.
The experience of any state or condition will shape the individual 
opportunity or preference sets which in turn influence the probability 
of transition. We have shown the importance of many human-capital and 
search theoretic variables in explaining observed transitions, notably 
the effect of on-the-job search and increased search effort, examined in 
chapters 3 and 4, in facilitating employment termination and accession 
respectively.
Our analysis is however constrained according to the nature of the
data set at our disposal. Since we have only two observations on the
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same individual taken one year apart, it would be inappropriate to model 
the instantaneous rate of labour market transition from a discrete data 
set that does not contain an exact record of labour market histories. 
In modelling the annual probability of transition therefore, we must be 
aware that our results could be affected by the interactions of the 
effects of the explanatory variables on the various transition rates. 
Secondly, there are potential biases arising form the construction of 
our data, namely issues of censorship and reporting errors, which may be 
important. Thirdly, our results may be sample and period specific.
This study is by definition supply-side in nature. Whilst 
undoubtedly the major factor in labour force entry and exit, the role of 
demand in helping determine employment inflows and outflows is also a 
matter worthy of further consideration.
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Footnotes
1. This assumes a correlation between the LFS and UK registration
definitions of unemployment. A restriction on benefit qualification 
may deter individuals from expressing availability for work in the 
survey definition of unemployment.
2. At the time of construction, the 1983 and 1984 surveys were the
latest available. The method is of course applicable to any 
consecutive pair of surveys from 1983 onward. In future work we hope 
to repeat the exercise over a period with a different level of 
aggregate unemployment.
3. Evidence from the 1984 LFS indicates that some 11 per cent of the 
population of working age are excluded in this way.
The selectivity problem restricts our estimation of the annual
probability of a state transition to be conditional on there being
no accompanying residential movement. Using Bayes law
Pr[Change State] = Pr[Change State and No Move]
Pr[No Move/Change State]
Our dataset does not contain sufficient information to estimate 
either the denominator or the numerator. It has proved difficult to 
devise a technique to circumvent this problem.
4. Give n states there are only (n-1) possible unique transition 
probabilities in an equilibrium. But in general there are n(n-l) 
unique transition probabilities outside a steady state, (Tuma and 
Hannan (1979)). Table 5.2 offers some confirmation that the latter 
situation holds.
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5. The relevant test statistic is
I - [Qi~El]2 _ X2 (k-1) k=l,2,3
i-1 Ei
where Ei are the "true" LFS state proportions and Oi are the matched 
sub-sample proportions.
6. It follows that any flow, Fij - Si x Pij.
7. The relevant flow numbers are EU-173, EN-163, UE-157, UN-116, NE-276
and NU-181.
8. There are 25 categories of economic activity when using actual
responses and only nine groups in the retrospective data. For 
example, the recall data asks only whether the individual was
unemployed one year ago. The true unemployed status incorporates 
five categories - actively seeking work, waiting to start work, 
temporarily sick, on holiday and awaiting results of a job 
application.
9. The small sample numbers involved prevent us from identifying 
separately the flows into discouragement in Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4.
10. We exclude attendance at a government job centre from the list of
potential job search methods since this is likely to be highly 
correlated with receipt of unemployment benefit. See chapter 4.
11. In the male regression for example, just forty-eight people made the
transition into employment. Pooling the male and female sample 
results in theoretically consistent wage coefficients (positive into 
employment, negative out of the labour force) but inconsistently 
signed vacancy and unemployment effects. None of the coefficients 
are significant.
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12. Evidence from the 1984 Labour Force Survey indicates that some 75 
per cent of small establishments are located in the service 
industries and that a majority of employees are white collar.
13. In 1983-84, male flows into unemployment were dominated by layoffs 
in the ratio 60:40, female flows were comprised in the ratio 45:55. 
The corresponding flows out of the labour force were 25:75 (males), 
18:82 (females).
14. The manual status dummy controls for occupation effects. The 
nominal wage variable is therefore essentially a "south-east" 
effect. We also experimented with a "real wage" variable, 
constructed by deflating nominal earnings by regional mean house 
price data. The results were not significantly different to warrant 
separate reporting.
15. 1983 LFS estimate.
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Appendix A5
Information on individual socio-economic characteristics is taken 
from a matched sample of participants in the 1983 and 1984 Labour Force 
Surveys. The raw unmatched data was supplied to us by the UK Office of 
Population Census and Survey and the ESRC Data Archive. We restrict our 
analysis to the population of working age, resident in England and 
Wales. All variables refer to the individual's circumstances in the 
Spring of 1983.
AGE
DEGREE
GCE
OTHER
SINGLE
SPOUSE
DEPENDENT CHILDREN 
COUNCIL TENANT 
TENURE
1 if individual falls within either 16-19, 20-24 or 
50-retirment age categories, 0 otherwise.
1 if individuals highest qualification is degree or 
equivalent, 0 otherwise.
1 if highest qualification is 'A' or 'O' level or 
equivalent, 0 otherwise.
1 if individuals hold any other qualification,
0 otherwise.
1 if single, divorced or separated, 0 otherwise.
— 1 if husband or wife currently employed, 0 
otherwise.
1 if resident in a household with children under 
the age of sixteen, 0 otherwise.
1 if living in local authority accommodation,
0 otherwise.
1 if length of current employment with firm falls 
within specified range, 0 otherwise.
SMALL
TEMPORARY WORK
PART-TIME
MANUAL
SEARCHING
WORK EXPERIENCE 
LAID OFF
DURATION
BENEFIT CLAIMANT
LEFT
DISCOURAGED 
SEARCH EFFORT
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— 1 if current workplace has fewer than twenty-five
employees, 0 otherwise.
— 1 if current job seasonal, temporary, casual or
fixed period, 0 otherwise.
= 1 if job assessed to be part-time, 0 otherwise.
— 1 if job categorised as skilled or unskilled manual
or general labourer, 0 otherwise.
— 1 if individual looking for new or additional
employment, 0 otherwise.
= 1 if individual has worked previously, 0 otherwise. 
= 1 if individual made redundant, dismissed or
temporary job ended,0 otherwise.
= 1 if individual seeking work within specified
range, 0 otherwise.
— 1 if individual claiming unemployment benefit,
supplementary allowance or a National Insurance 
credit, 0 otherwise.
— 1 if individual last worked within specified range,
0 otherwise.
= 1 if individual reports reason for inactivity as 
belief that no jobs are currently available.
=* Number of reported methods of job search utilised 
by an unemployed worker in survey reference 
week.
In addition we have supplemented our data set with information from 
the following sources:
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(a) Vacancies.
Regional vacancies expressed as a percentage of employees in 
employment. Source: Department of Employment Gazette, Table 3.6.
(b) Employment.
All employees in employment disaggregated by region. Source: 
Regional Trends (Central Statistical Office), Table 8.1.
(c) Unemployment.
Aggregate area unemployment rate, disaggregated to metropolitan 
county level. Source: Department of Employment Gazette, Table 2.9.
(d) Wages
Average hourly earnings of men and women, disaggregated to 
metropolitan county level (and by manual/non-manual if employed). 
Source: Department of Employment New Earnings Survey (1983), Part
E, Tables 122-123.
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Table 5.1
Comparison of Labour Force Composition. 1983-84
Employed Unemployed Out of Labour Force
Labour Force Survey
1983 64.1 7.7 28.2
1984 67.3 8.4 24.3
Matched Sample
1983 66.5 7.3 26.2
1984 67.8 8.4 23.8
Note: The 1983 LFS contains 123,365 individuals; the 1984 LFS contains
80,515 individuals. There are 7,172 individuals in our panel. All 
figures relate to population of working age.
Table 5.2. Annual Labour Market Transition Probabilities by Sex and Age, 1983-84
Sex and Age
Probability of Transition
EE
1.
EU
2.
EN
3.
UE
4.
UU
5.
UN
6.
NE
7.
NU
8.
NN
9.
1) Total .930 .036 .034 .284 .507 .209 .151 .086 .764
Males
2) Total .948 .033 .019 .235 .603 .161 .141 .099 .760
3) 16-19 years .937 .047 .016 .512 .390 .098 .259 .075 .667
4) 20-49 years .958 .033 .009 .225 .689 .086 .117 .245 .638
5) 50-64 years .924 .031 .045 .133 .489 .378 .038 .057 .905
Females
6) Total .902 .040 .057 .387 .304 .309 .154 .081 .765
7) 16-19 years .886 .072 .044 .500 .267 .233 .275 .087 .638
8) 20-49 years .904 .040 .056 .385 .303 .312 .150 .093 .756
9) 50-59 years .900 .033 .067 .188 .375 .438 .065 .035 .900
Note: The probability ij represents the likelihood that an individual will flow from state i to state
j. E - employment, U - unemployment, N - out of the labour force. First letter signifies 
status in 1983. Sample size = 7,172 of which in 1983 there were 4,793 employed, 554 unemployed 
and 1,825 non-participants.
Table 5.3 Annual Labour Force Flow Ratios using Actual and Retrospective Data
Transition Ratio
Sex and Age EE EU EN UE UU UN NE NU NN Sample Siz<
1) Total 0.987 1.065 1.250 1.013 0.873 1.554 1.213 1.203 0.944 7,122
Males
2) Total 0.997 0.971 1.061 0.885 0.907 1.311 1.322 1.788 0.948 3,718
3) 16-19 years 0.915 0.667 0.667 0.846 1.000 2.000 1.341 1.273 0.987 320
4) 20-49 years 1.001 1.015 1.115 0.911 0.914 1.000 1.167 1.824 0.953 2,340
5) 50-64 years 0.997 0.960 1.086 0.857 0.846 1.522 1.800 2.800 0.927 1,053
Females 
6) Total 0.974 1.212 1.397 1.228 0.754 1.931 1.176 1.027 0.943 3,404
7) 16-19 years 0.945 0.900 0.833 1.143 0.643 2.333 1.083 1.500 0.961 293
8) 20-49 years 0.975 1.341 1.441 1.378 0.804 2.222 1.154 0.935 0.933 2,489
9) 50-59 years 0.977 0.917 1.444 0.500 0.667 1.125 2.000 1.800 0.963 618
Note: E — Employed U — Unemployed N — Not in labour force. First letter signifies status in 1983.
Table 5.4 Characteristics of Annual Labour Market Flows, 1983-84
Sex and Age
Proportion of Flows
1.
into employment 
from outside the 
labour force 
(fne/fne + fue)
2.
out of labour 
force from 
employment 
(fen/fen + feu)
3.
into unemployment 
from employment
(feu/feu + fnu)
4.
out of labour 
force from 
unemp1oyment 
(fun/fun + fen)
5.
into unemp. 
from outside 
labour force 
(fnu/fnu + fne)
Total .655 .486 .515 .424 .364
Males
Total .462 .366 .652 .406 .413
16-19 years .713 .250 .284 .160 .140
20-49 years .180 .217 .739 .514 .676
50-64 years .400 .589 .657 .507 .600
Females
Total .762 .588 .406 .325 .344
16-19 years .800 .379 .301 .583 .207
20-49 years .737 .587 .410 .319 .383
50-59 years .850 .666 .550 .241 .346
Note: fij represents the number of individuals moving from state i to state j over the period.
E = employment, U = unemployment, N = out of the labour force.
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Table 5.5 Annual Transitions from Unemployment
Sample Mean 
Males Females
U-E
Males Females
U-N
Males Females
Constant -11.47 5.62 18.76 3.44
(15.56) (17.25) (17.49) (18.22)
Age: 16-19 0.12 0.18 0.94** 0.18 -0.01 0.70
(0.41) (0.51) (0.55) (0.57)
: 20-24 0.17 0.15 0.11 -0.05 -0.13 0.62
(0.36) (0.40) (0.45) (0.42)
: 50-Retirement 0.25 0.11 -0.93** -0.68 1.27** -1.02**
(0.33) (0.55) (0.35) (0.49)
Education: Degree 0.04 0.07 -0.72 -0.28 1.29** 0.17
(0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54)
: GCE 0.18 0.29 0.68** -0.12 -0.69* 0.06
(0.30) (0.32) (0.39) (0.33)
: Other 0.15 0.14 0.63* 0.31 -0.77* 0.16
(0.31) (0.38) (0.43) (0.44)
Single 0.42 0.47 0.21 -0.28 -0.14 -0.61
(0.29) (0.33) (0.34) (0.49)
Working Spouse 0.16 0.43 1.64** 1.26** -1.42** -1.09**
(0.34) (0.49) (0.47) (0.48)
Dependent Children 0.47 0.58 -0.02 -0.11 -0.15 0.55
(0.24) (0.29) (0.31) (0.34)
Council Tenant 0.41 0.27 -0.43* 0.09 -0.02 -0.70**
(0.23) (0.31) (0.28) (0.35)
Work Experience 0.92 0.87 -0.07 -0.79* 0.84 1.04*
(0.24) (0.48) (0.55) (0.55)
: Laid off 0.53 0.27 0.70** 1.02** -1.08** -0.80
(0.24) (0.32) (0.28) (0.39)
Unemployment Duration
: < 3 months 0.11 0.27 0.47 0.29 -0.65 -0.35
(0.36) (0.44) (0.45) (0.42)
: 3 months-1 year 0.27 0.42 0.23 0.63 -0.18 -0.56
(0.28) (0.42) (0.34) (0.38)
: 1-2 years 0.25 0.13 -0.10 0.88* -0.10 -1.47**
(0.30) (0.54) (0.34) (0.57)
Benefit Claimant 0.94 0.58 0.15 -0.09 -0.40 -0.45
(0.41) (0.28) (0.43) (0.30)
Search Intensity 1.53 1.32 0.32** 0.14 -0.59** -0.08
(0.13) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16)
Local Economic Conditions
: Vacancy Rate -0.60 -0.60 1.09 -0.85 -0.41 0.27
(1.27) (1.46) (0.89) (0.84)
: Wage Rate 5.93 5.59 2.52 -1.07 -3.08 0.06
(1.91) (1.84) (2.10) (1.91)
: Unemp.Rate -1.95 -2.01 0.94 -1.11 -1.13 0.14
(0.60) (0.72) (0.71) (0.74)
Table 5.5 (cont.)
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Males Females
Diagnostics At Zero At Convergence At Zero At Convergence
Log L -407.6 -263.4 -198.8 -164.4
Degrees of freedom 742 700 362 324
% correct predictions 33.0 66.9 33.0 53.6
Sample size 371 181
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis - ** denotes significant at 95% level
* denotes significant at 90% level. Likelihood Ratio test for
male-female sample split, LR — 51.0 ~ X^(40). Sample flow sizes are
UU=224, UE=88, UN=59 for men and UU=54, UE=71 and UN=58 for women.
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Table 5.6 
Annual Transitions from Employment
Sample
Males
Mean
Females
E-U
Males Females
E-N
Males Females
Constant -28.42** -8.11 8.34 13.12
(11.12) (10.35) (13.29) (8.42)
Age: 16-19 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.49 -0.32 -0.36
(0.46) (0.43) (0.58) (0.54)
: 20-24 0.09 0.13 1.03** 0.01 -1.48** 0.36
(0.41) (0.28) (0.71) (0.25)
: 50-Retirement 0.26 0.19 -0.13 -0.37 0.42* 0.60**
(0.22) (0.28) (0.23) (0.21)
Education: Degree 0.17 0.09 -0.82** -0.02 0.51 0.06
(0.36) (0.37) (0.34) (0.32)
: GCE 0.30 0.34 -0.39* -0.06 0.39 0.07
(0.22) (0.24) (0.24) (0.20)
: Other 0.10 0.12 -0.13 -0.08 -0.01 0.41*
(0.27) (0.26) (0.32) (0.22)
Single 0.20 0.29 0.01 0.14 0.14 -0.56**
(0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.21)
Dependent Children 0.53 0.49 0.49** -0.17 -0.74** 0.02
(0.20) (0.21) (0.23) (0.18)
Council Tenant 0.17 0.15 0.44** 0.46** 0.02 0.41**
(0.19) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22)
Job Characteristics
: Tenure < 6 mths 0.04 0.08 0.75** 0.51 -0.19 -0.04
(0.34) (0.35) (0.46) (0.29)
: Tenure 6mths-2yrs 0.11 0.19 0.63** 0.42 -0.32 -0.20
(0.27) (0.31) (0.33) (0.24)
: Tenure 2-10yrs 0.36 0.49 0.32 0.47* -0.41* -0.48**
(0.21) (0.27) (0.23) (0.20)
: Small Firm 0.26 0.43 0.19 -0.08 -0.43* 0.11
(0.20) (0.18) (0.25) (0.15)
: Temporary Work 0.02 0.06 1.07** 0.47* -0.78 0.04
(0.40) (0.26) (0.62) (0.23)
: Part-Time 0.01 0.43 -0.46 -0.09 1.29** 0.29*
(0.54) (0.21) (0.54) (0.17)
: Manual 0.56 0.35 0.92 0.09 -0.17 0.17
(0.62) (0.45) (0.69) (0.40)
: Searching on Job 0.04 0.05 0.73* 1.05** -0.90 -1.14**
(0.43) (0.27) (0.71) (0.29)
Local Economic Conditions
: Vacancy Rate -0.57 -0.57 0.26 -0.59 -0.42 0.17
(0.57) (0.61) (0.61) (0.52)
: Wage Rate 5.94 5.53 2.62* -0.30 -0.96 1.08
(1.44) (1.31) (1.57) (1.21)
: Unemp.Rate -2.04 -2.04 0.52 -0.38 -0.27 0.31
(0.43) (0.44) (0.44) (0.43)
Table 5.6 (cont.)
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Males Females
Diagnostics At Zero At Convergence At Zero At Convergence
Log L -3127 -669.2 -2087 -714.5
Degrees of freedom 5688 5650 3826 3758
% correct predictions 33.3 94.1 33.3 89.4
Sample size 2846 1900
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis - ** denotes significant at 95% level
* denotes significant at 90% level. Likelihood Ratio test for male-
female sample split, LR - 57.0 ~ X^(42). Sample flow sizes are
EE=2679, EU=98, EN=69 for men and EE=1700, EU-76 and EN-124 for women
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Table 5.7
Annual Transitions from Outside Labour Force
Samnle
Males
Mean
Females
N-E
Males Females
N-U
Males Females
Constant 8.82 4.31 -10.99 9.51
(14.44) (6.14) (14.72) (9.27)
Age: 16-19 0.32 0.11 0.82* 0.56** -0.69 -0.02
(0.42) (0.23) (0.41) (0.28)
: 20-24 0.05 0.10 0.52 -0.30 -0.19 0.28
(0.57) (0.22) (0.51) (0.21)
: 50-Retirement 0.46 0.23 -0.11 0.06 -0.85** -0.82**
(0.38) (0.24) (0.36) (0.29)
Education: Degree 0.06 0.05 0.40 0.58** -0.15 0.20
(0.47) (0.27) (0.42) (0.29)
: GCE 0.23 0.28 0.15 -0.28 -0.13 -0.45
(0.54) (0.27) (0.59) (0.42)
: Other 0.09 0.11 -0.02 -0.16 -0.06 0.39**
(0.24) (0.14) (0.29) (0.16)
Single 0.56 0.26 0.77* 0.26 -0.33 0.22
(0.43) (0.27) (0.37) (0.29)
Working Spouse 0.14 0.59 0.87* 0.58** -0.75* -0.02
(0.45) (0.24) (0.41) (0.24)
Dependent Children 0.46 0.72 0.52 0.41** -0.06 -0.58**
(0.35) (0.18) (0.34) (0.19)
Council Tenant 0.32 0.24 0.08 -0.48** 0.61** 0.59**
(0.23) (0.16) (0.24) (0.17)
Work Experience 0.75 0.84 -1.29** 0.35 0.97* -0.12
(0.54) (0.27) (0.40) (0.29)
: left < 1 yr ago 0.15 0.11 0.87* -0.03 -0.05 0.90**
(0.52) (0.25) (0.47) (0.25)
: left 1-3 yrs ago 0.22 0.13 0.23 -0.19 -0.07 0.68**
(0.52) (0.44) (0.47) (0.24)
: Laid off 0.12 0.04 -0.81 -1.03** 0.92* 0.70**
(0.57) (0.27) (0.50) (0.30)
Discouraged Worker 0.09 0.03 -0.25 -0.45** 0.62* 0.19
(0.28) (0.18) (0.36) (0.23)
Local Economic Conditions
: Vacancy Rate -0.56 -0.56 1.37** -0.07 -2.16* 0.04
(0.68) (0.39) (0.77) (0.47)
: Wage Rate 5.94 5.58 -1.71 -0.22 1.39 -0.91
(1.74) (0.99) (1.81) (1.16)
: Unemp.Rate -2.03 -2.03 0.04 -0.02 -0.07 0.41
(0.65) (0.34) (0.71) (0.40)
Table 5.7 (cont.)
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Males Females
Diagnostics At Zero At Convergence At Zero At Convergence
Log L -517.4 -296.0 -1488 -864.5
Degrees of freedom 942 904 2708 2670
% correct predictions 33.0 73.3 33.0 75.6
Sample size 471 1354
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis - ** denotes significant at 95% level
* denotes significant at 90% level. Likelihood Ratio test for male- 
female sample split, LR = 72.0 - X^(36). Sample flow sizes are 
NN=330, NE=82, NU=59 for men and NN-1021, NE-221 and NU=112 for 
women
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Table 5.8 
Predicted Transition Probabilities
Description of Origin State Predicted Probability
A . Unemployment U-E U-N
1. Prime-age married man, no qualification, 
council house, children. Seeking work 
between 3 months and 1 year, laid off,
claiming benefit, average search intensity. 0.20 0.01
2. As 1. but duration over 2 years. 0.14 0.04
3. As 1. but owner occupier, duration <
3 months, using 3 search methods. 0.44 0.02
4. As 1. but local wage rate 10% above average. 0.18 0.02
5. As 1. but local wage rate 10% above average. 0.18 0.02
6. Prime-age married woman, owner occupier, 
children. Quit last job and claiming benefit
duration 3-12 months, average search intensity. 0.43 0.44
7. As 6. but using 3 search methods. 0.52 0.34
8. As 6 but teenage, single, no work experience,
claiming benefit. 0.31 0.25
B . Employment E-U E-N
9. Prime-age male, some qualifications, married, 
children, council house, manual, large firm, 
full time, tenure > 10 years, not searching
on job. 0.07 0.02
10. As 9. but non-manual, owner-occupied, degree. 0.003 0.008
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Table 5.8 (cont.)
Description of Origin State Predicted Probability
11. As 9. but young, single, small firm, 
tenure < 6 months, searching on job. 0.49 0.001
12. As 9. but living in area with wages 10 
above average. 0.27 0.02
13. As 9. but female. 0.03 0.13
14- Prime-age female, some qualifications, 
children. Non-manual part-time, 
small firm. Tenure 6 months-2 years. 0.03 0.13
15. As 14. but degree, full-time, large firm. 
Tenure 2-10 years. Searching on job. 
Single. 0.02 0.01
C. Outside Labour Force N-E N-U
16. Prime-age married man, no qualifications, 
children, council house. Laid off over 
3 years ago. Discouraged. 0.01 0.91
17. Teenage, single male. No work experience. 
No dependents. Some qualifications. 0.27 0.10
18. As 16. but job quit. 0.11 0.76
19. As 16. but vacancy rate 10% above average. 0.02 0.88
20. Prime-age married female, some qualifications, 
children, owner occupier. Previous job ended 
in quit over 3 years ago. 0.25 0.06
21. As 20. but left 1-3 years ago. 0.30 0.21
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Chapter 6: Job Tenure and Inter-Firm Mobility in Britain
6.1. Introduction
Each year in Britain between ten to fifteen per cent of the working 
population, i.e some 2 to 3 million people, separate from their jobs. 
Many workers flow directly into unemployment, others withdraw from the 
labour force and still more, around 50 per cent, begin work with a new 
employer. Labour turnover is a necessary means by which to allocate 
human resources efficiently. Most workers in Britain hold long-term 
productive jobs. The movement of workers across firms facilitates this 
flow into long term employment. Workers unhappy with their current 
circumstances can engage in mobility as a means of improving their 
worth. Chapter 3 examined the first stage of this process - the decision 
to undertake on-the-job search. Here we seek to identify which workers 
are ultimately successful in their attempts to move. This chapter uses 
cross sectional and longitudinal observations of individuals to explore 
the incidence of inter-firm mobility in Britain, the determinants of a 
worker's likelihood of changing jobs and the process of job shopping.
Several studies in the United States have analysed inter-firm 
mobility using individual micro data. Bartel (1982) examined the effect 
of non-pecuniary characteristics on mobility. Mincer and Jovanovic 
(1981) concentrated upon the negative relationship between job tenure 
and the probability of a transition. Akerlof, Rose and Yellen (1988) 
investigated the pro-cyclical nature of job quits. Hitherto, United 
Kingdom studies of turnover (see Burgess and Nickell (1987), Shorey 
(1980) and Wickens (1978)) have used industry-level data specific to the 
manufacturing sector to analyse job separations, in part for want of an
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alternative dataset. Our analysis of UK individual mobility draws upon 
the information contained in the Labour Force Survey (LFS). In order to 
study differences in mobility behaviour, we make use of the dynamic 
information contained in the two period longitudinal dataset constructed 
from the 1983 and 1984 LFS used to analyse labour market transitions in 
chapter 5.
Following a technique developed by Hall (1982) , we use LFS 
information on uncompleted job tenure to estimate a worker’s "eventual 
tenure" and so infer the likely process of job shopping. Our approach 
embodies search theoretic, human capital and job matching considerations 
of labour mobility. In this way workers and firms form matches, the 
value of which may evolve over time if the worker invests in firm 
specific capital, or new information arrives to change the relative 
value of any job match. The individual decision to change jobs is based 
on information acquisition as measured by the characteristics of the 
job, both wage and non-pecuniary, some of which may be observed only 
after a match takes place. External economic conditions should also 
influence the ability of workers to change jobs.
In the following study we test these propositions empirically and 
assess the implications for the job shopping process. Of particular 
importance throughout this chapter, is the relationship between time 
spent with the firm and mobility. Since we consider lengthy job tenure 
as evidence of a successful job match, we concentrate upon the flow into 
long term jobs. Section 6.2 outlines the theoretical background to our 
work and Section 6.3 describes aspects of the dataset and its 
construction. Section 6.4 presents a series of analyses of turnover 
over time, by industry, occupation and tenure. High wage industries 
demonstrate significantly lower inter-firm mobility. We present logistic
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regression results of the likelihood that a worker will change jobs 
within the course of a year which confirm the existence of an inverse 
tenure-turnover relationship in Britain. We find evidence that long term 
employment relationships comprise the majority of British employment 
experiences. The average male employee is currently in a job that will 
last 15 years. Women hold jobs on average for around seven years. This 
reflects their segmented labour market participation. Over the working 
horizon women can be expected to hold around 2 more jobs than men. 
Section 6.5 concludes to the effect that the ability to engage in job 
shopping and efficiency enhancing inter-firm mobility may be limited by 
high levels of unemployment.
6.2. Theoretical Background
We seek to explain the movement of workers across firms as a means 
of increasing the personal returns to employment. Owing to the nature of 
our dataset, we do not exclude the possibility of an intervening 
unemployment spell. We therefore attempt to identify those workers who 
successfully changed jobs over a one year interval. These movements 
incorporate both worker initiated quits and firm inspired layoff 
behaviour. In other words, we measure aggregate turnover.
The recognition that labour turnover would result from the 
optimising decisions of firms and workers first appears in the works of 
Becker (1962) and Oi (1962). The theory of human capital embodied in 
these studies views workers as seeking to maximise lifetime income. In 
its simplest form, the theory predicts that workers will change jobs if 
by so doing they increase expected lifetime rewards, net of any
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transaction costs. Yet firms are not passive agents in this process. 
Both Becker and Oi realised that investments made by workers and firms 
during the course of a job would affect the value of the job match and 
that this could subsequently influence labour turnover.
In particular the provision of training programmes specific to the 
needs of an individual firm was seen as likely to reduce turnover, since 
their existence created an economic rent which both firm and worker 
could exploit if the job match was maintained. Firms gain from specific 
training if as a result, a worker's productivity is raised above that 
which would have occured without training. Likewise a worker will 
benefit should he/she be able to capture some of the returns from the 
increase in productivity. Firm specific, as opposed to general 
training, leaves a worker's productivity, and hence worth, in 
alternative employment unchanged. It Is therefore in a worker's 
interest to remain with a firm providing such training. The greater the 
volume of investment undertaken by firms or workers, the greater the 
cost of a job separation.
Parsons (1972) demonstrates that the size of worker and firm job 
investment will be reflected in quit and layoff behaviour respectively. 
Firms are less likely to layoff those workers in whom they have invested 
heavily for at least two reasons. Firstly, such workers will be endowed 
with the highest marginal product value and be most experienced with the 
firm's means of production. Secondly, the hiring and firing costs of 
these highly skilled workers will be correspondingly larger. Similarly, 
workers receiving a higher reward than obtainable elsewhere due to 
specific training, will be less likely to quit. The existence of worker 
search and transfer costs will also serve to raise the value of an 
existing job match and reduce quits accordingly. If workers share the
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cost of training by receiving lower current rewards coupled with a 
higher return upon completion of training, then once again the incentive 
to quit is reduced.
Parsons, among others, reports a strong empirical inverse 
relationship between turnover and job tenure. This issue is pursued by 
Jovanovic (1979a, 1979b) who offers two possible explanations for this 
observation. The first, (contained in Jovanovic (1979b)), belongs to 
the ’inspection-good' theory of turnover with which the Parsons study is 
also associated. Here workers are assumed to posess information 
regarding current but not alternative job matches. The rewards from a 
job are directly related to match-specific marginal productivities. 
Over time workers acquire information regarding the quality of 
alternative job offers whilst at the same time being free to invest in 
firm-specific capital on the current job. Hence the observed 
turnover-tenure relation. The more specific capital investment 
undertaken, and hence the more time spent on the job, the higher the 
productivity (and reward) in the current job and the less likely an 
alternative job will offer a higher match-specific productivity.
The alternative explanation for the inverse turnover-tenure 
relationship offered by Jovanovic (1979a), Wilde (1979) and Johnson 
(1978), belongs to the ’experience-good' theory of turnover. Here 
workers possess imperfect information regarding the quality of any job 
match. This informational uncertainty can only be reduced by a period of 
time spent on the job. Over time, characteristics regarding the job or 
the worker's productivity on the job are gradually revealed. Workers 
terminate matches in which their productivity or worth is deemed to be 
low. Since a mismatch is likely to be detected during the early stages 
of the job, so the inverse turnover-tenure observation is derived.
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Inter-firm mobility in this context is a means by which to engage in 
'job shopping' for new potentially more productive and rewarding job 
matches. Workers and firms could be expected to sample a succession of 
jobs for short periods until a productive match is eventually revealed 
and a long-term employment relationship begins. That the productivity of 
a job is dependent upon each worker-firm pairing is sufficient to create 
a distribution of returns and individual differences in the 
tenure-turnover relation. Neither hypothesis directly addresses the 
problem of firm initiated separations. If however firms layoff those 
workers with the least amount of specific human capital or terminate 
less productive job matches, then we would expect to observe a similar 
tenure-separation relationship. It will also be difficult to 
distinguish empirically between the experience and inspection 
explanations of the tenure effect. In practice we might expect elements 
of both hypotheses to be present. We now consider other possible 
determinants of inter-firm mobility.
Akerlof, Rose and Yellen (1988) have recently applied an 
inspection-good model of turnover to address the observation that 
voluntary job separations in the United States are highly pro-cyclical. 
The authors assume the existence of job rationing, i.e. firms set wages 
above market clearing levels, which creates competition for job 
vacancies. The greater the competition, as measured by an increase in 
the unemployment rate, the harder it becomes to change jobs and turnover 
subsequently falls. In good times the likelihood that a vacancy will be 
filled by an employed worker is much higher, hence the pro-cyclical 
nature of inter-firm mobility. A similar argument is advanced in 
Burgess and Nickell (1987). In their analysis of aggregate turnover 
(quits plus layoffs) the authors note that job-to-job quits will vary
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with job availability. A firm's layoff behaviour is then determined by 
the difference between total quits and planned employment levels. Thus 
in any empirical study of inter-firm mobility we would expect to observe 
a positive coefficient on vacancies and a negative effect of 
unemployment.
Ball commenting on Akerlof, Rose and Yellen (1988) notes that there 
may be positive externalities arising from the increased number of 
trading opportunities that a bouyant economy provides. This stems from 
the work of Diamond (1982) who demonstrates that turnover is not 
necessarilly efficient in search based models, because workers and firms 
engaged in a job match ignore the impact that this has on the ability of 
others to form a successful pairing. A greater number of trading 
opportunities improves the matching of jobs and workers by lowering the 
cost of finding a new job. Employed workers find it easier to engage in 
job shopping faced with more vacancies and reduced competition. Firms 
also benefit from increased trading opportunities. The cost of opening 
a vacancy is reduced under "thick-market conditions”. Firms however 
will be indifferent to the status of the job seeker. The firm benefits 
from the wider pool of potential employees that an increase in the 
number of job seekers will bring. Such a situation could arise equally 
in times of high unemployment or when employed job search is high. The 
results of chapter 3 suggest that on-the-job search is higher when 
unemployment is low. This could limit the effect of any unemployment 
variable in a turnover regression.1 Search externalities created by job 
matching models are necessary conditions for observing such effects.2
Since turnover is seen as a response to the total value of a job 
match it is perhaps useful to examine the constituent parts of a job's 
total worth. To the worker, the total reward from a job is the sum of
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its monetary and non-pecuniary components. In the experience good 
models, non-pecuniary characteristics (working environment, fringe 
benefits, the journey to work, for example) will be major motivating 
factors in the turnover decision, since the wage can always be observed 
before the job begins. A dissatisfied worker is more likely to generate 
an unproductive job match. If satisfaction or indeed non-pecuniary 
preferences evolve over time, as job aspects gradually reveal themselves 
to the worker, then turnover behaviour will respond likewise.
Several studies have endeavoured to test for the importance of non- 
pecuniary characteristics in explaining turnover behaviour. It has 
however proved difficult to measure these effects precisely in empirical 
work. Viscusi (1979) for example, uses both the industrial injury rate 
and a set of self-assessed job characteristics, (for example speed of 
work, physical effort required, pleasantness of working conditions), to 
capture non-wage effects. The author reports a positive effect of the 
former on industry and quit rates and significant effects of the latter 
on individual quit intentions. Bartel (1982), obtains significant 
effects on realised worker quit behaviour for a series of occupational 
characteristics. Akerlof, Rose and Yellen (1988), reduce the non-wage 
aspects of the job to a single monetary valuation. This is based upon a 
survey-initiated response to the subjective amount each worker must be 
compensated by to induce a move to a new job equivalent to the one 
currently held. On this basis the authors claim that non-pecuniary 
aspects of the job can explain around fifty per cent of all turnover 
decisions.
Whilst it seems doubtful that a satisfactory measure of non-wage job 
attributes currently exists, it does appear important to try and proxy 
the effect, if any, in empirical work. The approach we take follows
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that of Viscusi and Bartel. Since our dataset does not contain 
sufficient information regarding a worker’s assessment of non-wage 
aspects, we include industrial and occupational characteristics in our 
mobility regressions.3 Further details are given in Section 6.4.
Finally, it is important that we interpret the available information 
on turnover correctly. If labour mobility is indeed influenced by job 
matching or firm-specific capital considerations, then we would expect 
those workers with good (poor) matches to have long (short) job tenures. 
This would not necessarily be apparent from an analysis of aggregate 
incomplete tenure spells as contained in the LFS. Workers in the midst 
of an employment spell may be on the point of severing that link or may 
have embarked upon a job that will ultimately last the remainder of 
their working career. If some form of job shopping behaviour does hold 
then one might expect short durations to be a prelude to longer, more 
successful matches in which both firm and worker share in the resulting 
higher marginal productivity. Using a technique developed by Hall 
(1982) it is possible to estimate the likelihood of eventual tenure 
length from the data on distribution of current, incomplete spells. 
Hence we are able to assess the contribution of long-term (productive) 
jobs to total employment and their relevance to the British labour 
market.
6.3._____ Data
Our analysis of job tenure and turnover is drawn from the United 
Kingdom Labour Force Survey (LFS), an annual survey of around 60,000 
private households. Each year the LFS questions those currently in work
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as to whether they were employed by a different firm one year 
previously. We utilise the information contained in these responses as 
the basis for our investigation of inter-firm mobility. No details are 
given as to the exact data of transition, if any. In addition from 1983 
onwards, the LFS has contained information on the length of tenure of 
jobs currently in progress. Ordinarily it would be impossible to
analyse the effect of tenure on inter-firm mobility using data from a 
single LFS. Since the information on tenure refers to the current 
employment spell, it is endogenous with respect to the turnover 
variable. However such an analysis is possible using the specially 
constructed LFS longitudinal dataset used in chapter 5. By matching the 
personal characteristics of individuals contained in the 1983 and 1984 
surveys, we have access to around 4,500 people employed in both years 
(see also Wadsworth (1989) for further details). It is therefore 
possible to assess the effect of 1983 job tenure and other 
characteristics on subsequent mobility behaviour. As far as we are 
aware this dataset is unique. It allows us therefore to examine aspects 
of turnover hitherto possible using only United States data.
There are however some problems that should be noted as being 
particularly relevant in any analysis of turnover. Firstly, our dataset 
is not an entirely random sample of the population. The LFS sample 
overlap between successive surveys is constructed by returning to 
addresses and not individuals. Consequently those people who move home 
between survey interview dates are excluded. If there exists a
correlation between household and inter-firm mobility, our turnover 
estimates may be prone to sample selection bias. Estimates from the 
full 1984 LFS suggest that some 25 per cent of job-to-job changes are 
accompanied by a change of address.^ Unfortunately it has proved
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difficult to devise an adequate selectivity correction technique. All 
our subsequent work is therefore restricted to households who remained 
at the same address between surveys. We therefore exclude most long 
distance job related moves^ and all further inferences are tempered 
accordingly.
A second (lesser) problem concerns our inability to measure the 
exact timing or cause of any job separation. We restrict our sample to 
those individuals employed at both survey dates. We cannot however 
exclude the possibility of intervening unemployment or a spell outside 
the labour force between these two survey dates. Our measure of 
inter-firm mobility is therefore similar to that found in Mincer and 
Jovanovic (1981) rather than Mattilla (1974), who reports that around 
sixty per cent of all U.S. job changes involve no unemployment. The two 
concepts are highly correlated, yet because we cannot distinguish the 
cause of separation, our aggregate turnover measure incorporates aspects 
of both quit and layoff behaviour i.e. both worker and firm initiated 
decisions.^
Finally, our dataset does not contain any wage information. Since a 
worker's wage relative to that obtainable elsewhere partially determines 
the value of a job match, it is necessary to proxy this variable. We 
therefore include measures of the worker's occupational and industrial 
wage, available from an external source (see Data Appendix). As in 
chapter 3, the former approximates an own wage effect. The more highly 
paid the worker, the greater the value of the job match and the less 
likely a separation. The latter should capture a relative wage effect. 
The lower the industrial wage with respect to the available 
alternatives, the higher the chances of job dissatisfaction and a 
subsequent separation.? in addition we have augmented the dataset with
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variables intended to measure local labour market demand and potential 
non-pecuniary characteristics of a job. We therefore include regional 
vacancy, unemployment and redundancy rates together with industrial 
accident incidence.
6.4. Results
6.4.1 The Pattern of Turnover in Britain
We begin with an outline of the pattern of job separations in 
Britain over a seven year period, 1977-1984, using data from the 1977, 
1979, 1981, 1983 and 1984 Labour Force Surveys. During this time the 
economy moved into recession and had begun to recover again. We
categorise the annual separation rate according to whether the
transition resulted in a new job, unemployment or labour force 
withdrawal. We are further able to distinguish whether the movement 
into unemployment was due to either a quit or a layoff.® Between 13 and 
16 per cent of the employed work force separate from their jobs every 
year.
Table 6.1 illustrates that the incidence of aggregate separation
appears to vary somewhat pro-cyclically. As aggregate conditions 
worsen, the proportion of separations comprising job-to-job changes 
falls and the flow into unemployment rises. The increased flow into
unemployment is an involuntary movement, being principally attributable 
to a rise in layoffs. This accounted for a maximum of 72 per cent of 
the flow into unemployment by 1980-81, but fell back steadily to around 
50 per cent thereafter. Inter-firm mobility and job quits into 
unemployment are highly correlated. Both these flows fell as aggregate
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conditions worsened, particularly between 1977 and 1981, the height of 
the recession when layoffs were at their peak. This apparent 
pro-cyclicality of inter-firm mobility, suggesting that total quits 
dominate layoffs, is consistent with similar findings by Burgess and 
Nickell (1987) for separations in the manufacturing sector. This is 
indicative of the difficulties in gaining employment once lost or of 
changing jobs within slack labour markets. Individuals will not quit 
when the expected returns from doing so are low. High unemployment 
increases the value of a job match to the worker. In the relatively 
tight labour market of 1976-79, the opportunities for re-employment were 
correspondingly greater. Hence those who quit into search unemployment 
or were laid off could more readily find work within a year. Similarly 
the likelihood of observing a job-to-job transition with no intervening 
unemployment is correspondingly greater. Jobs are valued less in tight 
markets. From the firm's side, Pissarides (1986) notes that layoffs are 
a response intended to rid the firm of its least productive job matches. 
As the number of job quits fall, firms can no longer rely on natural 
wastage and resort to redundancies. This seems particularly relevant to 
the period 1980-81.
Given this established pattern of turnover, we now concentrate on 
inter-firm mobility over the period. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 outline the 
incidence of job-to-job moves by origin industry and occupation 
respectively. We do not distinguish between separations within and 
across occupational and industrial classifications. The 1984 LFS 
suggests that 68 per cent of those who moved firms also undertook a 
change of occupation. Inter-firm turnover fell by around fifteen per 
cent between 1977 and 1981, rising by a similar amount thereafter, until 
by 1984 the separation rate had almost reached the same level as in
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1977. Turnover is consistently higher amongst women. These patterns 
are reflected across all industries. Those industries with high 
turnover rates, notably Construction and the Retail and Distributive 
services, maintain these rates throughout the fluctuations in aggregate 
turnover. The cyclical sensitivity of the Construction industry is most 
apparent. Turnover is most volatile in this sector. Separation rates 
in male Manufacturing have remained broadly constant despite large 
employment falls in this sector. Mobility may also be lower where the 
value of the job match is higher. There is some evidence of an inverse 
relation between the industry wage rate and its turnover. The Energy 
and Communications industries demonstrate consistently low turnover 
rates and high wage rates. (The 1984 industry wage-turnover correlation 
coefficients are -0.38 for men and -0.49 for women.)
Turnover rates within occupations follow a similar if less 
pronounced pattern. Turnover is again higher for women. Separation 
rates are high throughout the period in the traditionally low paid 
Personal Service and Selling occupational groups, and generally lower in 
the more highly paid occupations. Turnover in the Professional and 
Managerial group remains the exception, being above average over the 
period. This may reflect the relatively tight labour market in this 
sector. A continued large number of opportunities would enable such 
workers to move more freely between firms. (The 1984 correlation 
coefficients between occupational wage and turnover were -0.23 for men 
and -0.35 for women).
Table 6.4 combines industrial and occupational separation rates. 
High (low) turnover industries display high (low) separation rates 
across all occupations, and vice versa. The standard deviation of 
occupational quit rates is generally higher across industries than is
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the equivalent industrial turnover dispersion across occupations. This 
is particularly apparent for manual workers. This suggests inter-firm 
mobility is a response to firm, rather than occupational, specific 
differentials. High turnover industries exhibit high rates of mobility 
amongst all workers. The reduction in turnover between 1977 and 1981 
holds for all occupations, with the exception of the managerial and 
professional group, across all industries. Consequently those 
industries with more professional staff experienced smaller reductions 
in turnover during the period.
6.4.2 Job Tenure and Turnover
We now examine the relationship between inter-firm mobility and time 
spent in a job in an attempt to assess the importance of job matching 
theories. Using our longitudinal dataset, Table 6.5 replicates the 
"tenure-turnover profile" which appears in Mincer and Jovanovic (1981). 
We report the proportion of each job tenure category who changed jobs 
between survey dates. Separation rates decline markedly with tenure, 
male rates more sharply than female. Indeed, the female profile is less 
concave over the entire tenure range. Twenty-five per cent of all males 
with completed tenure of under six months can be expected to change 
jobs, compared with less than three per cent of those with tenure in 
excess of twenty years. These observations are consistent with job 
matching theories. The flatter female tenure profile is indicative of 
lower specific capital investment and job worth. Since investments 
generate returns, the concave tenure profile may reflect the growth of 
these returns and eventual exhaustion. Males with longer expected 
working horizons may invest more and consequently face steeper profiles. 
High turnover rates in low tenure groups indicates job shopping.
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Turnover also declines with age. The age (or work experience) 
profile given in Table 6.6 is however less pronounced and distinct 
compared with the tenure relationship. It nevertheless suggests that 
the opportunities for, and returns to, inter-firm mobility decline over 
the life cycle. Heterogeneity amongst workers could also account for 
these observations. If workers simply differed in the amount of innate 
human capital, this would be sufficient to generate such profiles and 
not the idea that workers acquire firm-specific capital which imposes an 
eventual constraint on mobility. Heterogeneity implies the existence of 
movers and stayers. Movers will face high flat turnover profiles at all 
tenure (age) levels. Stayers face downward sloping profiles. 
Aggregation produces the observed concave relation. In practice the 
heterogeneity and job shopping effects are complementary. In subsequent 
turnover regressions we attempt to distinguish between these effects.
We argued earlier that the extent to which the population is 
successfully matched will be reflected in the completed tenure 
distribution of the working population. Productive jobs will be 
characterised by long tenure. Hall (1982) confirmed the existence of a 
majority of long-term employment relationships in the United States by 
extrapolating information on a worker’s current (incomplete) spell of 
employment. Current tenure data fails to measure those workers now in 
jobs that will ultimately last the majority of their working life. It is 
possible however to estimate the probable additional tenure spell. Table
6.7 summarises our estimates of these 'eventual tenure1 figures using 
similar data from the 1983 LFS, (of which our longitudinal dataset forms 
a subset). This is achieved by calculating a series of retention rates
i.e. the probability that a worker of given age and tenure will remain 
in the current job for a further specified number of years.
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Specifically we compute the n year retention rate for age group w with 
current tenure x years as :
% in age group w+n with tenure x+n Employment Rate w+n
% in age group w with tenure x Employment Rate w
The employment weights control for differential labour force 
attachment over the age cycle. The eventual tenure distribution is 
calculated by multiplying these retention rates by the initial tenure 
stock.
The eventual tenure of the average worker in the United Kingdom in 
1983 is around twice the length implied by the distribution of current 
tenure. Men can expect to remain continuously employed twice as long as 
women.^ Median tenure is around 10.5 years (14.7 years for men and 7.8 
years for women). Hall's equivalent U.S. estimate was 7.7 years. 
Although taken at different years and stages of the business cycle (1978 
in the U.S.), our results imply that turnover in Britain is 
correspondingly lower. Our results complement that of Main (1982) who 
using only a 10 year retention rate calculated from longitudinal data, 
estimates eventual U.K. tenure of 20 years for full time men aged 21 and 
above. Bellman and Schasse (1988) present similar estimates which 
suggest that employment tenure in West Germany is somewhat longer than 
in the U.S.
A similar result can be derived from the current tenure distribution 
if we were to adopt the approach of Akerlof and Main (1981) . Since on 
average an individual will be interviewed halfway through any 
incompleted spell of employment, we can double the length of current 
tenure to arrive at the eventual tenure distribution. Hashimoto and
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Raisian (1985) adopt a similar technique when asserting that long-term 
employment relationships are more prevalent in Japan than in the U.S. 
This method is not nearly as flexible as the Hall approach, since it 
allows no scope to estimate interim tenure probabilities. Institutional 
factors across countries undoubtedly help explain these differences. The 
relative absence of employment hiring and firing legislation in the U.S. 
is often cited as evidence of labour market flexibility, yet it does not 
help foster continuous employment. Firm-specific apprenticeships of the 
kind practised in Japan and in many skilled manual jobs in Britain, are
more likely to engender long-tem job matches. Britain would appear to
lie somewhere between the U.S. and Japan with respect to long-term 
employment relationships.
Our results imply that most men, and to a lesser extent women, 
eventually acquire a good job match as measured by lengthy tenure. Over 
one third of men are currently engaged in an attachment to a firm that 
will last over twenty years. In contrast, only eight per cent of women 
will remain in the same job match for an equal period, though a notable 
37 per cent can be expected to hold a job for more than 10 years. At the 
other end of the tenure distribution, ten per cent of the working 
population are in jobs that will last less than two years. If 
Jovanovic's hypothesis is correct, then these workers are engaging in 
job shopping. Table 6.8 shows the probability that a new job, one begun 
within 6 months of the survey interview, will become a long-term match. 
The likelihood is not large and varies across the age spectrum. Less
than a quarter of all teenagers starting a new job will remain with the
firm for two years, compared with around sixty per cent of prime age 
males. Even so, under one half of new jobs will not last five years. 
This would appear to support the claim that jobs are experience goods
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and that certain information is only acquired during the course of the 
match.
The likely process of job shopping is shown by Table 6.9. The number 
of new jobs held each year is estimated at double the fraction of 
workers in jobs with tenure less than six months. 10 We therefore 
predict that the average man and woman can expect to hold approximately 
6 and 8 jobs respectively, over the entire working horizon. The 
majority of job shopping occurs in the teenage years and early twenties, 
when the opportunities and returns from doing so are greater. Over the 
life cycle, women can be expected to hold at least two more jobs than 
men. Indeed women continue to change jobs regularly until their 
forties. This may reflect the re-entry of women into the labour market 
in their late thirties. The higher rate of female turnover seen in Table
6.7 results in them holding more jobs with shorter average durations 
over the life cycle. Time spent outside the labour force does not 
appear to offset these observed shorter durations. Women are not 
therefore found in as productive job matches as men. Levels of worth in 
work, or firm-financed specific human capital investment, are 
sufficiently low to create the flatter tenure turnover profiles of Table
6.5. Workers with low match values are more likely to accept 
alternative job offers as and when they arrive.
6.4.3 Econometric Results
We have stressed the importance of tenure as a significant 
determinant of the likelihood of inter-firm mobility. We now test this 
hypothesis more formally utilising the turnover information contained in 
our longitudinal dataset. The principal equation takes the form:
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Pr[Mi] - f[Tenurei, NPCi, Xi, Zi] + e±
where Pr[Mi] is the probability that a worker will change firms over the 
course of a year, NPCi represents proxies for the non-pecuniary 
characteristics of the job, Xi is a vector of personal and firm specific 
characteristics, Zi is a set of variables measuring local labour market 
activity (including wage proxies) and e^ is a logistically distributed 
error term. The maximum likelihood estimates are given in Table 6.10. 
We exclude the self-employed from our analysis.
The most striking feature of our results is the strength and 
significance of job tenure in explaining inter-firm mobility.
The relationships implied by our results on eventual tenure are 
confirmed. Workers are more likely to separate from jobs during the 
initial stages of a match. The tenure turnover relationship is 
monotonic and declines non-linearly. Workers are particularly likely to 
change jobs within the first two years of any engagement. This then is 
consistent with both experience and inspection good theories of 
turnover. Either workers acquire information regarding aspects of the 
job hitherto unobservable or an alternative job offer is deemed to be 
acceptable and a separation ensues. Workers are more likely to observe 
job characteristics or receive preferential job offers when their stock 
of firm-specific capital is low, at the beginning of a job match.
We were unable to find a significant difference between the tenure- 
turnover profiles of men and women suggested by Table 6.5. Whilst being 
generally negatively signed and therefore suggestive of lower human 
capital investment by females, the introduction of female-tenure 
interaction variables into our equation produced a likelihood ratio 
(L.R.) statistic of just 3.74 - X^(5) which is rejected at the 99 per
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cent level. The only behavioural differences of note are a) that single 
women are significantly more likely to change jobs than men, emphasising 
the role of such women in the primary workforce and b) women in 
temporary jobs will not move between firms as frequently as men. 
Chapter 3 has shown that female temporary workers are less likely to 
search on the job than their male counterparts. This smaller propensity 
to search on the job directly translates into reduced inter-firm 
mobility.
Table 6.10 shows that the age (i.e. experience) dummies are rendered 
insignificant by the inclusion of tenure variables. Hence the observed 
tenure-experience profile of Table 6.6 is mostly accounted for by time 
spent in a job. Older workers are more likely to have longer tenure and 
so carry the characteristics of a successful job match.
The existence of heterogeneous turnover behaviour other than that 
implied by job matching behaviour is acknowledged by the inclusion of a 
dummy variable indicating whether the individual left a further job in 
the year prior to initial sampling. We therefore attempt to control for 
an individual's propensity to move at any given level of tenure. The 
results suggest that were we to exclude this variable we would attribute 
to the tenure variables factors that were in effect due to 
heterogeneity. Workers, who left jobs in the recent past are more 
likely to change jobs again. This may reflect job shopping behaviour, 
but it also suggests that certain individuals are more prone to movement 
irrespective of tenure.
Aspects describing the worker's job will also measure the potential 
for job shopping and mobility. We have already remarked on the 
significantly higher turnover of men in temporary jobs. This may be 
indicative of the fact that neither firms nor workers have much
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incentive to invest in such a match. A similar argument could apply to 
the significant positive coefficient on part-time working, the 
composition of which is almost entirely female, secondary workers. 
Small establishments will not generally have the resources to provide 
extensive training programmes nor an internal labour market structure in 
which productive workers can be rewarded. The likelihood of some form 
of "voice" (see Freeman (1976)) is higher in larger plants. Turnover is 
correspondingly lower in these firms.H Individuals currently receiving 
or having received some form of training with a company are less likely 
to move. Although not strong it does give tentative support to the idea 
that training, particularly if firm-specific, increases the value of any 
job match and reduces the probability of a separation.^2 a  successful 
training programme will also be reflected in the observed negative 
tenure-turnover relationship.
Of the other variables reflecting heterogeneity or human capital 
differentials, only the education dummies proved to be significant. 
Workers with qualifications, either academic or vocational, were more 
likely to change jobs. Highly qualified workers can invest in human 
capital by moving between firms in the initial stages of their careers. 
If the labour market for skilled workers is tight, the opportunity to 
change jobs is that much greater than for poorly qualified, unskilled 
workers.^
Pecuniary rewards from a j ob match are captured by two variables, 
the industrial and occupational wage specific to each worker. The 
coefficients are significant and are signed consistently with the 
results of Tables 6.2 and 6.3. Turnover is higher in low wage 
industries and high wage occupations. Workers with higher pecuniary 
rewarding jobs have a lower propensity to move. The negative industry
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wage may reflect a turnover response to inter-industry wage 
differentials. Table 6.2 shows greater mobility in the low paid areas 
of retailing and non-metal or electrical manufacturing. Low wage 
industries could also generate higher turnover if the workers concerned 
changed firms within the same sector. However, according to our dataset 
some 68.9 per cent of workers who changed jobs were classified under a 
different two-digit SIC from the origin industry.^ Even allowing for 
reporting error, this would tend to support the idea of a relative 
earnings response in turnover behaviour. The positive occupational wage 
probably reflects a relatively tighter labour market for skilled workers 
and a consequently greater number of job openings. High initial 
turnover among human capital investors will be more likely to feature in 
high wage occupations, though over time we would expect high wages to 
reflect successful job matches.
Our attempts to capture the effect of non-pecuniary rewards on 
turnover were mixed. We experimented with occupational morbidity 
statistics, industrial strike and redundancy incidences, each with 
little success. Our final equation therefore closely resembles that of 
Viscusi (1979), in that our only significant non-pecuniary determinant 
is the industrial accident rate (see data appendix). Unlike Viscusi's 
study, our measure is positive and significant. Workers in high 
accident rate industries are more likely to separate from jobs. 
Presumably adverse non-wage working conditions, eventually outweigh any 
pecuniary consideration. This result supports the findings of Chapter 3 
which suggest that a significant negative effect of the industrial 
accident rate on on-the-job search is evidence that the workers 
concerned quit into search unemployment rather than remain in an 
unsatisfactory job. The results in Table 6.10 confirm the tendancy to
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separate more readily from dangerous industries. In a world of perfect 
information there would exist compensating wage differentials and such 
behaviour would not be observed. This result therefore lends support to 
experience good theories of turnover.
Our theoretical framework indicated that mobility is greater in low 
unemployment, high vacancy regions because of the increased 
opportunities for trade that such conditions engender. Table 6.1 and our 
results here confirm this general hypothesis. Unemployment has a 
significant and negative effect on turnover. Workers in high 
unemployment regions move between jobs less frequently. This finding 
complements both that of Burgess and Nickell (1987), who present a 
strong positive effect of the vacancy/unemployment ratio on 
manufacturing t u r n o v e r ^ ,  and Akerlof, Rose and Yellen (1988) who find a 
negative but insignificant unemployment coefficient in a similar 
regression to ours. Higher unemployment reduces the opportunity for 
change and increases the competition for available jobs. Similarly a 
greater supply of vacancies appears to facilitate greater incidence of 
job shopping, though this effect is not as significant as our 
unemployment variable. Nevertheless it does indicate that workers are 
more able to leave jobs when the supply of alternative work is high. 
Firms may also benefit if the quality of available workers increases as 
a result. The sign of our final measure of local labour market 
activity, regional redundancy rates is somewhat puzzling. One might 
expect that workers would react to such a downturn in labour demand by 
remaining in the current job. It may be that since our data 
incorporates both quit and layoff behaviour then a region with high 
redundancy rates will record a higher number of job separations. Given 
sufficient advance notification of an impending layoff workers will also
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increase job search (as confirmed in Chapter 3), which increases the 
likelihood of inter-firm mobility.
Table 6.11 presents some alternative specifications of the mobility 
equation. In column 1, we replace the 6 economic variables with a full 
set of 38 regional, industrial and occupational dummy variables. 
Comparison of the log likelihood with that of Table 6.10 shows that the 
economic variables capture the majority of the unexpained variation. The 
LR statistic for the joint significance of the dummy variables is 30.6 
~X2(38). This is rejected at the 95 per cent level. We also removed the 
six variables representing local economic conditions as a means of 
testing their explanatory power. On the basis of the LR statistic ( LR - 
25.10 ~ X2(6) ), we cannot reject the hypothesis that they are jointly 
significant.
Table 6.11 also provides additional confirmation of the debilitating 
effect of high unemployment on mobility. In column 2 we interact the 
tenure variables with a dummy indicating whether the individual was 
resident in a locality with above average unemployment (13 per cent in 
Spring 1983). Whilst the standard errors on the interaction parametres 
are large, the coefficients are negative throughout. High levels of 
unemployment reduce the ability of workers to change jobs at all tenure 
levels. This is particularly acute at tenure between 5 and 10 years. We 
might expect the supply of new jobs to fall in high unemployment 
regions. The results here indicate that it is those workers with 
considerable amounts of experience who find the most difficulty changing 
jobs. Seniority may cushion these workers from layoff unemployment, but 
the market for their skills outside the workplace becomes restricted. 
Firm-specific capital may increase a worker's worth within a firm, but 
is a more of a deterent to mobility under adverse economic conditions.
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Table 6.12 illustrates the implications for turnover of our 
regression results with some calculations of predicted probabilites for 
given sets of characteristics. Row 1 gives the likelihood of inter-firm 
mobility for a worker who most closely resembles the average 
characteristics of our sample. The base characteristics are given at the 
foot of the Table. The predicted probability of transition is 0.067, 
near to the sample mean of our dependent variable. Row 2 shows that the 
same person in a new job match (ie under 6 months duration) is twice as 
likely to terminate the match within the next year. Increasing job 
tenure to over ten years reduces the chance of a separation by 300 per 
cent (row 3). Men engaged in temporary work are three times as likely 
to change jobs, (row 4), but for female temporary workers the 
probability of transition falls to 0.036, (row 5). Part-time working
almost doubles the likelihood of a move (row 6).
Rows 7 to 10 show the effect of varying aggregate economic conditions. 
A ten per cent rise in the industry wage differential reduces mobility 
by the same magnitude that a ten per cent increase in occupational wages 
will increase it (rows 7 and 8) . Turnover also increases by a similar 
amount if the worker is employed in an industry with an accident 
incidence rate of 1.5 per 1000 employees (as opposed to the sample mean 
of 0.67). Row 9 provides some empirical clarification of our findings of 
the consequences of high unemployment on turnover. Should the worker
live in a region with an aggregate unemployment rate of 0.18, not
unprecedented in 1983, then the average probability of inter-firm 
mobility falls by one third. Finally rows 11 and 12 give predicted 
transition probabilities for differing mixes of characteristics. Young, 
single workers with short tenure and a history of prior mobility are 
around four times more likely to change firms within the year than the
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average worker. Conversely, the probability that an older worker with 
tenure in excess of ten years working in a less hazardous industry will 
undergo a transition is less than one per cent.
In summary, information regarding local economic conditions, potential 
working hazards and particularly job tenure says much about the 
likelihood of individual inter-firm mobility.
6.5. Conclusion
Inter-firm mobility by workers is an important subject for analysis 
since it constitutes the largest single movement within the labour 
market in any year. The movement of workers across firms facilitates the 
efficient allocation of human resources. This chapter has analysed these 
movements in the context of a theoretical framework which views labour 
turnover as an optimising decision made by individual firms or workers. 
Labour moves between jobs with the ultimate aim of securing a 
satisfactory long-term relationship. Only by sampling a succession of 
jobs/employees can a good match be located. Once secured both worker and 
firm profit from the resulting rise in marginal productivity.
The main conclusions of this chapter are that:
1) A negative relationship between job tenure and inter-firm mobility is 
shown to exist in Britain. The longer the employment duration, the more 
firm-specific capital acquired and the more valuable the match.
2) Turnover is highest in low wage industries and where there are likely 
to be adverse working conditions. This is supportive of 
"experience-good", imperfect information theories of turnover. Workers 
can only discover certain aspects of a job by first-hand working 
knowledge. This may influence their decision to invest in firm-specific
-222-
human capital.
3) Long-term employment relationships are a common feature of the 
British labour market. The average male is currently engaged in a job 
that will ultimately last around 15 years. Women, because of their 
segmented labour market experiences, hold jobs for 7 years on average.
4) Workers only attain such relative stability by extensive job shopping 
early in their careers. Men can expect to hold 6 jobs and women 8 over 
their working lifetime.
5) The allocation process is adversely affected by high levels of 
unemployment. Annual job-to-job movements appear to vary pro-cyclically 
and as such are highly correlated with the behaviour of job quits into 
unemployment. Inter-firm mobility of workers living in above average 
unemployment areas is reduced at all tenure levels. A five percentage 
point rise in the unemployment rate reduces the average probability of 
movement by one third.
If unemployment does impair mobility as we have shown, then job 
shopping is reduced and the opportunity to flow into long-term 
productive jobs is denied.
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Footnotes
1. This result also assumes homogeneity of employed and unemployed job 
seekers which may be unlikely given the better access to labour 
market information that the employed should possess.
2. This is because search externalities allow the possibility of a
multiplicity of equilibria and hence differential job-matching 
environments.
3. The LFS asks only those currently engaged in on-the-j ob search
whether they are satisfied with aspects of the current job other 
than wages. We experimented with instrumenting job satisfaction in
our turnover equation based on a prediction equation using the
sub-sample of on-the-job seekers, suitably corrected for selectivity 
bias. However neither the prediction equation nor the instrumented 
variable proved significant.
4. The LFS includes a question as to whether the individual moved house 
within the last year, in addition to whether a change of job 
occurred. By definition our sample is restricted to those who 
replied negatively to the first question.
5. The sample selection problem can be demonstrated more formally as 
follows:
We wish to estimate the unconditional probability that an individual 
will change jobs during the year. Our dataset only allows us to 
estimate the likelihood of inter-firm mobility conditional on there 
being no accompanying residential movement. Using Bayes law
Pr(Job Change) = Pr(Change Jobs and No Move)
Pr(No Move/Change Jobs)
00 0
G(j)
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where f(j,m) is a bivariate distribution of the decision to change 
jobs and/or move, and G(j), is the univariate (conditional) 
distribution of job change. Our dataset does not contain sufficient 
information to estimate either the denominator or the numerator.lt 
has proved difficult to devise a technique to circumvent this 
problem.
6. It is of course possible, given sufficient advance redundancy 
notification, that a pure job-to-job change measure would 
incorporate firm initiated behaviour. Conventional wisdom however 
views job-to-job moves as worker quit decisions. See Gottshalk and 
Maloney (1985) for an interesting approach to this subject.
7. The industrial wage is also affected by the occupational 
distribution within industries. Several U.S. authors have 
established the validity of industry wage differentials however. 
See Dickens and Katz (1987) for example.
8. From 1983 onward we can also determine the cause of job separation 
of those subsequently outside the labour force.
9. Hall finds that U.S. women hold a similar number of jobs to men 
(around ten). We find little evidence that shorter duration is due 
to the concentration of women in specific occupations. Differences 
in eventual tenure distributions of men and women in clerical 
occupations resemble those of the aggregate distribution.
10. Workers may of course begin more than one job within six months. 
This assumption is made neccessary by an inability to disaggregate 
tenure below six months when using the 1983 LFS.
11. The LFS does not contain any information regarding union status. 
The inclusion of plant size will partially control for this effect.
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12. General training will of course increase a worker’s productivity in 
all firms and could encourage turnover if the provision of training 
simultaneously increased the arrival of job offers. The LFS 
question relating to training is rather vague, referring only to the 
receipt of "training connected with your job".
13. The inclusion of occupational dummies whilst insignificant, 
(Likelihood Ratio statistic - 9.6 ~ X^(5)) intimates at a higher 
likelihood of separation for professional and skilled groups.
14. The inclusion of industrial dummy variables renders both the 
industrial wage and accident rate terms insignificant (Likelihood 
Ratio statistic “18.6 ~X^(9)). The only significant industry terms 
were Construction, Distributive Services and Other Manufacturing, 
all of which were positively signed and all of which are relatively 
low paid industries. See Table 6.2. Since the dummy variables 
obscure the effects we wish to highlight, they are omitted from our 
final specification.
15. The use of the VU ratio, as in Burgess and Nickell (1987), reduces 
our model’s performance (Log L = -853.0).
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Appendix A6
The primary data source for this study is the matched sample of 
participants taken from the 1983 and 1984 Labour Force Surveys. The raw 
unmatched data for 1977, 1979, 1981, 1983 and 1984 was supplied to us by 
the UK Office of Populations Census and Survey and the ESRC Data 
Archive. The sample is restricted to the population of working age 
resident in England and Wales. The LFS derived variables, which refer 
to the respondents' situation in 1983 unless specified, are as follows:
FEMALE = Female dummy variable: 1 if female; 0 otherwise.
AGE1619 — 1 if aged 16-19; 0 otherwise.
AGE2024 = 1 if aged 20-24; 0 otherwise.
AGE5064 — 1 if aged 50-64; 0 otherwise.
DEGREE = 1 if highest qualification is degree or recognised professional 
qualification; 0 otherwise.
GCE — 1 if obtained 'A' or 'O' level passes or equivalents; 0 otherwise 
OTHER = 1 if obtained vocational, technical or any other recognised 
qualification; 0 otherwise.
SINGLE = 1 if single; 0 otherwise.
DCHILD = 1 if household contains dependent children under 18 years of 
age; 0 otherwise.
SMALL = 1 if number of people employed at the location where the
respondent works is under 25; 0 otherwise.
TEMPORARY = 1 if current job seasonal, temporary, casual or of fixed
contract length; 0 otherwise.
PTIME = 1 if respondent reports current job is part-time; 0 otherwise. 
TRAIN = 1 if worker has received or is currently receiving training in 
connection with job; 0 otherwise.
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TENLT6M to
TEN5-10Y = 1 if current tenure is less than 6 months, 6-12 months, 1-2 
years, 2-5 years or 5-10 years respectively; 0 otherwise.
BEFORE = 1 if respondent changed jobs in the year prior to sampling; 0 
otherwise.
UHIGH — 1 if resident in area with above average unemployment; 0
otherwise.
In addition we have supplemented the LFS dataset with the following:
OCCWAGE = Log of average weekly earnings of men and women disaggregated 
by 11 standard regions and 16 broad occupational categories. 
Source: Department of Employment New Earnings Survey (1983),
Part E, Tables 122-23.
INDWAGE — Log of average weekly earnings of men and women disaggregated 
by 11 standard region and 2 digit SIC. Source: Department of 
Employment New Earnings Survey (1983), Part E, Tables 118-21.
VRATE = Regional vacancies (expressed as a percentage of employees in 
employment). Source: Department of Employment Gazette, Table
3.6.
URATE = Log of aggregate area unemployment rate, disaggregated to 
metropolitan county level. Source: Department of Employment
Gazette, Table 2.9.
REDRATE = Confirmed number of redundancies, disaggregated by 11 standard 
regions (expressed as a percentage of employees in employment). 
Source: Department of Employment, Gazette, Table 2.30.
-228-
ACCRATE — Number of fatal and major injuries reported to enforcement 
authorities per 1,000 employees, disaggregated by 2 digit SIC. 
Source: Health and Safety Executive, Health and Safety
Statistics, (1984-85), HMSO.
Employment = Employees in Employment disaggregated by 11 standard 
regions. Source: Department of Employment, Gazette, Historical 
Supplement, No.l, (August 1984).
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Table 6.1
Job Separation and Outcome. Labour Force Survey 1975-84
Annual Percentage 
of Employee 
Separations
Proportion of 
are
E-E E-U
moves that 
E-N
Unemp1oyment 
Rate
1976-77
Total Separations 
: Quits 
: Job Losses
14.8 59.2 20.0
42.5
57.5
21.1 6.0
1978-79
Total Separations 
: Quits 
: Job Losses
15.9 62.8 15.1 
46.8
53.2
22.1 5.0
1980-81
Total Separations 
: Quits 
: Job Losses
14.7 42.8 34.2
28.3 
71.7
23.0 9.7
1982-83
Total Separations 
: Quits 
: Job Losses
13.7 46.8 29.3
38.8
61.2
23.9
75.9 
24.1
11.3
1983-84
Total Separations 
: Quits 
: Job Losses
14.7 52.2 25.2
43.4
56.6
22.6
79.4
20.6
11.6
Note: E-E denotes individual employed by different firm one year after
sampling as employed. E-U denotes movement from employment to 
unemployment in the course of a year. E-N denotes a movement from 
employment to outside the labour force during the year.
Source: Labour Force Surveys (1977, 1979, 1981, 1983, 1984).
Table 6.2
Inter-Firm Mobility by Industry
Industry Percentage of Employees moving firms during the year
(1 digit SIC)
All Male Female
1977 1981 1984 Wage
Rank
1977 1981 1984 Wage
Rank
1977 1981 1984 Wage
Rank
0. Agriculture 4.9 5.0 6.0 8 5.0 5.2 6.0 8 4.2 5.0 5.6 *
1. Energy
2. Metal, Mineral
4.8 2.8 2.7 1 4.5 2.7 2.6 2 7.4 3.6 4.0 2
Manufacture 7.1 6.3 6.5 3 5.6 5.7 5.1 4 10.4 7.0 9.9 5
3. Manufacturing 7.4 7.4 7.4 4 7.5 6.8 7.5 7 8.5 9.9 6.9 6
4. Other Manufacturers 9.0 7.6 9.7 9 8.8 7.5 9.4 6 9.3 8.3 10.4 7
5. Construction
6. Distributive
13.4 9.0 12.0 6 13.5 8.5 11.8 9 11.8 14.7 13.9 *
Services 
7. Transport and
10.8 9.0 11.4 10 10.4 8.7 12.1 10 11.3 9.6 10.8 8
Communications 6.8 5.0 5.8 2 6.2 4.5 5.1 5 10.0 7.4 8.8 1
8. Financial Services 9.4 7.8 8.6 5 6.7 5.6 5.4 1 12.1 10.2 9.0 4
9. Public Administration 
Mean Quit Rate
8.3
8.6
7.8
7.1
6.1
8.4
7 8.1
8.3
6.5
6.5
8.2
8.2
3 8.4
9.3
6.0
7.9
6.6
8.8
3
Data Sources: Mobility rates are contained in the 1977, 1981 and 1984 LFS. Wage rankings are obtained from
the 1984 New Earnings Survey. The small number of women employed in the Agriculture and Construction 
industries prevents an accurate estimate of the wage rate from being reported.
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Table 6.3
Inter-Firm Mobility by Occupation
Occupation
All
Percentage of Employees moving firms during the year
Male Female
1977 1981 1984 Wage
Rank
1977 1981 1984 Wage
Rank
1977 1981 1984 Wage
Rank
1. Professional & 
Managerial 6.0 8.0 9.6 1 4.0 8.2 9.5 1 7.7 7.2 9.7 1
2. Professional - Health 
Education 7.3 6.5 6.3 6 5.9 6.1 6.6 5 8.1 6.7 6.1 4
3. Literary, Art, Sport 10.5 4.1 10.7 3 9.3 4.5 10.0 2 13.7 3.4 12.0 3
4. Professional - 
Scientific 6.7 5.9 6.0 2 6.7 6.0 5.8 3 6.0 4.1 8.1 5
5. General Managerials 5.9 6.5 7.4 5 5.7 6.4 7.1 4 6.8 7.0 6.9 6
6. Clerical 9.3 8.2 8.1 14 6.0 5,2 5.8 12 10.5 9.3 8.8 7
7. Selling 12.9 9.7 13.8 12 13.5 10.4 14.7 8 12.4 9.2 13.2 12
8. Security 8.8 5.3 6.0 4 8.8 5.1 6.3 6 8.5 7.1 2.7 2
9. Personal Services 8.9 7.7 10.4 15 10.7 10.5 11.9 15 8.5 7.0 10.0 13
10. Farming, Fishing 9.0 5.2 7.8 16 8.9 5.3 7.8 16 9.6 4.1 8.3 *
11. Materials Processing 
(ex. metal & electrical) 9.8 7.9 9.7 11 10.3 7.8 10.1 9 8.5 8.1 8.8 11
12. Materials Processing 8.1 5.4 7.4 7 8.2 5.5 7.5 7 7.1 4.7 6.7 8
13.
- metal & electrical 
Repetitive Assembly 8.1 6.7 8.1 13 8.1 6.0 9.3 12 8.2 7.7 6.5 10
14. Construction, Mining 11.2 5.4 9.2 8 11.2 5.4 9.2 10 * * 9.1 *
15. Transport 9.4 7.6 7.4 9 9.5 7.5 7.6 11 5.4 10.5 5.3 9
16. Miscellaneous 9.2 4.9 6.0 10 9.1 5.4 6.1 14 10.3 * 1.1 *
Mean Quit Rate 8.7 7.1 8.4 8.3 6.7 8.2 9.3 7.5 8.8
Data Sources: Mobility rates are taken from the 1977, 1981 and 1984 LFS. Wage rankings are obtained from the
1984 New Earnings Survey. The small number of women employed in occupational categories 10, 14 and 16 prevents 
an accurate estimate of the wage rate from being reported.
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Table 6.4
Turnover Rates by Industry and Occupation
Occupational _________________Industry (S.I.C.)______________ Mean (Std)
Grouping 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Dev'
I: 1977 2.3 3.4 4.4 7.2 6.0 8.0 7.8 5.4 6.8 7.0 6.6 (1.3)
1981 4.0 3.1 8.5 6.3 7.2 10.9 6.7 3.2 6.8 6.4 6.6 (1.6)
1984 3.1 2.6 6.1 8.1 10.6 8.9 8.9 6.7 8.2 6.1 7.4 (1.7)
II: 1977 6.1 5.6 12.0 8.6 11.1 9.9 11.4 8.7 10.3 8.9 9.5 (1.3)
1981 10.5 3.4 3.8 12.4 10.1 15.1 11.0 4.9 9.3 6.0 8.4 (2.9)
1984 * 3.3 9.1 6.7 11.8 13.2 11.4 7.3 8.0 5.4 8.3 (2.6)
III: 1977 * * 11.3 15.8 12.4 14.3 12.7 7.7 11.2 10.6 12.1 (1.3)
1981 * * 15.5 15.6 14.8 17.6 8.7 4.3 6.9 6.6 9.1 (2.7)
1984 * 5.0 18.3 18.3 17.7 * 12.9 8.2 10.8 4.4 11.9 (4.5)
IV: 1977 2.9 3.7 5.7 7.1 9.2 14.7 10.4 3.4 6.7 10.8 9.0 (3.4)
1981 5.9 2.1 4.8 6.2 7.6 7.0 6.8 1.8 5.7 3.5 6.0 (1.8)
1984 14.3 2.8 6.2 7.5 10.1 12.0 10.8 2.7 8.3 6.0 8.9 (3.0)
V: 1977 8.2 7.2 7.0 6.9 9.1 15.7 11.9 7.4 10.4 8.9 9.0 (2.2)
1981 5.9 3.4 6.2 7.1 6.4 12.7 11.9 6.6 5.3 5.0 7.1 (2.5)
1984 8.7 2.2 5.1 5.7 7.6 12.9 12.9 6.0 14.3 6.8 8.4 (3.0)
Mean 
(Std. Dev)
1977 * * 6.9 7.4 9.0 13.4 11.8 6.8 9.5 8.3
(2.3)(1.3)(1.4)(2.9)(2.7)(1.7)(1.6)(1.2)
1981 * * 6.4 7.4 7.6 9.1 9.0 5.0 7.8 5.8
(2.3)(2.3)(1.7)(2.9)(2.1)(1.9)(1.4)(0.8)
1984 * 3.1 6.4 7.3 9.7 12.0 11.4 5.9 8.6 5.8
(2.4)(2.2)(1.8)(2.1)(2.6)(1.7)(1.5)(1.6)(0.5)
Sources: 1977, 1981, 1984 LFS. * indicates small cell numbers, estimate
not reported. Occupational groupings are; I: Managerial and
Professional, II: Clerical and Related, III: Other Non-Manual, IV: 
Skilled Manual, V: Unskilled Manual. Industrial Classifications 
are as given in Table 6.2.
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Table 6.5 
Inter-Firm Mobility bv Job Tenure
Tenure prior to 
Separation
ProDortion of Tenure Cateeorv Chaneine Jobs
All Male Female
0-6 months .194 .253 .149
6-12 months .152 .164 .141
1-2 years .120 .154 .090
2-5 years .076 .096 .053
5-10 years .047 .046 .049
10-20 years .023 .024 .023
20 years+ .022 .025 *
Note: * denotes small sample size, estimate not shown.
Source: LFS longitudinal dataset 1983-84
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Table 6.6 
Inter-Firm Mobility by Age
Proportion of Category Changing Job 
Age All Male Female
16-19 11.0 10.7 11.5
20-24 9.4 9.3 9.5
25-29 9.1 10.0 7.4
30-34 7.6 6.0 10.6
35-39 7.3 7.6 6.8
40-45 3.5 2.0 5.5
45-49 4.4 3.8 5.1
50-54 2.5 2.2 2.8
55-59 2.5 2.8 1.8
60-64 _ 1.3 _
Source: LFS longitudinal dataset 1983-84.
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Table 6.7
The Distribution of Current and Eventual Tenure
Tenure
Percentage of Workers in each Tenure Category
Current Eventual
All Male Female All Male Female
0-6 months 7.6 6.3 9.4 0.6 0.4 0.9
6 months-1 year 7.3 6.1 8.9 5.1 4.5 5.9
1-2 years 9.0 7.2 11.5 3.5 2.0 5.5
2-5 years 23.5 20.7 27.2 16.0 12.4 21.0
5-10 years 22.5 21.8 23.5 23.6 19.1 29.7
10-20 years 19.7 22.5 15.9 26.4 24.7 28.6
20 years+ 10.4 15.5 3.5 24.8 36.8 8.3
Median Tenure (Years) 5.6 7.2 4.3 10.5 14.7 7.8
Source: 1983 LFS
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Table 6.8 
The Expected Tenure of New Jobs
Age and Sex
Probability of reaching given Tenure
6-12
months
1-2
years
2-5
years
5-10
years
10-20
years
20+
yeari
Males
16-19 .998 .568 .236 .197 .107 .063
20-24 .953 .532 .532 .337 .151 .092
25-29 .838 .483 .483 .353 .209 .117
30-34 .889 .567 .567 .409 .274 .144
35-39 .794 .629 .629 .435 .304 .189
40-44 .962 .627 .612 .438 .305 .103
45-49 .834 .613 .590 .461 .317 -
50-54 .999 .633 .633 .478 .311 -
55-59 .999 .778 .655 .485 - -
60-64 .721 .524 .524 - • - -
Females
16-19 .999 .600 .172 .112 .037 .007
20-24 .891 .589 .589 .190 .044 .014
25-29 .875 .619 .453 .196 .069 .022
30-34 .891 .525 .390 .236 .096 .023
35-39 .881 .649 .485 .319 .153 .024
40-44 .978 .730 .680 .475 .225 -
45-49 .715 .693 .693 .486 .257 -
50-54 .999 .652 .652 .504 - -
55-59 .775 .570 .570
Source: LFS 1983.
Note: Probability of reaching given tenure is the n year retention rate
calculated for all new jobs i.e. jobs with a current duration of 
less than 6 months.
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Table 6,9
The Incidence of Job Shopping Over the Life Cycle
Age New Jobs 
Per Year 
Male Female
New Jobs over 
the Age Interval 
Male Female
Cumulative Number 
of Jobs Held 
Male Female
16-19 0.415 0.446 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.8
20-24 0.212 0.243 1.1 1.2 2.8 3.0
25-29 0.168 0.221 0.8 1.1 3.6 4.1
30-34 0.122 0.247 0.6 1.2 4.2 5.3
35-39 0.092 0.195 0.5 1.0 4.7 6.3
40-44 0.079 0.129 0.4 0.6 5.1 6.9
45-49 0.070 0.099 0.4 0.5 5.5 7.4
50-54 0.054 0.079 0.3 0.4 5.8 7.8
55-59 0.044 0.062 0.2 0.3 6.0 8.1
60-64 0.056 - 0.3 - 6.3 -
Source: 1983 LFS. The number of new jobs per year is the fraction of each
age category with current tenure under 6 months.
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Table 6.10
Logistic Estimation of the Likelihood of Inter-Firm Mobility. 1983-4
Independent Variable Sample Mean Estimate Standard Error
Constant -9.01 (2.96)**
FEMALE 0.41 -0.50 (0.31)*
AGE1624 0.05 -0.29 (0.32)
AGE2024 0.11 0.07 (0.21)
AGE5064 0.22 -0.22 (0.23)
DEGREE 0.14 0.63 (0.25)**
GCE 0.32 0.65 (0.18)**
OTHER 0.11 0.68 (0.22)**
SINGLE 0.24 -0.30 (0.25)
DCHILD 0.51 0.02 (0.15)
Job Characteristics
SMALL 0.32 0.26 (0.14)*
TEMPORARY 0.03 1.07 (0.40)**
PTIME 0.17 0.46 (0.25)*
TRAIN 0.07 -0.21 (0.26)
TENLT6M 0.05 1.98 (0.32)**
TEN6-12M 0.07 1.59 (0.31)**
TEN1-2Y 0.08 1.62 (0.27)**
TEN2-5Y 0.23 1.17 (0.24)**
TEN5-10Y 0.23 0.68 (0.25)**
BEFORE 0.05 0.60 (0.25)**
FEMALE*SINGLE 0.12 0.67 (0.32)**
FEMALE*TEMPORARY 0.02 -1.22 (0.57)**
Local Economic Conditions
OCCWAGE 4.87 1.48 (0.59)**
INDWAGE 4.87 -1.16 (0.50)**
VRATE 0.55 0.48 (0.34)
URATE -2.04 -1.25 (0.62)**
REDRATE 0.17 0.25 (0.17)
ACCRATE 0.67 0.17 (0.10)*
Diagnostics
Log L -850.91
Model LR Test (d.f.) 119.14 (27)
% Correct Predictions 93.5
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.065
Sample Size 3947
Note: ** denotes significant at 95 per cent level, * denotes significant
at 90 per cent level 2-tailed t test.
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Table 6.11
Alternative Specification of Inter-Firm Mobility. 1983-4
Independent Variable I
Model
II
TENLT6M 2..01 (0.,35)** 1.99 (0..42)**
TEN6-12M 1..59 (0.,31)** 1.65 (0,.39)**
TEN1-2Y 1..62 (0.,28)** 1.,64 (0..37)**
TEN2-5Y 1.18 (0.,24)** 1.,33 (0.,31)**
TEN5-10Y 0..69 (0., 24)** 1.,04 (0.,32)**
URATE -1.,05 (0..64)*
UHIGH*TENLT6M -0.02 (0,.45)
UHIGH*TEN6-12M -0.11 (0..45)
UHIGH*TEN1-2Y -0..01 (0..27)
UHIGH*TEN2-5Y -0.30 (0..37)
UHIGH*TEN5-10Y -0..80 (0,.43)*
Regional Dummies Yes No
Industry Dummies Yes No
Occupation Dummies Yes No
Diagnostics
Log L -835.61 -848.55
Model LR Test (d.f.) 246.77 (59) 203.85 (32)
% Correct Predictions 93.5 93.5
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.065 0.065
Sample Size 3947
Note: ** denotes significant at 95 per cent level, * denotes significant
at 90 per cent level 2-tailed t test. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Both regressions contain the same variables as given 
in Table 6.10 in addition to those reported above.
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Table 6.12
Predicted Probabilities of Inter-Firm Mobility for Given Characteristics
Predicted Probability
1) Base Characteristics* 0.067
2) As 1 but TEN1619—1 0.137
3) As 1 but Tenure in excess of 10 years 0.021
4) As 1 but TEMPORARY-1 0.172
5) As 4 but FEMALE-1 0.036
6) As 1 but PTIME-1 0.101
7) As 1 but 10% rise in INDWAGE 0.059
8) As 1 but 10% rise in OCCWAGE 0.076
9) As 1 but URATE- 0.18 0.045
10) As 1 but INDRATE—1.5 0.076
11) As 1 but AGE2024—1, DEGREEE-1, SINGLE-1,
OCHILD=0, SIZE-1, TEN612M-1, BEFORE-1, 
living in low unemployment, high vacancy,
high wage region 0.320
12) As 1) but AGE5064-1, no formal qualifications, 
tenure in excess of 10 years, low industrial 
accident rate 0.005
* Base characteristics define male aged 25-49, married with dependent 
children, working full time in some large plant for between 2 and 5 
years.
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Chanter 7: Summary and Conclusions
Mobility is essential to the efficient working of an economy because 
it transports labour from situations where it is no longer needed, or 
under-utilised, to environments in which it can increase productive 
worth. We have sought throughout this thesis to establish how 
unemployment may affect the mobility of labour. In practice, there is no 
single, readily identifiable relationship because of the' breadth of 
definition that these two concepts encompass. We have therefore chosen 
to highlight five aspects of labour mobility and examined the potential 
for unemployment to influence each specific case. We have adopted 
micro-theoretic considerations to address individual behavioural 
decisions. The Labour Force Survey has proved a rich source of labour 
market data with which to analyse these issues. The conclusion that 
arises from these studies is that high levels of unemployment generally 
impose constraints upon the mobility of all individuals, not just the 
unemployed. The capacity for the movement of labour to act as an 
equilibriating force in the economy therefore functions less effectively 
when it is most needed, during periods of depressed aggregate demand. In 
this final chapter we summarise the results that led us toward this 
conclusion.
We saw in chapter 2 how inter-regional movements of labour could be 
influenced by unemployment at three levels. There is evidence that 
experience of the unemployed state provides a strong incentive to 
migrate. The potential rewards and costs to mobility ensure migration is 
a more valid option to the unemployed worker. Having controlled for
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labour market status, we were unable to identify any additional 
influence of regional unemployment differentials on gross migratory 
behaviour. The observed outward movement of labour from high 
unemployment regions cannot be attributable to regional economic 
signals, but is instead caused by the greater propensity to migrate of 
the unemployed members of that region. A higher proportion of unemployed 
results in larger regional outflows.
Chapter 2 also provided evidence of a dimunition of mobility 
following the rise in unemployment that occured during the early 
eighties in Britain. Comparing migration responses across periods of low 
and high aggregate unemployment, we found evidence of a dramatic decline 
in the migration propensities of the unemployed. Whilst remaining the 
group most likely to undertake movement, the probability of migration 
for a typical unemployed worker halved over the period 1977 to 1984. In 
contrast, estimated migration probabilities for employed workers were 
little changed. Hence inter-regional mobility following a rise in 
unemployment suffers in the area where it would be most beneficial.
Evidence of this debilitating unemployment effect is also uncovered 
in chapter 3*s analysis of on-the-job search. Although the decision to 
look for alternative employment is dominated by worker satisfaction in 
the current job, there exists a significant disincentive effect of high 
unemployment on search. Employed workers with long job tenures are 
generally in productive job matches. They have acquired a degree of 
firm-specific capital which renders their outside worth relatively low. 
Pecuniary disparities, as captured by industry wage differentials and 
non-pecuniary job characteristics, as measured by industrial accident 
rates capture aspects of job dissatisfaction that induce on-the-job 
search.
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However workers who happen to live in high unemployment regions are 
demonstrably less likely to search on-the-job. Since this is the product 
of the decision to seek alternative work and to search in employment 
conditional on search, the observed negative coefficient must imply that 
high unemployment discourages the unconditional probability of job 
search and hence future mobility.
In addition it seems that the search strategies adopted by employed 
job seekers are also affected by local economic conditions. Most 
employed job seekers choose methods of search that are readily 
integrable into a working environment. High unemployment does however 
encourage workers to seek the help of intermediaries in their attempts 
to contact alternative job offers. Use of employment agencies, whether 
public or private, is concentrated in high unemployment regions. This 
suggests employed job seekers attempt to maximise the likelihood of 
making contact with existing vacancies and that this is best secured, in 
high unemployment areas, through an agency.
Chapter 4 was principally concerned with the role of unemployment 
benefits in promoting the mobility of unemployed workers. We provided 
empirical evidence that benefit recipients maintain a stronger labour 
force attachment. In addition, for the subset of workers who commit 
themselves to the labour market, benefit claimants search more 
extensively. The harder an unemployed worker searches, the greater the 
likelihood of locating a job vacancy and the higher the probability of 
gaining employment, for a specified level of worker choosiness. It is of 
course possible that benefits simultaneously affect the reservation 
wage, an issue addressed by numerous authors in earlier studies. Rather, 
chapter 4 sought to highlight the ways in which unemployment benefit can 
encourage, as opposed to discourage, the movement of unemployed workers.
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We also uncovered evidence of an additional interaction between 
mobility and unemployment entering through the depressing effect of 
adverse economic conditions on search effort. The higher the level of 
unemployment, the fewer job search methods used by the unemployed. This 
complements the results of chapter 3. A reduction in job availability 
leads to an entrenchment of search effort.
The labour market is determined by continuous dynamic movements. The 
final two chapters were concerned with attempts to identify aspects of 
labour mobility that would ordinarily be denied in an analysis of 
conventional LFS data. We therefore constructed a two period 
longitudinal dataset by matching a sub-set of individuals interviewed 
in both the 1983 and 1984 surveys. This considerably expands our 
capability of investigating dynamic labour market issues in Britain. We 
are now able to determine the effects of previous environment and 
actions on current status in a more detailed and efficient manner. 
Despite difficulties with the randomness of the sample (we exclude the 
more mobile members of the population), the potential benefits for 
continued use of this dataset, and others similarly constructed over 
different time periods, are obvious. Future work will follow on from the 
studies presented here.
Chapter 5 made advantage of the present dataset to study the 
movement of workers across the states of employment, unemployment and 
inactivity. Using a broad Markovian framework, it was possible to 
estimate gross and individual annual probabilities of transition between 
these states. Whilst we are unable to account for the possibility of 
multiple transitions over our sample period, our results indicated the 
degree of mobility in the labour market. Over 4 million individuals can 
be expected to change status within a year. The probability of
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transition was shown to vary substantially across demographic groups. 
Differential transition probabilities imply differential labour market 
problems for these groups. Over 80 per cent of prime age male 
unemployment inflow is caused by employment separation. Conversely, the 
majority of female and teenage unemployment was shown to be caused by 
difficulties of certain members of these populations in gaining 
employment having entered the labour force. Yet most women and teenagers 
face little difficulty in gaining employment. This suggests the 
existence of within-group heterogeneity.
Prime age and older men also face the greatest problem escaping 
unemployment. These conclusions were supported by the individual 
transition regressions. The results emphasised the dominance of 
heterogeneity over state duration influences. Since we estimated annual 
and not instantaneous transitions, we were unable to control for 
potential offsetting interactions of the explanatory variables on the 
alternative transition rates. Unemployment and inactivity outflows 
appear relatively impervious to state duration effects given observed 
heterogeneity. In contrast, state spell duration is the dominant 
influence on employment outflows. Human capital acquisition theories, 
which explain worker attachment to the employed labour force, do not 
appear to hold in reverse for the unemployed labour force. It should be 
stressed that these conclusions are very much specific to this dataset. 
Ideally we would require more precise information on the timing of any 
transition to deal with this question.
Chapter 5 did however confirm the results of earlier chapters, 
notably the effect of job search in encouraging mobility. The effect of 
unemployment benefit is however ambiguous once we control for the level 
of worker search effort. Though as chapter 4 stressed, the role of
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unemployment benefits is to promote search effort.
Chapter 6 also drew upon the longitudinal dataset to analyse annual 
job to job movements. This is an important area for study since these 
movements constitute the largest single labour force flow in any year. 
Only by indulging in job shopping can workers move into long-term 
productive employment. We demonstrated the high incidence of inter-firm 
mobility, particularly amongst workers early in their careers. Men can 
expect to hold 6 jobs and women 8 over their working lifetime. The
majority of these jobs are held only briefly as workers (and firms) 
sample the labour market.
We estimated that long-term employment relationships prevail in the 
British economy. Workers eventually move into jobs that can be expected 
to last 15 years on average, if male, and 7 years if female. Using the 
matched dataset we were able to show the dominance of job tenure over 
labour market experience, as proxied by age, in determining inter-firm 
mobility. This is consisitent with job-matching and firm-specific 
theories of turnover. The more valuable the match the less likely a 
separation. Job worth evolves over time. The ability to move into
long-term employment is denied by high levels of unemployment.
Inter-firm mobility varies pro-cyclically and is reduced in high 
unemployment regions at all tenure levels.
This thesis therefore ends with a similar result to that with which it 
began. We are led to conclude, from the evidence presented, that whilst 
the ability of labour mobility to act as an equilibriating mechanism in 
the allocation of human resources is undisputed, the opportunities for 
efficency enhancement appear to be diminished by high levels of
unemployment.
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